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The problem of multiagent learning (or MAL) is concerned with the
study of how agents can learn and adapt in the presence of other agents that are
simultaneously adapting. The problem is often studied in the stylized settings
provided by repeated matrix games. The goal of this thesis is to develop MAL
algorithms for such a setting that achieve a new set of objectives which have
not been previously achieved. The thesis makes three main contributions.
The first main contribution proposes a novel MAL algorithm, called
Convergence with Model Learning and Safety (or CMLeS), that is the first
to achieve the following three objectives: (1) converges to following a Nash
equilibrium joint-policy in self-play; (2) achieves close to the best response
when interacting with a set of memory-bounded agents whose memory size is
upper bounded by a known value; and (3) ensures an individual return that is
very close to its security value when interacting with any other set of agents.
vi
The second main contribution proposes another novel MAL algorithm
that models a significantly more complex class of agent behavior called Marko-
vian agents, that subsumes the class of memory-bounded agents. Called Joint
Optimization against Markovian Agents (or Joma), it achieves the following
two objectives: (1) achieves a joint-return very close to the social welfare max-
imizing joint-return when interacting with Markovian agents; (2) ensures an
individual return that is very close to its security value when interacting with
any other set of agents.
Finally, the third main contribution shows how a key subroutine of
Joma can be extended to solve a broader class of problems pertaining to
Reinforcement Learning, called “Structure Learning in factored state MDPs”.
All of the algorithms presented in this thesis are well backed with rigor-
ous theoretical analysis, including an analysis on sample complexity wherever
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A multiagent system [76] can be defined as a group of autonomous,
interacting entities sharing a common environment, which they perceive with
sensors and upon which they act with actuators. Multiagent systems are find-
ing applications in a wide variety of domains including robotic teams [65],
distributed control [69], data mining [73] and resource allocation [25]. They
may arise as the most natural way of looking at the system, or may provide
an alternative perspective on systems that are originally regarded as central-
ized. For instance, in robotic teams the control authority is naturally dis-
tributed among the robots [65]. In resource management, while resources can
be managed by a central authority, identifying each resource with an agent
may provide a helpful, distributed perspective on the system [25].
Although the agents in a multiagent system can be programmed with
behaviors designed in advance, it is often necessary that they learn new behav-
iors online, such that the performance of the agent or of the whole multiagent
system gradually improves. This is usually because the complexity of the en-
vironment makes the a priori design of a good agent behavior difficult or even
impossible. Moreover, in an environment that changes over time, a hardwired
1
behavior may often be inappropriate.
An alternative to hard wiring agents with a predefined behavior is to
allow them to adapt and learn new behavior online. This brings us to the
field of Reinforcement Learning (RL) [70]. An RL agent learns through inter-
action with its dynamic environment. At each time step, the agent perceives
the complete state of the environment and takes an action, which causes it to
transit to a new state. The agent receives a scalar reward signal that evaluates
the quality of this transition. Well-understood algorithms with good conver-
gence properties are available for solving the single-agent RL task (such as
Q-learning [74]).
However, several new challenges arise for RL in multiagent systems. In
a multiagent environment the learning agent must also adapt with the behavior
of other learning (and therefore non-stationary) agents in the environment.
Only then will it be able to coordinate its behavior with theirs, such that
a coherent joint behavior results. This non-stationarity poses the primary
challenge of learning in multiagent systems and comprises the main reason
that it is best considered distinctly from single agent RL. When some or all of
these entities are learning, especially about each other, we arrive at the field
of Multiagent Learning (or MAL for short).
MAL is often studied in the stylized settings provided by repeated ma-
trix games (normal form games) such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and
Rock-Paper-Scissors [56]. Repeated games of this type provide the simplest
setting that encapsulates many of the key challenges posed by MAL. Specifi-
2
cally, they abstract away the conventional notion of state (situatedness) and
allow one to focus purely on the impact of the agents’ actions on each other’s
outcomes, or utilities.
Such research on MAL in repeated games typically strives to develop
algorithms that can provably converge to following the optimal policy when
interacting with specific classes of other agents, along with decent performance
guarantees in self-play (interacting with other agents with the same behavior).
For example, there is a significant volume of prior work in MAL that proposes
algorithms that converge to following the optimal exploitation policy when
interacting with other stationary agents (agents who choose their actions from
a fixed distribution over their action space), while also converging to following
a Nash equilibrium [55] joint-policy in self-play [13, 27].
However, requiring that the other agents in the environment all be
stationary is quite restrictive. For one thing, it eliminates the possibility that
any of the other agents are themselves responding to the past actions of other
agents. In an attempt to address the above issue, there has been a growing
body of more recent work in MAL that focuses on learning in the presence of
memory-bounded adaptive agents, or simply memory-bounded agents, whose
policy is a (fixed) function of some historical window of past joint-actions
by all the agents [58, 59]. Though memory-bounded agents are restricted to
consulting only a fixed window of past joint-actions to decide their current
step action, they are still a step forward towards considering “fully adaptive
agents” that use the entire history of play to decide their actions.
3
The goal of this thesis is to develop MAL algorithms that achieve a new
set of goals which have not been previously achieved by any MAL algorithm.
Especially we are interested in modeling agents which are more complex than
memory-bounded agents. To that end we further extend focus to a particular
class of agent behavior that can be modeled as Markovian agents. We define
a Markovian agent to be one that chooses its actions as a (still fixed) function
of a set of discrete feature variables computed from the joint history of play.
Depending on the joint-action taken, the feature values transition in a Marko-
vian fashion on every time step. It so happens that memory-bounded agents
are indeed a special class of Markovian agents whose feature space is just the
set of joint-actions from a bounded history of play.
This thesis takes a significant step forward in the theory of MAL as it
introduces novel algorithms for modeling a comparatively more complex class
of agent behavior than has been modeled to date. Furthermore for all of our
main algorithms, we provide sample complexity bounds. 1
With this motivation in mind, the two main research questions that
this thesis answers are as follows:
• How can a group of agents learn to maximize their payoffs over time
when interacting repeatedly with another group comprised of Markovian
agents, whose policies are unknown?
• How can they achieve the above in efficient sample complexity?
1total number of actions taken to converge to the final desired behavior
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The second goal is very important as we do not just want our algorithms
to model and perform well against the set of Markovian agents, we also want
them to do so with a formal guarantee on the number of samples needed.
Next, we highlight the key contributions of this thesis.
1. Our first contribution concerns modeling memory-bounded agents. In
this regard we formally frame the problem as learning in an Adversary
Induced Markov Decision Process (or AIM for short): a general frame-
work for modeling Markovian agents. The concept of AIM is the founda-
tion upon which all of our modeling techniques are built. As part of this
contribution, we propose a couple of algorithms that utilize the AIM
framework to model memory-bounded agents, assuming their memory
size is known [19]. We also present empirical evidence of the effective-
ness of these algorithms by pitting them against certain representative
algorithms from the MAL and game theory literature. This contribution
is presented in Chapter 3.
2. Our second contribution builds on our first contribution and proposes
a novel multiagent learning algorithm called Convergence with Model
Learning and Safety (or CMLeS [20] for short) that in a multi-player
multi-action (arbitrary) repeated matrix game, is the first to achieve the
following three objectives:
• Convergence: converges to following a Nash equilibrium joint-policy
in self-play (when all the other agents are also CMLeS agents);
5
• Targeted Optimality against memory-bounded agents: achieves close
to the best response when interacting with a set of memory-bounded
agents whose memory size is upper bounded by a known value;
• Safety: achieves an individual return very close to its security value
when interacting with any other set of agents;
This contribution is presented in Chapter 4.
3. Our third contribution focuses on modeling Markovian agents which are
more general than memory-bounded agents and introduces another novel
MAL algorithm, called Joint Optimization against Markovian Agents (or
Joma for short), that achieves the following two objectives:
• Maximizes social welfare in the presence of Markovian agents: in
the presence of Markovian agents in the population, Joma provably
achieves a joint-return very close to the social welfare maximizing
joint-return (for the Joma agents). As stated earlier a Markovian
agent is one that decides on its next mixed action by consulting the
values of a set of discrete feature variables derived from the joint his-
tory of play. The feature vector values transition in a fashion such
that their values at time t + 1 depend only on their values at time
t and the joint-action taken at time t (Markov assumption, [60]).
Joma assumes prior knowledge of a set of possible features, called
the target set of features, some of which are assumed to character-
ize the unknown policy of the Markovian agent. Joma achieves its
6
objective of modeling the Markovian agents with the most concise
model (based on only the relevant features from the target set) via
efficient exploration and in the process remains sample efficient;
• Safety: achieves an individual return very close to its security value
when interacting with any other set of agents;
Along with a thorough theoretical analysis of Joma’s properties, we also
present some empirical results from the gamut test-bed demonstrating
its relative effectiveness compared to some of its peers from the MAL
literature. This contribution is presented in Chapter 5.
4. Our fourth contribution focuses on a special case scenario of a two player
repeated game against a Markovian agent. Here we propose a simplified
algorithm, called Targeted Opponent Modeler for Markovian Agents (or
Tomma for short), which is motivated from our findings while imple-
menting Joma. Tomma efficiently models and exploits a Markovian
agent in a two player repeated game setting. Again we assume prior
knowledge of a set of possible features (target set of features) some of
which are assumed to characterize the unknown policy of the Markovian
agent.
As our first test-bed for validating Tomma’s effectiveness , we introduce
a challenging new domain - The Surveillance Game. The game is de-
rived from the multi-robot patrol problem, a well-studied problem in the
robotics community, e.g. [1, 53]. As our second test-bed, we focus on The
7
Ticket Checking problem [42] which is inspired by a real life problem of
catching passengers who do not buy a ticket (or evaders) while traveling
on trains. For both of these domains, we pose the problem as learning in
the presence of a feature based adversary and show how Tomma models
and exploits patterns in the adversary’s behavior.
This contribution is presented in Chapter 6.
5. The fifth and final contribution of this thesis shows how our approach
of modeling Markovian agents generalizes to solving a broader class of
problems pertaining to the single agent RL setting, called “structure
learning in factored state MDPs (FMDPs)” [4, 30]. Structure learn-
ing is the problem of learning the unknown structures in the underlying
transition function of the FMDP from as few samples of online data as
possible. Leveraging from our approach of modeling Markovian agents,
we propose an alternative mechanism [21] of solving the structure learn-
ing problem that results in sample complexity bounds which compare
favorably with those provided by the existing approaches. We also em-
pirically show that our approach competes well with the current state-of-
the-art structure learning algorithm in certain representative benchmark
domains. This contribution is presented in Chapter 7.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
the background necessary to understand all of the technical contributions of
this thesis. Chapters 3 to 7 present all of our contributions as listed above.
8
Chapter 8 presents some related work and situates our research. Finally Chap-





Our objective is to devise learning algorithms that an autonomous
learning agent can use while functioning in a multiagent environment. In
order to achieve this objective, we pose the learning problem as a Reinforce-
ment Learning problem in a multiagent environment. Keeping in line with past
research, we use the canonical game theoretic framework of repeated matrix
games as our chosen multiagent environment.
This chapter serves two purposes. First, it reviews the concepts from
Reinforcement Learning and repeated matrix games that are necessary for fully
understanding the technical details of this thesis. Second, it establishes the
notation that we use throughout this thesis. We begin in Section 2.1 by intro-
ducing the concepts related to Reinforcement Learning. Then in Section 2.2
we present the concepts related to repeated matrix games.
2.1 Concepts pertaining to Reinforcement Learning
In the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework, an agent makes its
decisions as a function of a state signal which it receives from the environment.
A state signal can be of many forms, one that remembers the entire history
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of past sensations to one that remembers nothing. Ideally we prefer a state
signal that summarizes past sensations compactly, yet in such a way that all
relevant information is retained. Such a state signal that succeeds in retaining
all relevant information is said to be Markov, or to have the Markov property
(we define this formally below).
For example, a checkers position (the current configuration of all the
pieces on the board) would serve as a Markov state because it summarizes
everything important about the complete sequence of positions that led to it.
If an environment has the Markov property, then its one-step dynamics
enable us to predict the next state and expected next reward given the current
state and action. An RL task that satisfies the Markov property is called a
Markov Decision Process, or MDP [60]. If the state and action spaces are
finite, then it is called a finite Markov Decision Process (finite MDP).
Definition 1. Finite Markov Decision Process: A finite Markov Decision Pro-
cess is given by a tuple {S,A, T,R} where S is a finite set of states, A is a
finite set of actions available to a learner, T : S × A × S ′ 7→ [0, 1] is the tran-
sition function and R : S ×A 7→ ℜ is the bounded reward function. On taking
an action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S, the probability of transitioning to state s′ ∈ S
and the reward obtained are given by T (s, a, s′) and R(s, a) respectively.
A RL agent finds itself in a MDP and it has to choose actions in different
states to maximize the sum of rewards obtained. For that it needs to follow
11
a policy: a strategy of choosing actions at different states. The better the
policy, the higher is the sum of rewards obtained.
Definition 2. Policy: A policy is a stationary strategy for choosing an action
from a state in a MDP. A stationary strategy is one that produces an action
based on only the current state, ignoring the rest of the agent’s history. It can
be formally defined as a function from states to actions; π : S 7→ A.
Let UπT (s) and U
π(s) be the T -step expected return and the infinite-
horizon return respectively, from following a policy π when starting in state
s in a MDP. More formally let rt denote the expected reward at time step t





and Uπ(s) = limT→∞U
π
T (s) (2.1)
Following a policy in a MDP induces a Markov chain [60] on visited
states. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that for any fixed policy of a
MDP, the induced Markov chain is unichain [60]. We call such MDPs unichain
MDPs [47]. Before, we formally introduce the concept of unichain MDPs, we
need to introduce certain technical terminologies pertaining to MDPs.
Two states s1 and s2 communicate under a policy π if there is a positive
probability of reaching each state from the other. A state is recurrent under
a policy π if starting from that state, the probability of reaching that state
again is non-zero. A non-recurrent state is called transient. A recurrent class
of states is a set of recurrent states which also communicate with each other.
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A Markov chain is unichain if it has a single recurrent class of states along with
a set of (possibly empty) transient states. Then a unichain MDP is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 3. Unichain MDP: A MDP is termed unichain if every policy in
the MDP induces a unichain Markov chain, irrespective of the start state.
For example Figure 2.1(a) shows a unichain Markov chain induced by
following a specific policy in a MDP with two states s1 and s2. The policy is
to follow action a1 in both the states. Given that policy, the probability of
transitioning from s1 to s2 and the reward associated with that transition are
1 and 1000 respectively (denoted by 1,1000 in the figure). Similarly the prob-
ability of remaining in s2 and the associated reward are 1 and 1 respectively.
It is a unichain Markov chain as it has only one recurrent class of states {s2}
and one set of transient states {s1}.
On the contrary, for a multichain MDP, there exists at least one pol-
icy which leads to at least two recurrent classes of states along with a set of
(possibly empty) transient states. For example Figure 2.1(b) shows a multi-
chain Markov chain induced by following a specific policy in a MDP with three
states s1, s2 and s3. The policy is to follow action a1 in all the states. Given
that policy, the probability of transitioning from s1 to either of s2 or s3 and
the reward associated with that transition are 0.5 and 1000 respectively. The
probability of remaining in s2 and the associated reward are 1 and 1 respec-

















Figure 2.1: Examples of a unichain and a multichain MDP.
0 respectively. It is a multichain Markov chain as it has two recurrent classes
of states, namely {s2} and {s3}, and one set of transient states {s1}.
There are a number of interesting properties of unichain MDPs. Fore-
most among them is that for any policy, the infinite-horizon return from fol-
lowing that policy is independent of the start state and is a unique value. That
is to say that the limit in Equation 2.1 exists for all s and is a unique value.
For example in the unichain Markov chain from Figure 2.1(a), the infinite-
horizon return from both the states is 1. Whereas in the multichain Markov
chain from Figure 2.1(b), the infinite-horizon return from states s1, s2 and s3
are 0.5, 1 and 0 respectively. Restricting our attention to just unichain MDPs
simplifies our analysis while trying to compute an optimal policy for the MDP
(optimal policy defined below), as we do not need to worry about different
returns originating from different states. Note this is not a limitation of our
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approach, but just a simplifying assumption for the sake of analysis.1 Our
results naturally extend to multichain MDPs with just a small and necessary
change to the definition of best performance we can expect from our learning
algorithms.
Since the infinite-horizon return from all the states for a unichain finite
MDP is the same for a fixed policy π, we denote it by a unique value Uπ.
Henceforth whenever we refer to a MDP, we mean a unichain finite MDP.
Solving a RL task for a MDP means finding the optimal policy of the
MDP. For MDPs, we can precisely define an optimal policy as follows.
Definition 4. Optimal policy: A policy that achieves the highest infinite-
horizon return amongst all possible policies is the optimal policy. Let the op-
timal policy be π∗ and its infinite-horizon return be U∗. Then formally U∗
satisfies the following condition: ∀π 6= π∗, U∗ ≥ Uπ.
There are numerous algorithms for computing the optimal policy of a
MDP. Instead of presenting them in detail, we point the reader to [52] for
an excellent survey of these methods. For the purposes of understanding the
technical details of our algorithms, an in-depth knowledge of these algorithms
is not necessary. The knowledge of the fact that they do exist and can suc-
cessfully compute an optimal policy for a MDP is sufficient.
1A very common assumption in RL literature while dealing with MDPs in average reward
setting [47, 15, 52]
15
A special class of MDPs are factored state MDPs (FMDP for short) [36]
which exhibit a special structure in their state space and transition function.
To be more precise, they assume that both the state space and the transition
function can be factored into separate individual components.
Definition 5. Factored state MDP: A factored state MDP, is a finite MDP
where each state consists of n discrete factors. Formally S = {X1, . . . , Xi, . . . Xn}
where each Xi assumes a value in the discrete range D(Xi), called the domain
of Xi. Furthermore the transition function of the FMDP is also factored and
satisfies the conditional independence assumption. Let st+1(i) be the value
of factor Xi in state st+1. Let Ti,at(st, st+1(i)) be the probability of transi-
tioning to st+1(i) when action at is taken in state st. Then the conditional
independence assumption implies that the following holds: T (st, at, st+1) =
∏n
i=1 Ti,at(st, st+1(i)).
Since FMDPs are instances of MDPs, all concepts pertaining to MDPs
(namely the concept of policy, optimal policy and return) extend naturally to
FMDPs. For all of our contributions apart from contribution 5 (presented in
Chapter 7), the setting is the general MDP.
While seeking theoretical guarantees about the quality of the time av-
eraged return of a learning algorithm in a MDP after a finite number of steps,
we need to take into account some notion of the mixing times of policies in
the MDP. More formally, we need to understand the concept of the ǫ-return
mixing time [47] of a policy in a MDP.
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The standard notion of the ǫ-mixing time for a policy in a MDP quan-
tifies the smallest number T of steps required to ensure that the distribution
of visited states after T steps when following the policy is within ǫ of the sta-
tionary distribution induced by that policy where the distance between the
distributions is measured by max norm or some standard measure. ǫ is gen-
erally a small value between 0 and 1. In contrast to the ǫ-mixing time, the
ǫ-return mixing time only requires the expected return after T steps to ap-
proach the infinite-horizon return. The ǫ-return mixing time of π is defined as
follows.
Definition 6. ǫ-return mixing time: For an 0 < ǫ < 1, the ǫ-return mixing
time T of a policy π is the smallest T such that ∀T ′ ≥ T and ∀s, |UπT ′(s) −
Uπ|∞ ≤ ǫ.
2
In other words, once we have executed a policy π for at least T steps
where T is the ǫ-return mixing time of π, the expected return is always within
a bound ǫ of Uπ, irrespective of the start state.
This concludes our introduction of concepts pertaining to RL. We now
proceed to introduce the concepts pertaining to our chosen game theoretic
setting, namely repeated matrix games.
2||∞ is the max norm.
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2.2 Concepts pertaining to repeated matrix games
Game theory [56] is a method of studying strategic decision making.
More formally, it is the study of mathematical models of conflict and coop-
eration between intelligent rational decision makers. Game theory has been
extensively used over the years in diverse fields such as economics, political sci-
ence, logic and psychology. As the setting for our research, we focus on matrix
games: the simplest and most well-studied of all game theoretic frameworks.
Definition 7. Matrix game: A matrix game represents a scenario in which
n agents are interacting with each other by simultaneously selecting actions.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of actions available to all
the agents are the same, i.e., A1 = . . . = Ai = · · · = An = A. The payoff
received by an agent i in the interaction is determined by a utility function
over the agents’ joint-action, ui : A
n 7→ ℜ.
Definition 8. Bimatrix game: A bimatrix game is a special case of a matrix
game with just two agents.
Table 2.1 presents a couple of examples of famous bimatrix games with
two actions for each agent. An outcome is a set of payoffs for all agents
achieved as a result of a joint-action. Thus in Prisoner’s Dilemma when both
the agents play “cooperate”, the resultant outcome is (3, 3).
Definition 9. Repeated game: A repeated game is a setting in which the agents
play a matrix game repeatedly. While playing a repeated game each agent
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Table 2.1: Payoff matrices for Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken.
follows a policy to choose its action on each step. The general notion of a
policy for an agent in a repeated game is a function mapping each possible
history of play to a distribution over its actions (a.k.a mixed action). Formally
it is defined as follows: ∀k ≥ 0, π : Ank 7→ ∆A.3 An agent also achieves an
expected return from playing the repeated game as defined in Definition 10.
We say an agent i is playing a stationary policy if it plays the same
mixed action at every time step. Note, the concept of stationary policy for
a repeated game is different from the one pertaining to MDPs (Definition 2).
The former is completely stateless while the latter implies playing the same
action from a given state. Though we use the same terminology for both of
these scenarios, the one we refer to would be obvious from the context. A
stationary policy is called pure if it plays the same fixed action at every time
step; otherwise it is called mixed. The set of policies for all agents is called a
joint-policy.
One of our prime objectives is to pose the problem of learning the best
response while playing an agent in a repeated game, which is either memory-
3∆A means a distribution over A.
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bounded or Markovian, as learning an optimal policy in a MDP. In such sce-
narios, the utility function of the matrix game serves as the reward function
of the MDP. Whereas the unknown policy of the other agent determines the
state space and the transition function of the MDP. We make these connec-
tions more explicit when we introduce the concept of Adversary Induced MDP
in Definition 17.
Definition 10. Expected return: In a repeated game, when all the other agents
follow their own share of a joint-policy, an agent i by following its own share





over those T steps. rt is i’s expected payoff at time t from following πi given
that all the other agents are following their own share of the joint-policy.
Definition 11. Joint-return and social welfare: At any particular time step,
the set of individual expected returns for all the agents playing a repeated game
is called the joint-return on that time step. The sum of the elements of a joint-
return is the social welfare (SW) value of that joint-return. More formally at




t is the social
welfare.
For example in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Table 2.1(a)), when
both the agents keep playing “cooperate”, the resultant joint-return at any
particular time step has a social welfare value of 6.
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A very crucial solution concept pertaining to learning in repeated games
is the Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) [55].
It is a joint-policy where no agent gains by unilaterally deviating to follow a
different policy. In other words, if each agent chooses a policy and no agent
benefits by changing its own policy unilaterally, then the corresponding joint-
policy constitutes a Nash equilibrium joint-policy.
The most popular form of Nash equilibrium is the single stage Nash
equilibrium. It is a stationary joint-policy that serves as a Nash equilibrium
of both the single stage (the matrix game played just once) and the repeated
game (when played repeatedly in every stage). It is a stationary joint-policy
because each agent’s policy is independent of the history of interactions so
far and fixed for every time step. Formally a single stage Nash equilibrium is
defined as follows. Let the set of all possible stationary policies for i be Πi,
while that of the other agents be Π−i.
Definition 12. Single stage Nash equilibrium (NE): Assume that all agents
are following a stationary joint-policy. Let agent i’s share of the stationary
joint-policy be πi while the rest of the agents’ share be π−i. Let U
πi be i’s




(ui(ai, a−i)). We call this stationary joint-policy a
single stage Nash equilibrium if for all such i’s, the following inequality holds:
∀π
′
i ∈ Πi, π
′




For example in Prisoners Dilemma (Table 2.1(a)), the single stage NE
for each agent is to play “defect”. Once an agent plays “defect”, there is no
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incentive for the other agent to deviate from playing “defect”. Similarly the
single stage NE in Rock-Paper-Scissors (R-P-S) (Table 2.2) is for each agent
to play each action with probability 1/3. Henceforth whenever we refer to a
NE joint-policy, we mean the single stage NE joint-policy.
Often NE is a very hard solution concept to achieve primarily because of
the difficulty of computing one for arbitrary matrix games. In such scenarios,
we are often concerned with what the agent can achieve on its own as the best
of all worst case scenarios. That leads us to the concept of security value for
an agent in a matrix game. A security value (aka maximin value) for an agent
is the maximum expected payoff it can guarantee on every time step regardless
of the policies the other agents use.
Definition 13. Security value: The security value SVi for an agent i is the
expected payoff it can guarantee on every time step regardless of the policies








A stationary policy that guarantees the security value is called the
safety policy. A safety policy for an agent can be computed through a simple
linear program by solving Equation 2.2. For example in R-P-S (Table 2.2),
playing each action with probability 1/3, guarantees an expected return of 0
to an agent, regardless of the policy the other agent uses.
As a starting point achieving the security value is a reasonable solution
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rock paper scissor
rock (0, 0) (-1,1) (1,-1)
paper (1,-1) (0, 0) (-1,1)
scissor (-1,1) (1,-1) (0, 0)
Table 2.2: Payoff matrix for Rock-Paper-Scissors.
concept, but often a better return is achievable, especially when the other
agent(s) exhibit limitations that can be modeled and exploited.
In practice, the other agent(s) may have unknown policies and may
themselves be adapting. Ideally, we would like to develop algorithms that are
guaranteed to perform “optimally” (yield maximal expected return) against
any possible set of agent policies. However the prospect of doing so is limited
by a variant of the No Free Lunch theorem [75]: any algorithm that tries to
maximally exploit some class of agent policies can itself be exploited by some
other class.
However, if one is willing to restrict the class of possible other agents
to some finite set of policies, it is possible to develop learning algorithms that
are guaranteed to perform well against agents drawn from this set. This thesis
is concerned with modeling two such classes of agents: memory-bounded and
Markovian. The class of Markovian agents subsume the class of memory-
bounded agents. We formally introduce these two classes of agent policies
next. But before we do that we introduce the concept of a bounded history.
Definition 14. Bounded history: A bounded history is a vector of length K
consisting of the past K joint-actions played by the agents. Formally we denote
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it by hK where K is the window size or length of the joint history. hK(j) is
the jth joint-action in the sequence hK where 0 ≤ j < K with hK(0) being the
most recent joint action. Similarly hKi (j) is the jth action played by agent i
in the sequence hK with hKi (0) being the most recent action played by i. The
bounded history at time t is denoted by hK,t.
We formally denote the set of all feasible bounded histories of size K as
HK. Note, while playing against a set of memory-bounded agents of memory
size K, not all bounded histories of size K are reachable. For example while
playing against an agent that never plays a specific action, it is impossible to
have any bounded history which has that agent playing that specific action.
Definition 15. Memory-bounded agent: A memory-bounded agent character-
ized by its memory size K chooses its next mixed action as a function of the
most recent K joint-actions played in the current history. Formally its policy
π is defined as π : HK7→ ∆A.
Memory-bounded agents occur frequently in the literature of repeated
games. For example the famous tit-for-tat policy [56] for playing repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma which leads to two rational agents coordinating by playing
“cooperate”, is a memory-bounded policy with memory size 1. The agent only
remembers the last action played by the other agent and repeats that in the
current time step.
Definition 16. Markovian agent: A Markovian agent decides on its next step
action by consulting the values of a set of features, denoted by F . A feature
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f ∈ F is a finite discrete valued statistic computed from the joint history
of play. Each such feature transitions in a fashion such that its value at time
t+1 depend only on the collective values of all the features and the joint-action
taken, both from time t (Markov property [60]).
Note that memory-bounded agents are a special case of Markovian
agents whose feature space is the set of joint-actions from a bounded history
of play. Below we present more examples. Henceforth for the introduction of
the remaining concepts, we assume that there are just two agents playing the
repeated game, where one of the agents is under our control and denoted by
i. The other agent and its unknown policy are o and πo respectively.
The setting is repeated R-P-S. Assume o plays each action randomly
unless i has chosen the same action on the last 5 consecutive plays, in which
case it plays the best response to that action. In this case πo can be represented
as a function of the past 5 actions played. But it can also be represented more
efficiently with just two features, namely the last action played by i and how
many consecutive times (up to 5) that action has been played. o is Markovian
because the next step values of these two features depend only on their most
recent values and the last action selected by i.
However, the concept of Markovian agents is far more general than plain
memory-bounded agents and captures agents whose policies are based on the
entire history of play. Consider the following example of two agents playing
the coordination game from Table 2.3. Assume o follows a coordination policy
25
Heads Tails
Heads (1, 1) (0,0)
Tails (0,0) (1, 1)
Table 2.3: Payoff matrix for coordination game.
which is as follows. If the number of times i played action “Heads” over the
entire history of play is even, then play “Heads”, else play “Tails”. πo can
easily be modeled with just one boolean feature, namely whether the number
of times i played “Heads” over the entire history of play is even or not. o
is Markovian because the next step value of this feature depends only on its
most recent value and the last action selected by i.
The key insight enabling our research is that in a scenario where o
is either memory-bounded or Markovian, the dynamics of playing against o
can be modeled as a MDP. We illustrate this with the example of o being a
memory-bounded agent with memory size K. Similar analogies can be drawn
for the case when o is Markovian. Then the dynamics of playing against o
can be modeled as a MDP whose transition probabilities and reward function
are determined by πo. That is for a bounded history of play (a “state”) h
K,t,
the next state hK,t+1 and the reward received are determined by the current
state hK,t, o’s policy for that specific state πo(h
K,t), and the action ai chosen by
agent i at time step t. We call such a MDP an Adversary Induced MDP [8, 19].
Definition 17. Adversary Induced Markov decision process (AIM): An Ad-
versary Induced MDP characterized by a memory size K is defined as follows,
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State Space: The state space is HK; the set of all feasible bounded histories
of length K.
Action Space: The action space is A; the set of actions available to agent i.
Transition Function: The bounded history (state) is updated as a sliding win-
dow. Transitioning from a state hK,t to a state hK,t+1 is just keeping the
last K − 1 joint-actions (each shifted one time step backwards) and in-
cluding the latest pair at index 0 of the vector. Let the latest joint-action
in hK,t+1 be (ai, ao). Then the probability with which this transition hap-
pened is πo(h
K,t, ao): the probability with which o plays action ao given
the current state is hK,t.
Reward Function: The reward obtained by i when it takes action ai in state
hK,t and o plays an action ao ∼ πo(h
K,t) (‘∼’ means drawn based on
πo(h
K,t)) is ui(ai, ao).
Consider the following example of an AIM. In R-P-S assume o is a
memory-bounded with K = 1. Let the current state be (R,P ), meaning that
on the previous step, agent i selected R and o selected P . Assume that from
that state, o’s policy is to play actions R,P and S with probability 0.25, 0.25,
and 0.5 respectively. When i chooses to take action S in state (R,P ), the
probabilities of transitioning to states (S,R), (S, P ) and (S, S) are then 0.25,
0.25 and 0.5 respectively. Transitions to states that have a different action


























for state (R,P) and action S
Opponent Strategy
Figure 2.2: Example of the partial transition function for state (R,P)
transitions to state (S,R), (S, P ) and (S, S) are -1, 1 and 0 respectively. Thus,
both the transition and the reward functions follow the Markovian dynamics
and are completely determined by the unknown πo.
By modeling the interaction dynamics as an AIM, we can find the
optimal policy of playing against o (best response) by solving for the optimal
policy of the AIM. If πo were known, then we could compute the optimal
policy via Dynamic Programming (using techniques such as Value Iteration).
However, since we assume that πo is unknown, we need to solve for the optimal
policy of the MDP using online Reinforcement Learning methods: a key goal
of the learning algorithms presented in this thesis.
As suggested earlier, we assume that the induced AIM is a unichain
MDP. In that case, we need not worry about different returns originating from
different states while following a policy. Also, it is important to realize that
there exist Markovian agents which do not allow convergence to the optimal
policy of the induced MDP once a certain set of moves has been played. For
example, the grim-trigger agent in Prisoner’s Dilemma plays “cooperate” at
first, but then plays “defect” forever once the other agent plays “defect” even
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once. Grim-trigger is Markovian because its policy is based on only one Marko-
vian boolean feature: whether the other agent ever played “defect”. There is
no way of detecting its policy without defecting, after which it is impossible
to recover to the optimal policy that leads to mutual cooperation. Thus, in
our analysis we constrain the class of Markovian agents to include only those
which do not negate the possibility of convergence to optimal exploitation,
given any initial sequence of exploratory moves.
That concludes our introduction of concepts pertaining to RL and re-
peated matrix games. The above alluded concepts are sufficient for under-
standing most of the technical contributions of this thesis. We reserve a small
amount of notation of local relevance for later chapters.
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Chapter 3
Learn or Exploit in Adversary Induced
Markov Decision Processes
Our overarching goal is to model agent policies which are common in
day to day life and are exploitable. A natural form of such an agent policy
is a memory-bounded one where the agent only remembers a finite number of
past samples of data to decide on its current action.
There are three reasons which motivate us to consider a memory-
bounded agent as a candidate agent behavior for our learning algorithms to
model and exploit. First, memory-bounded behavior is quite prevalent in
day to day life. For example, often while deciding whether we should visit a
restaurant or watch a movie pertaining to a particular director, our decision
is guided by our most recent experiences from having performed that action.
Second, in practice every agent has a finite memory. For example if an agent
is a computer, its memory is limited by its primary and secondary storage ca-
pacity. Third and most importantly, despite how restrictive it might appear,
a large set of agents from both the game theory and MAL literature are in
fact memory-bounded. Common examples include Godfather [68], polynomial
Nash policy [51] and Bounded Fictitious Play [61]. Furthermore, if we consider
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agents whose future behavior depends on the entire history, we lose the ability
to (provably) learn anything about them in a single repeated game, since we
see a given history only once. The concept of memory-boundedness limits the
agent’s ability to condition on history, thereby giving us a chance to learning
its policy online.
Motivated by these observations, there is a large amount of literature
that attempts to model memory-bounded agents [8, 58, 59]. This chapter
introduces a new algorithm that adds to that list called Learn or Exploit in
Adversary Induced Markov Decision Processes (or LoE-AIM for short) that
models any agent that can be treated as a memory-bounded agent with a fixed
memory size, in a bimatrix game. LoE-AIM makes no prior assumptions
about the other agent apart from the fact that it is memory-bounded with a
fixed memory size and its memory size is known. We relax this assumption in
Chapter 4 where we present a learning algorithm that is unaware of the exact
memory size of the other agent, but only a very loose upper-bound of it. In
repeated play, LoE-AIM either explores and gathers new information about
the other agent or converges to the best response to its partially learned policy.
LoE-AIM is fully implemented with results in this chapter demonstrating its
superiority over representative algorithms from the literature.
Though memory-boundedness is a stricter assumption than we ulti-
mately want, we relax this assumption in Chapter 5 and onwards where we
deal with modeling Markovian agents. Focusing first on this restrictive case al-
lows us to lay the framework for the algorithms that follow later. The chapter
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is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces LoE-AIM, Sections 3.2 and 3.3
presents empirical results demonstrating the performance of LoE-AIM in rep-
resentative bimatrix games and against representative agents, and Section 3.4
summarizes the chapter.
3.1 LoE-AIM
Our focus is on modeling memory-bounded agents as ones which induce
a Markov Decision Process (MDP) according to the Adversary Induced MDP
(AIM) model (See Definition 17 from Chapter 2). By this model the learner
finds itself in a MDP whose state space is the set of all feasible bounded his-
tories and whose transition and reward functions are determined by the other
agent’s policy. This section introduces LoE-AIM, our learning algorithm
for the AIM setting. We present two versions of LoE-AIM: one tailored to
model memory-bounded agents which play deterministically and the other for
memory-bounded agents which play stochastically. The former can be used if
we are certain that the other agent is deterministic. If not, the latter should
be used. In both the versions, we assume that K is the true memory size
of the other agent and LoE-AIM is aware of it. Henceforth we denote the
other memory-bounded agent as o and its policy as πo (see Definition 15 from
Chapter 2), while the agent under our control as i.
Algorithm 1 presents the version of LoE-AIM for modeling determin-
istic agents. The algorithm takes as input the current model of πo (denoted
as π̂o), the current start state of the AIM (denoted as “s” in Algorithm 1; ini-
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tial K sized bounded history) and the number of episodes for which it should
continue learning. To begin with, π̂o refers to some partially learned model
if it exists. If the algorithm has no prior information about o, π̂o comprised
of zero mappings. All the results presented in this chapter assume that there
exists no such partial model and LoE-AIM learns from scratch.
Since πo is deterministic, just one visit is needed to a state of the AIM
to know what is o’s policy for that state. The Solve-Aim function finds a
control policy (πi) by solving for the optimal policy of the AIM assuming that
for every known state s of play, o plays π̂o(s) and for all unknown states, o
plays the maximax policy for i (a friendly policy that maximizes the maximum
payoff for i).
For example in PD (Table 3.1(a)), the maximax policy for o is to play
“cooperate”. i can then play “defect” and achieve the maximum payoff of
4. Similarly in Chicken (Table 3.1(b)), the maximax policy for o is to play
“swerve”. i can then play “bully” and achieve the maximum payoff of 4. In
Rock-Paper-Scissors, the maximax policy can be playing any of the actions
with probability 1. There always exists an action that beats the chosen action
resulting in the maximum payoff of 1.
This optimism under uncertainty assumption for unknown states forces
πi to explore states not visited before. Whenever a new state s is visited
for the first time, the Update-Model method updates the current model π̂o
with the new information: what o plays for s. The Update-History method








ao ← action taken by agent4
ai ← action as per πi5
if s not visited before then6
π̂o ← Update-Model(π̂o, s, ao)7
πi ← Solve-Aim(π̂o)8
s ← Update-History(s, ai, ao)9
episode ← episode + 1;10
until episode < episodes11
end
joint-action.
Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1 except now πo can be stochastic.
In this case, i maintains a stochastic model of πo. The only structural differ-
ence from Algorithm 1 is when and how the model π̂o is updated (Line 6 of
Algorithm 2). Algorithm 2 updates the model when any state s gets visited
for the m’th time. The updated model now captures o’s policy for state s (i.e.,
π̂o(s)) which is just the empirical distribution of o’s play for state s based on
the first m samples of data, i.e., first m visits to s. All results in this chapter
use m = 10, the value that led to the best results in informal preliminary
testing.
It follows that in repeated play LoE-AIM either converges to the opti-








ao ← action taken by agent4
ai ← action as per πi5
if s visited m times then6
π̂o ← Update-Model(π̂o, s, ao)7
πi ← Solve-Aim(π̂o)8
s ← Update-History(s, ai, ao)9
episode ← episode + 1;10
until episode < episodes11
end
model. Let π̄o be the remainder of πo that needs to be learned at a particular
time instant, while π̂o refers to the part of πo that i knows. By solving for
a control policy where for every state in π̄o, i believes that it could get the
best possible reward (since it assumes that o plays the maximax policy for
i at those states and hence i gets the maximum reward of the matrix game
for those states), the algorithm generates πi that promotes exploring states in
π̄o. However there exists a probability that LoE-AIM might get stuck in a
sub-space of the AIM from where certain other states are not reachable (due
to πo), or reachable with a very low probability. In those cases, it converges
to the best policy pertaining to the partially learned model. This exploratory
aspect of LoE-AIM is motivated in part by the Rmax algorithm [15] which
also deliberately balances exploitation with exploration of unvisited states.
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3.2 Results against deterministic agents
This section presents the results achieved by LoE-AIM (deterministic
version) against certain deterministic agents, namely k-Markov agents such as
Godfather [68], Bully [68] and Best Response (BR). We begin by introducing
these policies.
Godfather is a finite-state policy that makes the other agent i an offer
that it cannot refuse. It strategizes as follows. First it chooses a targetable
pair. A targetable pair is a stationary pure joint-policy which assures a payoff
greater than the security value for each agent. We only focus on games where
such a targetable pair exists. Then if i plays its half of the targetable pair on
time step t, Godfather plays its half in time step t + 1. Otherwise, it plays
the minimax policy (threat) that forces i to achieve at most its security value.
So there remains no incentive for i not to play its own share of the targetable
pair which ensures it a return greater than its security value. Godfather is
a memory-bounded agent with memory size 1, i.e., K = 1. For example in
the case of PD (Table 3.1), Godfather targets the {“cooperate”, “cooperate”}
pair and uses “defect” as the threat policy. We now introduce a couple of
variations of the Godfather policy that are tailored for K > 1.
• Godfather-lenient plays its part of a targetable pair if i played its own
half of the pair at least once within the last K time steps. Otherwise
Godfather-lenient punishes i by playing the threat policy that reduces










Table 3.1: Payoff matrices.
• Godfather-strict is a stricter version that punishes i if i ever deviated
from the targetable pair during the past K time steps.
Bully is a pure stationary policy given by argmaxao∈Auo(a
∗
i , ao) where
a∗i = argmaxai∈Aui(ai, ao). Bully optimizes its payoff by assuming that i is
the follower and will adapt accordingly. Thus in PD, the Bully policy is to
play “defect”. i which follows adjusts accordingly and plays “defect”, as that
ensures it the highest payoff. Similarly in Chicken (Table 3.1), the Bully
policy is to always play “bully”. i which follows adjusts accordingly and plays
“swerve”, as that ensures it the highest payoff. Bully is a stationary policy
with K = 0.
BR is a best response policy that computes the empirical distribution
of i’s actions over the past K time steps, and plays best response to it. So
in Chicken, if the i played “swerve” more than “bully” over the past K time
steps, the BR policy is to play “bully”, and vice versa.
Now we present results which show that LoE-AIM exploits all of the
above agents without knowing their identity a priori. Figure 3.1 shows the
results achieved by LoE-AIM in PD against the variations of the Godfather
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policies. For benchmarking purposes we also present results from self-play
(the Godfather policies playing against each other). The results presented in
Figure 3.1 are for K = 3. We ran 30 runs of each setting with random instan-
tiations of the start state, i.e., start state for LoE-AIM and the godfather
policies. LoE-AIM converges to the optimal exploitation policy in each of
the runs.
Against Godfather-strict, LoE-AIM eventually learns that it should
play “cooperate” (its half of the targetable pair) and hence converges to a
payoff of 3 (see Figure 3.1(a)). For Godfather-lenient, LoE-AIM learns to
optimally exploit by playing “cooperate” frequently enough so that the history
always contains one “cooperate” action for i. At convergence, the LoE-AIM
player plays “defect” twice followed by a cooperate ensuring two consecutive
payoffs of 4 followed by a payoff of 3 (Figure 3.1(b) shows the plot for one such
run).
In PD, both the Bully and BR policy is to play “defect” always. Against
both of these agents, LoE-AIM eventually learns to play “defect” and con-
verges to a payoff of 2 (see Figure 3.2).
3.3 Results against stochastic agents
We now present results of LoE-AIM (stochastic version) learning against
popular MAL algorithms that converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. Our
results are against Wolf-Iga [13] and Redvaler [9]. We refer the reader
to the respective citations for the details of these algorithms. An important
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point worth noting about these algorithms is that neither is memory-bounded
and instead each uses the entire history of interactions to decide their current
mixed action. However, our results show that even for K = 4, LoE-AIM can
efficiently model these agents and exploit them optimally in certain games.
Once again all our results are averaged over 30 runs. For LoE-AIM, the start
state is chosen randomly for each of these runs. The learning rates used for
Wolf-Iga are 0.08 and 0.04, while that for Redvaler is 0.05.
Figure 3.3 gives evidence that LoE-AIM was successful in reaching its
optimal payoff in Chicken (Table 3.1(b)) by exploiting the MAL agents on both
the occasions. The reason we choose Chicken is because the game has three
Nash equilibria: two in pure policies, sustaining the outcomes (4,2) and (2,4),
and one in mixed policies where the players play each of their actions with
equal probability with the corresponding expected payoff of 2.5 for each agent.
Neither Wolf-Iga, nor Redvaler guarantees the possible final converged
Nash outcome in self-play, e.g, in both Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b), self-play
between these MAL algorithms generates a payoff much less than 4 showing
that on numerous occasions the final converged Nash outcome was not (4,2),
the one most coveted by i. In contrast, in all of its runs, LoE-AIM converged
to the outcome (4,2). The difference in the total payoff accrued by LoE-
AIM and the MAL algorithms after 350 episodes of learning is statistically
significant by a T-test (p-value < 0.05).
Finally Figure 3.5 shows an evaluation of head to head comparison
amongst the various agent policies discussed in this chapter. There are 78
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structurally distinct bimatrix games with two actions for each player in which
the two players can strictly rank the four outcomes from best to worst (a
ranking from 4 to 1). Of the 78 games, only 6 games (shown in Figure 3.4)
have multiple Nash equilibria with each player favoring a different one. We
present results from these games because in self-play neither of the tested MAL
algorithms (Wolf-Iga and Redvaler) guarantee the final converged Nash
outcome. Each point in the plot has been averaged over results achieved from
all the 6 games, with the results in each game averaged over 30 runs.
For benchmark comparisons, we show head to head results achieved by
various other algorithms that i could have used as its default policy instead of
LoE-AIM. Figure 3.5 shows that against the MAL algorithms (Redvaler and
Wolf-Iga) and BR, LoE-AIM (stochastic version) successfully converges to
its best payoff of 4 on all occasions thereby demonstrating its ability to exploit
them optimally. All the benchmarks generate lower average payoffs when
played against these agents. Against the other agents, LoE-AIM does better
than all the other benchmarks though the average payoff is lower than 4 in
these cases. Note, that against certain agents it is not possible to achieve the
payoff of 4 because it won’t allow that, e.g, against Godfather-strict in PD (see
Figure 3.1(a)). The difference in the average payoff accrued by LoE-AIM and




To summarize, our objective in this chapter was to introduce a simple
algorithm that can model a memory-bounded agent in a repeated bimatrix
game assuming it knows the agent’s memory size. Called LoE-AIM, it makes
no prior assumptions about the other agent apart from the fact that it is
memory-bounded with a fixed known memory size. In repeated play, LoE-
AIM either explores and gathers new information about the other agent or
converges to the best response to its partially learned policy. We also presented
empirical results demonstrating its superiority over representative algorithms
from the literature.
However there are three shortcomings of LoE-AIM. First, it assumes
that the true memory size of the agent is known beforehand. Second, the
guarantee it provides mostly relies on empirical testing, without a proper the-
oretical backing. Third, there are no guarantees of the quality of return it
achieves in self-play or against agents which are not memory-bounded with
a known memory size. Our next contribution (Chapter 4) addresses all of
these shortcomings. In Chapter 4 we introduce a novel multiagent learning
algorithm called CMLeS which achieves three crucial objectives, namely (1)
converges to a Nash equilibrium joint policy in self-play, (2) achieves close
to the best response against memory-bounded agents whose memory size is
upper-bounded by a known value and (3) achieves close to the security value




































Figure 3.1: Results against Godfather policies in PD with K = 3. Against
Godfather-strict, LoE-AIM eventually learns that it should play “cooperate”
(its half of the targetable pair) and hence converges to a payoff of 3. For
Godfather-lenient, LoE-AIM learns to optimally exploit by playing “cooper-



















Figure 3.2: Results against Bully and BR in PD with K = 3. Both the Bully
and BR policy is to play “defect” always. Against both of these policies,





































Figure 3.3: Results against Redvaler and Wolf-Iga in Chicken, K = 4.
Neither Wolf-Iga, nor Redvaler guarantees the possible final converged
Nash outcome in self-play, e.g, in both cases, self-play generates payoffs much
less than 4 showing that on numerous occasions the final converged Nash
outcome was not (4,2), the one most coveted by i. In contrast, in all of its
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Figure 3.4: Payoff matrices of 6 games with multiple Nash equilibria. ((1,1)
(0,0) (0.25,0.5)) means that the game has 3 Nash equilibria where the proba-




























Figure 3.5: Result against the 6 games with multiple Nash equilibria. Against
the MAL algorithms (Redvaler and Wolf-Iga) and BR, LoE-AIM suc-
cessfully converges to its best payoff of 4 on all occasions thereby demonstrat-
ing its ability to exploit them optimally. All the benchmarks generate lower
average payoffs when played against these agents. Against the other agents,
LoE-AIM does better than all the other benchmarks (though the average
payoff is lower than 4).
45
Chapter 4
Convergence, Targeted Optimality and Safety
in Multiagent Learning
In the previous chapter, we presented an algorithm LoE-AIM that
models memory-bounded agents assuming that the memory size of these agents
is known beforehand. In situations where such prior knowledge is unavailable,
a possible solution can be to use a very large memory size that suffices to
be a conservative upper-bound of the true unknown memory size. Lets call
this conservative estimate Kmax. Recall that in such a scenario, LoE-AIM
in the worst case requires visits to all bounded histories of size Kmax before it
can converge to following an exploitive policy. Since the number of bounded
histories of size Kmax is exponential in Kmax, this renders LoE-AIM highly
inefficient (and impractical) for modeling agents with a big Kmax. One of the
main goals in this chapter is to address this shortcoming of LoE-AIM and
propose an algorithm whose sample complexity scales exponentially with the
true memory size, not with the conservative upper-bound Kmax. This gives us
the freedom to choose a loose Kmax without having to worry about the sample
complexity of achieving close to the best response being adversely affected by
that.
46
In fact our overarching objective in this chapter is not just to solely fo-
cus on modeling memory-bounded agents. In the true spirit of MAL, we seek
some guarantee against any possible set of agents playing the repeated game.
In this regard, the contribution of this chapter (the first big contribution of
this thesis) is a novel MAL algorithm called Convergence with Model Learning
and Safety (or CMLeS for short)1 that for a multi-player multi-action (arbi-
trary) repeated game, achieves the following three objectives (the first in the
literature to do so):
Convergence [13]: converges to following a Nash equilibrium joint-policy in
self-play (other agents are also CMLeS);
Targeted optimality [59]: achieves close to the best response with a high
probability, against a set of memory-bounded agents whose memory size
is upper-bounded by a known value Kmax;
Safety [32]: achieves close to the security value against any other set of agents
which cannot be represented as being Kmax memory-bounded;
CMLeS improves upon the state-of-the-art MAL algorithm for model-
ing memory-bounded agents, called Pcm(A) [59], in the following two ways.
1. The only guarantee of optimality against memory-bounded agents that
Pcm(A) provides is against the ones that are drawn from an initially
1pronounced as “seamless”;
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chosen target set. In contrast, CMLeS can model any memory-bounded
agent(s) whose memory size is loosely upper-bounded by Kmax. Thus it
does not require a target set of agents as input: its only input in this
regard is Kmax;
2. Once convinced that the other agents are not self-play agents, Pcm(A)
achieves targeted optimality against memory-bounded agents by requir-
ing that all feasible bounded histories of size Kmax be visited a sufficient
number of times. Kmax for Pcm(A) is the maximum memory size of
any agent from its target set.
For CMLeS, Kmax serves to be a conservative upper-bound of the true
memory size (say K). To achieve targeted optimality, requiring visits to
all feasible bounded histories of size Kmax may be very wasteful if K is
significantly smaller than Kmax. Our key theoretical result concerning
CMLeS shows that it achieves targeted optimality by requiring a suffi-
cient number of visits to only all feasible bounded histories of size K. In
that way CMLeS is much more sample efficient than Pcm(A).
We are going to introduce CMLeS in two parts. In the first part, we
introduce a subroutine of CMLeS called MLeS that ensures targeted optimal-
ity against memory-bounded agents and safety against any other set of agents.
Then we are going to build on MLeS to propose the fully blown CMLeS al-
gorithm that achieves convergence as well. The remainder of the chapter is
organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents MLeS, Section 4.2 presents the fully
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blown CMLeS algorithm, Section 4.3 presents some empirical results while
Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter.
4.1 Model Learning with Safety (MLeS)
In this section, we introduce an algorithm, Model Learning with Safety
(MLeS for short), a sub-routine of CMLeS that ensures targeted optimality
against memory-bounded agents and safety against any other set of agents.
Assume a repeated game between MLeS and a set of other agents. MLeS
then achieves the following two objectives:
Targeted optimality: if these other agents are memory-bounded with their
memory size upper-bounded by Kmax, MLeS then achieves close to the
best response with a high probability;
Safety: achieves close to the security value against any other set of agents
which cannot be represented as being Kmax memory-bounded;
We begin by showing how MLeS achieves the targeted optimality ob-
jective. Let the MLeS agent (the agent under our control) be i and the set of
memory-bounded agents be a single agent o, with K and πo being its unknown
memory size and policy respectively.2 We assume that Kmax ≥ K. Also to
keep the analysis simple, we assume that the action space for o is just A.
2Note, a set of memory-bounded agents with a memory size K can be treated as a single
memory-bounded agent of the same memory size whose policy is just the joint-policy of all
the agents.
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We can always model πo by assuming that it is memory-bounded with
memory size Kmax. A model for πo is defined as follows.
Definition 18. Model: A model π̂k of πo is defined by a possible memory size
k ≤ Kmax and specifies a distribution over the action set A (mixed action) for
every feasible bounded history of size k, i.e., π̂k : Hk 7→ ∆A.
Note that modeling πo based on Kmax may involve learning over a much
larger state space than is necessary. Our goal is to model πo with the shortest
most descriptive model (the model pertaining to the true memory size K or
less).
MLeS is introduced in Algorithm 3. For the sake of clarity, we break
our algorithmic analysis of MLeS into five parts. First in Section 4.1.1, we
discuss the choice of the inputs for MLeS. Second in Section 4.1.2, we describe
how MLeS operates from a high-level. Third and fourth in Sections 4.1.3
and 4.1.4 we focus on MLeS’s two main algorithmic components: the Find-
Model algorithm and its action selection mechanism respectively. Finally
in Section 4.1.5, we remove a crucial assumption made in the aforementioned
four sections (namely Assumption 1 from Section 4.1.1) and complete our
specification of MLeS.
4.1.1 Inputs to MLeS
The inputs to MLeS are ǫ, δ, T and Kmax. Both ǫ and δ are small
probability values. T is the planning horizon explained in the next paragraph.
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A reader not interested in a deep theoretical understanding of MLeS may skip
the rest of this subsection and treat these inputs as free parameters. We devote
the rest of this subsection justifying the choice behind these input parameters
that facilitates our theoretical claims concerning MLeS.
MLeS operates by planning for T time steps at a time. In each such
planning iteration, it uses the best model of πo at hand and plans its actions
for the next T time steps based on it. Let U∗ be the expected return from the
best response against o, i.e., the optimal return achievable in the AIM induced
by πo. To facilitate the theory behind our claim that MLeS converges to
follow the best response against o, we assume that the (ǫ, T ) pair taken as
input always satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The planning horizon T is sufficiently large and the ǫ suffi-
ciently small to ensure that
1. T is the ǫ-return mixing time of the optimal policy for the AIM;
2. for any sub-optimal policy π and for any state s of the induced AIM,
UπT (s) < U
∗ − 2ǫ;
Another way of thinking of Assumption 1 is that if we achieve a T -step
expected return as high as U∗−2ǫ in the underlying AIM from any start state,
then we must be following the optimal policy for the AIM.
A pertinent question is whether for any set of memory-bounded agents
such an (ǫ, T ) pair exists or not. Let Û be the expected return in the AIM from
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the best sub-optimal policy. Lets choose an ǫ smaller than U
∗−Û
3
. Let T be the
maximum of all ǫ-return mixing times from all policies. Clearly this choice of
an (ǫ, T ) pair satisfies Assumption 1. Hence for any set of memory-bounded
agents, there exists an (ǫ, T ) pair that satisfies Assumption 1.
Our initial analysis caters to the special (and the more interesting)
case where we assume that MLeS is aware of such an (ǫ, T ) pair that satisfies
Assumption 1 (Sections 4.1.2 to ??). Later in Section 4.1.5, we show how a
simple extension of our solution for this special case solves the more general
problem where MLeS is unaware of such an (ǫ, T ) pair a-priori.
4.1.2 High level idea behind MLeS
This subsection provides the high level idea behind MLeS (Algorithm 3).
Since MLeS is unaware of the exact K that characterizes πo, it maintains a
model of πo for every 0 ≤ k ≤ Kmax. Thus it maintains Kmax + 1 models
in total. Let the model that is based on the past k joint-actions be π̂k. In-
ternally each π̂k maintains a value Mk(bk) which is the maximum likelihood
distribution of o’s play, for every possible value bk of the past k joint-actions.
Whenever the past k joint-actions assume a value bk in online play, we say a
visit to bk has occurred. π̂k(bk) is then defined as follows:
π̂k(bk) =
{
Mk(bk) once visit(bk) = mk
⊥ when visit(bk) < mk
(4.1)
where visit(bk) is the number of times bk has been visited and mk is a parame-
ter unique to each k. In other words, once a bk is visited mk times, we consider
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Algorithm 3: MLeS








τ ← τ + 1;8
t ← t + 1;9
until τ > T10
if t ≥ Tmax and actual return < SVi − ǫ then11
break;12





the estimate Mk(bk) reliable and assign π̂k(bk) to it. Henceforth we make no
updates to π̂k(bk) (for visit(bk) > mk). We discuss later (Equation 4.5) how
mk is chosen for each k. If a reliable estimate of Mk(bk) is unavailable (when
visit(bk) < mk), then π̂k(bk) is set to ⊥ (meaning “I don’t know”).
MLeS operates by planning for T steps at a time. The operations
performed by MLeS are as follows:
M1. Determine π̂best (Line 3). Almost in every planning iteration assign
the predictive model that best describes πo as π̂best by making a call to
Find-Model. However once in every ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉ planning iterations, assign
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π̂best by selecting randomly amongst the n + 1 models. The need of this
exploratory iteration would become obvious once we specify our action
selection mechanism in Section 4.1.4.
M2. Compute a stationary policy based on the π̂best returned and execute
it for the next T -steps (Lines 4 - 10). Note, a stationary policy in this
case refers to a policy that is stationary in the context of an AIM, i.e.,
playing a fixed action for each state which may differ for different states.
M3. If Tmax time steps have elapsed and the actual return is less than SVi−ǫ,
switch to following the safety policy forever (Lines 11-12 and 15-17).
Recall that SVi is the security value for agent i (Definition 13 from
Chapter 2). We specify how Tmax is computed in Section ??. The
purpose of this step is to satisfy the safety criterion of MLeS.
M4. Update all models based on the past T joint-actions (Line 13).
Note the better the model returned in Step M1, the higher is the return
accrued in Step M2. The main objective of Step M1 is then to consistently
return a π̂best which is a close approximation of πo. That brings us to the
concept of an ǫ-approx model for πo.
Definition 19. ǫ-approx model: We call a model π̂ an ǫ-approx model of πo,
when for each feasible instantiation bK of a bounded history of size K (i.e.,
bK ∈ HK), the prediction made by π̂ is 6=⊥ and within a bound ǫ of πo(bK).
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In order to have a close approximation of πo, Step M1 relies on Find-
Model to return an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo. An
ǫ
T
-approx model of πo is
desired because the T -step expected return from following the optimal policy
pertaining to such a model is always within ǫ of the T -step expected return
from following the optimal policy pertaining to the true model πo [45]. We
next specify the details of Find-Model, the main algorithmic component of
MLeS.
4.1.3 Find-Model algorithm
Find-Model is the model selection algorithm running at the heart of
MLeS. Its objective is to output the best predictive model for πo from all
possible Kmax + 1 models maintained by MLeS.
Intuitively, all models of size ≥ K can learn πo accurately (as they
span over all of the past K joint-actions) with the bigger models requiring
more samples to do so. On the other hand models of size < K cannot fully
represent πo. From a high-level perspective, Find-Model operates by com-
paring models of increasing size incrementally to determine the shortest most
descriptive model such that all larger models cease to be more predictive of πo.
The next few paragraphs explain how Find-Model functions. A reader not
interested in deep technical details may directly skip to the paragraph before
Lemma 4.1.1, our main theoretical result concerning Find-Model. In short,
Lemma 4.1.1 specifies the sufficient condition on exploration that needs to be
satisfied for Find-Model to return an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo.
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Since our approach involves comparing models of different sizes, we
need some way of measuring how much they differ in their predictions. To
that end we use a metric ∆k.
Definition 20. ∆k: ∆k is the maximum difference in prediction between con-
secutive models of size k and k + 1. Let Aug(bk) be the set of all k + 1 length
bounded histories which have bk as the value of its first k joint-actions, and
any possible value for the k + 1’st joint-action. Then,
∆k = max
bk,bk+1∈Aug(bk))
||π̂k(bk) − π̂k+1(bk+1)||∞ s.t. π̂k+1(bk+1) 6=⊥. (4.2)
We will choose mk’s such that π̂k+1(bk+1) 6=⊥ will always imply π̂k(bk) 6=⊥.
If for all bk+1’s, π̂k+1(bk+1) =⊥, then by default ∆k is set to -1.
Find-Model is fully specified in Algorithm 4. Its key steps are as
follows.
S1. On every T -step planing iteration, for all 0 ≤ k < Kmax, compute ∆k
(using Equation 4.2) and σk. If ∆k = −1, then we assign σk = 1.
If ∆k 6= −1, then we assign σk as the tightest estimate satisfying the
following condition:
Pr(∆k < σk) > 1 −
δ
n + 1
∀k ≥ K (4.3)
By tightest we mean an estimate as close to ∆k as possible. In such a

















Nk denotes the number of bounded histories of size k. The complete
details on how we arrived at this is presented in Appendix A.1. Why
we require the error probability from Equation 4.3 to be δ
n+1
becomes
apparent in the following step.
S2. Find-Model then searches for that smallest value of k such that all the
subsequent ∆k’s are less than their corresponding σk’s (Lines 2 - 11 of
Algorithm 4). It then concludes that this smallest k is the true value
of K and returns π̂k as π̂best. Since for each k ≥ K, there is an error
probability of at most δ
n+1
with which the condition from Equation 4.3
may fail, the total error probability with which Find-Model selects a






Find-Model always selects a model of size at most K with a high
probability of at least 1 − δ.
It is important to note that although we compute a σk for every 0 ≤ k < Kmax,
Equation 4.3 is only guaranteed to hold for K ≤ k < Kmax. However, in the
early learning stages, Equation 4.3 may also hold for all k ∈ [k′, Kmax}, where
k′ < K. This is generally true when we have not explored enough to deduce
the relevance of all of the past K joint-actions. So initially Find-Model
may return sub-optimal models that are based on a shorter memory size than
K. However once sufficient exploration has occurred (as quantified in the
upcoming Lemma 4.1.1), then the model returned by Find-Model is always
an ǫ
T
-approx of πo with high certainty.
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Algorithm 4: Find-Model
for all 0 ≤ k < Kmax, compute ∆k and σk;1
for 0 ≤ k < Kmax do2
flag ← true;3
for k ≤ k′ < Kmax do4







We now state our main theoretical result concerning Find-Model,
namely Lemma 4.1.1. It states the sufficient condition on the exploration




πo, with a high likelihood. Complete details of all the calculations involved in
the proof are presented in Appendix A.2. Recall that Nk denotes the number
of bounded histories of size k, i.e., Nk is the size of Hk.
3







once every bK ∈ HK has been visited mK times, the π̂best returned by Find-
Model is of memory size at most K and an ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high
probability of at least 1 − 2δ.
3We use N to denote the size of the state space of the underlying AIM. As our notion of
AIM varies in different chapters depending on the other agents we are considering, so will
our notion of N . With slight abuse of notation, we redefine N for each different context of
an AIM.
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Lemma 4.1.1 gives us the condition that needs to be satisfied to ensure
that the π̂best returned by Find-Model is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo. However, it
says nothing about how MLeS should select its actions to ensure that this
condition is satisfied. Next we focus on its action selection mechanism (Step
M2) which ensures that the exploration condition from Lemma 4.1.1 holds.
4.1.4 Action selection
In order to ensure that the condition of visits specified in Lemma 4.1.1
is met as quickly as possible, MLeS uses an action selection mechanism based
on the model-based RL algorithm Rmax [15]. We begin with a brief summary
of how Rmax operates.
Rmax periodically computes a stationary policy by carefully balanc-
ing exploration and exploitation. The objective of the policy is to ensure
faster exploration of state-action pairs that have not been visited many times,
while ensuring a near optimal return if an accurate model of the MDP has
already been learned. To encourage exploration of state-action pairs that have
not been visited a sufficient number of times (say m), Rmax assigns an ex-
ploratory bonus to visiting that state-action pair. For state-action pairs that
have been visited m times, Rmax performs the conventional Dynamic Pro-
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gramming backup. The policy is recomputed every time a new state-action
pair is visited for the mth time.
There are two reasons why we choose Rmax as the RL algorithm for
our action selection mechanism. First, its propensity to visit less visited states
early in its learning stage is in line with our goal of achieving the necessary
visits to all the bK’s (as recommended by Lemma 4.1.1) as early as possible.
Second, it comes with a formal guarantee on the number of samples required to
satisfy this exploration, which in turn facilitates our sample complexity bound
for MLeS.
MLeS maintains a separate instance of Rmax for each of the possible
Kmax + 1 AIMs corresponding to the Kmax + 1 possible models of πo. At
any iteration of MLeS, let the π̂best returned by Step M1 be π̂k and the AIM
associated with it be Mk. MLeS then picks the stationary policy computed
from the Rmax instance associated with Mk to decide on the next T -step
actions. The policy for the Rmax instance can be computed using any of
the standard techniques, namely Value Iteration and Policy Iteration. MLeS
believes that k is the true value of K and hence attempts to explore all bk ∈ Hk
mk times to satisfy the condition of visits from Lemma 4.1.1. The policy
computed from the Rmax instance associated with Mk precisely helps it to
achieve that. However, there is a possibility that MLeS might get stuck at a
part of the state space where only some amongst the past K joint-actions are
truly active (it may not reach up to K). In that case, it might converge to
exploiting based on a sub-optimal model π̂k and the return may then be far
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below U∗.
In order to avoid that, once in every ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉ such T -step planning iter-
ations, MLeS computes the policy slightly differently. First, it chooses a k
randomly from 0 to Kmax. The goal in this iteration is to visit a new bounded
history of size k which has not been visited mk times. If such a visit is not
possible (maybe because all such bounded histories have already been visited
mk times or they are reachable from the current start state with a very low
probability), then exploit based on the current π̂best. The Rmax policy com-
putation is then as follows. Assume that the state space of the underlying
MDP comprised of all past Kmax joint-actions. First, for all states of the
MDP whose past k joint-actions have not been visited mk times, provide them
the exploratory bonus. For every other state use π̂best to perform the Bellman
back up. Note π̂best only concerns itself with the joint-actions that are within
its memory size and not on all of the past Kmax joint-actions. Henceforth for
future references, we call such a planning iteration as an exploratory iteration
while the former a greedy iteration.
Now due to these exploratory iterations, π̂K is chosen periodically as
the random model in these exploratory iterations. Eventually by the implicit
explore or exploit property of Rmax, it can be shown that at some exploratory
iteration where MLeS chooses π̂K as the random model, it must achieve an
expected return as high as U∗ − 2ǫ, with a high probability (since there are
only finitely many entries to explore). Then from Assumption 1, we know
that MLeS must be following the optimal policy, otherwise such a high return
61
would not have been possible. Thus MLeS has learned a decent enough model
of πo that yields the optimal policy. Henceforth in every greedy iteration, it
keeps exploiting based on this model and follows the optimal policy which
eventually leads to a near optimal return. Complete details of how the above
happens is presented in Appendix A.3 as the proof of the upcoming Lemma,
our main theoretical result concerning MLeS.
Lemma 4.1.2. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, with a high probability
of at least 1 − 4δ, MLeS achieves an actual return ≥ U∗ − 5ǫ against any


















, Kmax, NK, |A| and T .
Note our sample complexity bound is a worst case bound. Against
most practical agents, MLeS will likely converge to near optimal behavior in
far fewer samples (as shown in our results section, Section 4.3).
The computational complexity of MLeS for every planning iteration
comprises two parts. The first part arises from Find-Model, while the latter
from the action selection step. Find-Model takes an order of O(K2max) com-
putations on each planning iteration. For the action selection step, we need to
solve a MDP. Hence the computational complexity for this step is equivalent
to that of any MDP solver, such as Value Iteration.
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This concludes our discussion on how MLeS achieves targeted opti-
mality against memory-bounded agents when Assumption 1 is satisfied. Next
we show how Assumption 1 can be removed.
4.1.5 Removing Assumption 1
Our methodology follows the same line of reasoning as used by Rmax
when it attempts to achieve a near optimal return in a MDP in polynomial
sample complexity in cases where it is unaware of its desired planning horizon
T . We first discuss how Rmax does so.
Let P (T ′) denote the number of samples required by Rmax to achieve
a near optimal return when the value of the planning horizon is T ′. P (T ′) is
polynomial in T ′, the size of the state and action space of the MDP (namely the
size of the MDP), as well as other relevant parameters. Being unaware of T ,
Rmax then repeatedly runs itself in restarts with incremental values of T , i.e.,
it first runs with T = 1, then with T = 2, and so forth. Whenever P (T ′) time
steps have elapsed since it started running with a planning horizon T ′, it stops
and restarts with T ′ + 1. So eventually at some restart T ′ equals T and from
that run onwards it always accrues a near optimal return. Since
∑T
T ′=1 P (T
′) is
still polynomial in T , the size of the MDP and other relevant parameters, this
technique of running Rmax in restarts still preserves its desired polynomial
sample complexity property.
We use a similar technique when we lack a prior knowledge of a desired
(ǫ, T ) pair that satisfies Assumption 1. However there are a couple of subtle
63
distinctions worth noting. First, unlike the case of Rmax we are unsure of
the state space of the underlying AIM since we are unsure of the memory size.
Second, we are dealing with two unknown values, namely ǫ and T , as opposed
to just one for Rmax. Next we explain the modified MLeS that addresses
both of these problems with an emphasis on how it differs from the above
presented version of Rmax.
Again, let the true memory size of the memory-bounded agent be K,
where K ≤ Kmax. Our modified version of MLeS is very similar to Algo-
rithm 3 except it does without Lines 11-12 and 15-17: the part which caters
to achieving the safety criterion. In this case we achieve safety in a slightly
different fashion addressed later. The modified MLeS algorithm operates as
follows:
• We keep running Algorithm 3 (without the Lines 11-12 and 15-17) in
restarts with incremental values of T and decremental values of ǫ and δ.
Let the values for T , ǫ and δ on run i be Ti, ǫi and δi respectively. We
restart whenever Algorithm 3 has converged to a model and the number
of time steps elapsed since it has converged to that model is equal to
the sample complexity bound provided in Lemma 4.1.2. Note the latter
requires a value of K which we get from our converged model. In each
run i, Algorithm 3 always converges to a model that is at most of size
K with an error probability of at most δi (from Lemma 4.1.1).
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• Let Ti, δi and ǫi be assigned on the i’th run as follows:
Ti = 2






where δinit and ǫinit are small initial probability values. Thus the total







= δinit. So we have assured that our modified version
of MLeS (running Algorithm 3 in restarts) never ever operates on an
AIM that is of memory size > K, with a high probability of at least
1 − δinit.
• Furthermore, the number of runs required to reach the desired (ǫ, T ) pair
is upper-bounded by max(⌈log2(T )⌉, ⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉) + 1. Suppose we reach
our desired T earlier than our desired ǫ. Then the values of δi and Ti at






)⌉+1 ≈ O(ǫδinit) and Ti = 2




On the contrary if we reach our desired ǫ earlier than our desired T , then














Thus for each run until we reach the desired value of (ǫ, T ) the sample
complexity is polynomially dependent on the quantities listed in Lemma 4.1.2.
Hence the total number of time steps elapsed until our modified version of
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MLeS starts accruing a near optimal return is also polynomially dependent
on the same quantities.
Now all that remains to be shown is how this modified version of MLeS
can be further improved to achieve safety. This can be achieved as follows.
We always require that MLeS (the modified version) checks its actual return
before every restart. If the actual return is below SVi − ǫ, it plays its safety
policy a sufficient number of time steps following it to compensate for the loss
and bring the return back to within ǫ of SVi, with a high probability of 1− δ.
The number of time steps it requires to play its safety policy to compensate for





. Hence before every restart, MLeS always achieves an actual return
≥ SVi − ǫ with a high probability of 1 − δ.
However by the definition of safety from [32], we require MLeS to
ensure that there exists a T > 0 such that the expected return from any
T ′ ≥ T steps of learning is provably within a desired bound of SVi. What we
show over here is that only at the beginning of any restart, MLeS achieves an
actual return ≥ SVi − ǫ with a high certainty. What if the actual return falls
below SVi − ǫ in every run following a restart? Then we have not achieved
safety. In this regard it can shown that after a certain number of restarts this
never happens. In other words once we have ensured that the actual return
remains ≥ SVi − ǫ for a certain number of restarts, then we have compensated
enough to ensure that even if the learner achieves an actual return of zero in
the next run, the overall actual return never falls below SVi − 2ǫ. Hence there
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exists a T such that MLeS always achieves an actual return ≥ SVi−2ǫ with a
high certainty, for any T ′ > T time steps of learning. Hence safety is achieved
by this modified version of MLeS. We point the reader to Appendix A.4 for
a complete account of the details behind this claim.
This completes our complete analysis of MLeS. Next we present our
full blown CMLeS algorithm.
4.2 Convergence with Model Learning and Safety (CM-
LeS)
CMLeS builds upon MLeS and achieves convergence as well, i.e., con-
verges to a NE joint-policy in self-play. CMLeS begins by testing the other
agents to see if they are also running CMLeS (self-play); when not, it uses
MLeS as a subroutine. The algorithmic structure of CMLeS (Algorithm 5)
comprises the following steps.
Lines 1 - 2: We assume that all agents have access to a NE solver and they
compute a NE joint-policy. If the game has multiple NE joint-policies,
CMLeS chooses randomly amongst them. So different CMLeS agents
may settle for a different NE joint-policy;
Lines 3 - 4: CMLeS maintains a null hypothesis that all agents are following
the same NE joint-policy (AAPE = true). AAPE stands for “all agents
playing equilibrium”. The hypothesis is not rejected unless CMLeS
has evidence to the contrary. τ keeps count of the number of times the
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execution reaches Line 4;
Lines 5 - 8 : Whenever the algorithm reaches Line 5, it plays the equilibrium
policy for a fixed number of time steps, Nτ . It keeps a running estimate
of the empirical distribution of actions played by all agents, including
itself, during this run. At Line 8, if for any agent j (including itself),
the empirical distribution φτj differs from π
∗
j by at least ǫ, AAPE is set
to false. The CMLeS agent has reason to believe that j may not be
following the same NE joint-policy that it computed. How the Nτ value
is computed for each τ is explained in Section 4.2;
Lines 10 - 16: If AAPE remains true after the execution of Line 8, the
CMLeS agents continue to the next NE coordination phase by switching
the execution back to Line 5. Once AAPE is set to false, CMLeS goes
through a series of steps in which it checks whether the other agents
are memory-bounded with memory size at most Kmax. The details are
explained below in Theorem 4.2.2. For the time being it suffices to know
that the CMLeS agents follow a fixed set of actions to signal to one
another that they are indeed CMLeS agents and in the process also
detect Kmax memory-bounded agents;
Lines 17 - 21: If all the agents follow the same fixed set of actions as described
in Lines 10 -16, then CMLeS sets AAPE back to true and goes into
a new NE coordination phase. For that it again computes a new NE
joint-policy by choosing randomly from amongst the possible set of NE
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joint-policies;
Lines 22 - 23: Before the CMLeS agents enter a new NE coordination phase,
they check for each agent whether its actual return is below ǫ of its se-
curity value. If so, then that agent plays its safety policy for a sufficient
number of time steps to compensate and ensure an actual return within ǫ
of its security value, with a high probability of 1−δ. Akin to MLeS, the
number of time steps it requires to play its safety policy depends poly-





. To keep every CMLeS agent in sync, once a
CMLeS agent switches to following its safety policy to compensate for
any loss, every other agent also does so, and waits for the process to com-
plete. Once that is over, they go back and start a new NE coordination
phase (Line 4);
Line 25: When the algorithm reaches here, it is sure (with probability 1) that
the not all agents are following CMLeS. Then it switches to following
MLeS;
Next we highlight some of CMLeS’s key theoretical properties.
Theoretical underpinnings
We first show how Nτ is computed for each τ . Theoretically we want a
Nτ such that if any agent j is following its share of a NE joint-policy π
∗
j , then
the empirical distribution of its actions over that Nτ time period (φ
τ
j ) is always
within ǫ of π∗j with an error probability of at most
δ
2τ+1
. We can compute that
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Algorithm 5: CMLeS
input : ǫ, δ, τ = 0, τ ′ = 0




for Nτ time steps do5
Play π∗self6
For each agent j update φτj7
recompute AAPE using the φτj ’s and π
∗
j ’s8
if AAPE is false then9
if τ ′ = 0 then10
Play ai, Kmax+1 times11
else if τ ′ = 1 then12
Play ai, Kmax times followed by a13
random action other than ai14
else15
Play ai, Kmax+1 times16
if all agents play the above prescribed set of actions then17
AAPE ← true18
τ ′ ← τ ′ + 119
for ∀j in the set of agents do20
π∗j ←ComputeNashEquilibriumStrategy()21
if actual return < SVself − ǫ then22
play safety policy enough times to compensate23
τ ← τ + 124
Play MLeS25








Now we prove CMLeS’s first theoretical property.
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Theorem 4.2.1. In self-play, the CMLeS agents converge to following a
Nash equilibrium joint-policy in the limit.
Proof. The proof follows in three parts. The first part of the proof shows that
in self-play the execution of CMLeS always reaches Line 5 once it reaches Line
10. That is the CMLeS agents get infinite number of chances to coordinate
to a NE joint-policy. This holds because once its execution reaches Line 10, it
follows a fixed set of prescribed actions. Since each CMLeS agent follows this
fixed policy, CMLeS remains assured that all other agents are indeed CMLeS
agents and its execution reaches Line 5 to start a new NE coordination phase.
The second part shows that all the CMLeS agents compute the same
NE joint-policy periodically. This is very easy to show. If there are k different
NE joint-policies and n agents, then in expectation once in every kn NE coor-
dination phases, the CMLeS agents must choose the same NE joint-policy.
The third part shows that in self-play, the probability of all the CMLeS
agents following a NE joint-policy forever, once they select the same one in
some NE coordination phase, is non-zero and this probability increases mono-
tonically with every such NE coordination phase (where they select the same
NE joint-policy). This is ensured by our choice of Nτ for each τ . Assume
that the first time when they compute the same NE joint-policy is for a NE
coordination phase with τ = p. From union bound, it can be shown that
the probability of AAPE ever getting set to false from that NE coordination









. Let the next NE
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coordination phase when all agents compute the same NE joint-policy be q
(q > p). The probability of AAPE ever getting set to false from that NE














, the claim follows.
Combining these three parts of the proof, it follows that in infinite
repeated play, CMLeS converges to following a Nash equilibrium joint-policy
in the limit.
CMLeS cannot distinguish between a CMLeS agent and a memory-
bounded agent if the latter by chance plays the computed NE joint-policy
from the beginning, and may coordinate with it to converge to a NE. Note,
this might not strictly be the best response against such a group of agents, but
we believe it is still a reasonable solution concept. Henceforth, our analysis on
memory-bounded agents will exclude this special case.
Theorem 4.2.2. CMLeS achieves targeted optimality against memory-bounded
agents whose memory size is upper-bounded by a known value Kmax.
Proof. The proof follows in two parts. In the first part, we argue that given
these other agents are not following the NE joint-policy, every time the exe-
cution reaches Line 5, there is a non-zero probability that it reaches Line 10.
This part of the proof follows trivially from how we compute AAPE in Line
8.
The second part of the proof shows that given the execution reaches
Line 10 periodically, the execution must eventually reach Line 25 at some point
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and switch to following MLeS. We utilize the property that a K memory-
bounded agent is also a Kmax memory-bounded agent. The first time AAPE
is set to false, CMLeS selects a random action ai and then plays it Kmax+1
times in a row. The second time when AAPE is set to false, it plays ai,
Kmax times followed by a different action. If the other agents have behaved
identically in both of the above situations, then CMLeS knows : 1) either the
rest of the agents are following CMLeS, or, 2) if they are memory-bounded
with a memory size upper-bounded by Kmax, they play stochastically for a
Kmax bounded memory where all agents play ai. The latter observation comes
in handy below. Henceforth, whenever AAPE is set to false, CMLeS always
plays ai, Kmax+1 times in a row. Since a memory-bounded agent must be
stochastic (from the above observation), at some point of time, it will play a
different action on the Kmax+1’th step with a non-zero probability. CMLeS
then rejects the null hypothesis that all other agents are CMLeS agents and
jumps to Line 25.
Combining these two parts of the proof, it follows that against memory-
bounded agents whose memory size is upper-bounded by Kmax, CMLeS even-
tually converges to following MLeS and hence achieves targeted optimal-
ity.
All that remains to be shown is that CMLeS achieves safety against
arbitrary agents. If CMLeS converges to following MLeS, then by virtue
of MLeS, it achieves safety. If CMLeS never converges to following MLeS,
then Lines 22 - 23 ensure that at the beginning of any NE coordination phase,
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it always achieves an actual return ≥ SVi − ǫ with a high probability of 1 −
δ. It can shown that after a certain number of NE coordination phases, we
compensate enough to ensure that even if CMLeS achieves an actual return
of zero in the next coordination phase, the overall actual return never falls
below SVi − 2ǫ (analogous to the proof in Appendix A.4). Hence safety is
achieved by CMLeS.
4.3 Results
Whereas the main contribution of this chapter is the introduction of
CMLeS as a theoretically grounded MAL algorithm, we would also like it to
be useful in practice. As an empirical exercise, we choose to focus on how
efficiently MLeS (the main component of CMLeS) models memory-bounded
agents in comparison to existing algorithms, Pcm(A) and Awesome. Our
empirical analysis uses the version of MLeS presented in Algorithm 3, not
the one which runs in restarts.
Theoretically, the specification of MLeS depends on the following input
parameters: δ, ǫ, T and Kmax. δ, ǫ and T together determine the mk and σk
for each model. Recall that mk is the number of visits we require to each bk to
consider the estimate Mk(bk) (empirical distribution of o’s play for a k sized
bounded history bk) reliable. Furthermore we require the (ǫ, T ) pair to satisfy
Assumption 1. An implementation of MLeS straight from its theoretical
specification is challenging for the following reasons.
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1. First, there exists no principled way of guessing an (ǫ, T ) pair a priori
that satisfies Assumption 1.
2. Second, even if we know such an (ǫ, T ) pair, the value of each mk com-
puted based on it is prohibitively high for practical purposes. Note, the
definition of mk is a very conservative one and in practice much smaller
values of mk should suffice.
Hence we introduce a few approximations when implementing MLeS.
First, instead of seeding MLeS with a δ, ǫ, Kmax and T , we seed it with an
m, δ and Kmax. m plays the role of mk and is the same for models of all sizes.
δ is required to compute the value of σk (Equation A.4). All our results are
reported for m = 20 and δ = 0.2. Kmax in our case consists of the past 10
joint-actions. In other words, we let MLeS figure out which amongst these
past 10 joint-actions can be best used to model the other agents.
Also, note that MLeS needs an exploratory iteration once every ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉
planning iterations. Since we do not specify a value for ǫ, it is not clear
when to opt for an exploratory iteration. Hence we opt against an exploratory
iteration. In all of our experiments, the explorations that happen in the greedy
iterations are sufficient to generate good results.
Finally, MLeS functions by planning for T time steps at a time (see
Algorithm 3). Such a T -step action selection policy is just the stationary
Rmax policy computed by running Value Iteration in the underlying AIM and
executed for T steps. In our implementation, we keep executing the computed
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stationary Rmax policy forever, unless a new state of the underlying AIM
gets visited for the m’th time. In that case, we recompute it. This approach
is structurally similar to the one described in Algorithm 3, except that it is
more computationally efficient.
We use the 3-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game as our representa-
tive matrix game. The game is a 3 player version of the n-player PD present
in gamut.4 In this version, the payoff to each agent is based on the number of
agents who “cooperate” not including the agent itself. If the number of other
agents who “cooperate” is i, then we say that C(i) is the payoff for cooperating
and D(i) is the payoff for defecting. In order for this payoff scheme to result
in a Prisoners Dilemma, it must be the case that:
• D(i) > C(i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1;
• D(i + 1) > D(i) and also C(i + 1) > C(i) for 0 ≤ i < n − 1;
• C(i) > D(i)+C(i−1)
2
for 0 < i ≤ n − 1;
The payoffs supporting this payoff scheme is automatically generated
by gamut and so we need not worry about it. The memory-bounded strategies
we test against are,
Type 1: every other player plays “defect” if in the last 5 steps MLeS played
“defect” even once. Otherwise, they play “ cooperate”. The agents are
thus deterministic memory-bounded strategies with K = 5;
4http://gamut.stanford.edu
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Type 2: every other player behaves as type-1 with 0.5 probability, or else
plays completely randomly. In this case, the agents are stochastic with
K = 5;
The total number of bounded histories of size 10 in this case is 810, which
makes Pcm(A) highly inefficient. However, MLeS quickly figures out the true
K and converges to the optimal behavior in a reasonable number of steps.
Figure 4.3 shows our results against these two types of agents. The Y-axis
shows the payoff of each algorithm as a fraction of the optimal payoff achievable
against the respective opponent. Each plot has been averaged over 30 runs
to increase robustness. Against type-1 agents (Figure 4.3(i)), MLeS figures
out the true memory size in about 2000 steps and converges to playing near
optimally by 20000 episodes. Against type-2 agents (Figure 4.3(ii)), it takes
a little longer to converge to playing near optimally (about 30000 episodes)
because in this case, the number of feasible bounded histories of size 5 are
much more. Both Awesome and Pcm(A) perform much worse.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a novel MAL algorithm, CMLeS, which
in an arbitrary repeated game, achieves convergence, targeted-optimality against
memory-bounded agents whose memory size is upper-bounded by a known
value Kmax, and safety. A key contribution of CMLeS is in the manner it























Episode (Against 50 % Random and 50 % Trigger Strategy)
CMLeS PCM(A) AWESOME
Figure 4.1: Against memory-bounded agents in 3 player PD.
Against type-1 agents (upper figure), MLeS figures out the true memory size
in about 2000 steps and converges to playing near optimally by 20000 episodes.
Against type-2 agents (bottom figure) MLeS converges to playing near opti-
mally in about 30000 episodes. Both Awesome and Pcm(A) perform much
worse.
other agents’ memory size. Second, and more importantly, CMLeS improves
upon the state of the art algorithm, by promising targeted optimality against
memory-bounded agents by requiring sufficient number of visits to only all fea-
sible joint histories of size K, where K is the other agents’ true memory size.
This concludes our formal treatment of memory-bounded agents in this thesis.
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Starting with the following chapter, we concern ourself with a significantly
more complex class of agents, namely Markovian agents.
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Chapter 5
Maximizing Social Welfare in the presence of
Markovian agents
In the previous chapter, we proposed a MAL algorithm CMLeS that
in a arbitrary repeated game, converges to following a NE joint-policy in self-
play, achieves close to the best response with a high probability against a set
of memory-bounded agents whose memory size is upper-bounded by a known
value, and achieves close to the security value against any other set of agents
which cannot be represented as being Kmax memory-bounded. CMLeS is the
first MAL algorithm to achieve all of the above objectives.
However there are two shortcomings of CMLeS. First, it requires all
the CMLeS agents to compute a NE to ensure that they converge to one
in self-play. Computing a NE for arbitrary matrix games is a computation-
ally hard problem. In fact it is known to be PPAD complete [24]. Second,
the only guarantees of optimality it provides is against a homogeneous set of
memory-bounded agents whose memory size is upper-bounded by a known
value Kmax. In a population comprised of more than one CMLeS agent and
the rest memory-bounded agents with a memory size bound of Kmax, from a
single CMLeS agent’s perspective, the rest of the population is still arbitrary
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(as it does not comprise wholly of CMLeS or memory-bounded agents). In
such a scenario, CMLeS only ensures a return close to the security value. As
one might expect if the CMLeS agents can coordinate with each other, they
can guarantee a better joint-return.
The main contribution of this chapter (the second big contribution
of this thesis) is to introduce a novel MAL algorithm called Joma (Joint
Optimization against Markovian Agents) that does not need to solve a com-
putationally hard problem to achieve its objective and can also coordinate with
other self agents to jointly explore and exploit. Our initial analysis caters to a
simpler setting than that considered in Chapter 4: we assume that the Joma
agents know each others’ identities in the population. We show that in such a
setting, Joma achieves the following two objectives:
• achieves close to the social welfare maximizing joint-return in a popula-
tion comprised of self (Joma) and Markovian agents, in provably efficient
sample complexity. The social welfare value is the sum of returns of the
Joma agents in the population, the agents we control;1
• ensures safety against any other set of agents;
The complete technical details behind how Joma achieves these two
objectives is presented in Sections 5.2 to 5.4.
1Our result naturally extends to the general notion of social welfare as defined in Defi-
nition 11. However in this setting our current definition of SW seems more natural.
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In the second part of our analysis, we show how Joma fairs in more
general settings where it does not a-priori know the identities of the other
Joma agents in the population. In such settings, we provide similar guarantees
as the ones cited above except for a minor, yet necessary relaxation. We
address this in detail in Section 5.5.
As introduced in Definition 16, a Markovian agent chooses its actions
as a (fixed) function of a set of discrete feature variables computed from the
joint history of play. Depending on the joint-action taken, these feature values
transition in a Markovian fashion on every time step (see Definition 16 from
Chapter 2). We assume that Joma has some prior knowledge of the possible
set of features upon which the Markovian agents may base their policies, but
not the exact set. In order to achieve its first objective, each Joma agent
coordinates with the other Joma agents in the population to figure out the
relevant features from this feature set that determine the Markovian agents’
policies and then exploits them to maximize social welfare. Joma does not
need to solve any computationally hard problem to achieve this goal. Also
recognizing that each agent needs to be individually motivated to follow Joma,
we respect the requirement that each Joma agent achieve at least its security
value. Recall that each agent can always play its safety policy to unilaterally
ensure its security value. Thus in an attempt to maximize social welfare, if
some Joma agent receives an individual return less than its security value,
then the other Joma agents (agents with an individual return greater than
their security values) compensate by making side payments [16] to that agent.
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The mechanism of side payment in place is the standard one as defined in [16]
and hence we omit further details.
Joma represents a significant step forward in the theory of MAL by
introducing a novel mechanism of modeling a comparatively more complex
class of agent behavior than that has been modeled to date. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first MAL algorithm that models other agents
based on features. In many real world problems, we have prior knowledge of
decent features that may characterize the other agents’ policies. Joma can
utilize such prior knowledge to good effect in modeling such agents. However,
often such features are non-Markovian and then we cannot frame the learning
problem as learning in an unknown MDP. Even in such scenarios, leveraging
from existing planning techniques that perform in non-Markovian settings,
Joma can be applied to solve such problems. We give a couple of examples of
such scenarios in the next chapter.
Though in this chapter we focus primarily on characterizing and proving
Joma’s theoretical properties, we also provide some initial empirical results in
which it compares favorably to some of its peers from literature. The remainder
of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a road map on
how we incrementally introduce Joma, Sections 5.2 to 5.5 present all the
algorithmic aspects of Joma, Section 5.6 presents some empirical validations
of the theoretical properties of Joma and Section 5.7 summarizes the chapter.
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5.1 Road map to specifying Joma
The incremental steps that lead to fully specifying Joma are as fol-
lows. In the first three steps, we assume that the Joma agents know each
other and only need to model the Markovian agents in the population. In the
fourth step, we remove this assumption. We also assume that Joma has some
prior knowledge of the possible set of features, denoted by F, upon which the
Markovian agents may base their policies, but not the exact set F ⊆ F.
Step 1. The first step introduces a subroutine that solves a much simpler, yet
challenging problem (Section 5.2). Here we make a couple of simplifying
assumptions,
1. There is only one Joma agent in the population, the rest being
Markovian. We denote the set of Markovian agents as a single agent
o with an unknown policy πo. Note, a set of Markovian agents can
be treated as a single Markovian agent whose policy and action
space is just the joint-policy and joint-action space of all of them
respectively. For the sake of simplicity in analysis, we assume that
the action space of o is A;
2. The feature set F that determines the unknown policy of the Marko-
vian agents (πo) satisfies a sequential structure, i.e., the features in
F are arranged in a sequence such that the first K features com-
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pletely determine πo, K being unknown;
2
The objective of the subroutine is to achieve an actual return very close
to the optimal return (the return from optimally exploiting πo), with a
high likelihood.
Step 2. The second step builds on the first step and provides a subroutine
that solves a progressively harder problem (Section 5.3). We again as-
sume that there is only one Joma agent in the population, the rest being
Markovian. However the second assumption from Step 1 no longer holds
(the features in F can be arranged in any order). Again the objective
of this subroutine is to achieve an actual return very close to the opti-
mal return, with a high likelihood (given that the sequential structure
assumption does not hold).
Step 3. In the third step we specify the full blown Joma algorithm (Sec-
tion 5.4). The population comprised of more than one Joma agent,
the rest being Markovian agents. There are two high-level algorithmic
components of Joma:
1. First, it goes through an ordering computation phase where it set-
tles on a shared common ordering amongst all the Joma agents,
with all other Joma agents;
2Note, in this chapter K refers to the number of relevant features and should not be
confused with the memory size of a memory-bounded agent as used in Chapters 3 and 4.
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2. Second, it reverts to using the subroutine from Step 2 to achieve
an actual joint-return very close to the social welfare maximizing
joint-return;
Joma achieves both of the above subgoals with a very high likelihood.
Step 4. Finally in the fourth step, we analyze the case when the Joma agents
are unaware of each others’ identities (Section 5.5). Our specification of
Joma remains the same as introduced in Step 3, however our analysis
changes.
We next delve deep into specifying our algorithms for each of the above
steps.
5.2 Model Learning and Exploitation of Markovian agents
with the Sequential Structure Assumption
In this section we present our subroutine for Step 1 of our road map.
As before we denote the agent under our control as i and the Markovian agents
as a single agent o, with πo being their unknown policy. Let F be the set of
possible features that πo might depend on and n be its size.
3 Recall that in
this case we assume that the feature set F satisfies the sequential structure
assumption. Hence we call the associated learning problem the sequential
structure learning problem.
3Note, in this chapter n denotes the number of features in F and should not be confused
with the number of agents playing the repeated game as introduced in Definition 7. We do
not use the latter in our analysis in this chapter.
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Definition 21. Sequential Structure Learning problem: In a sequential struc-
ture learning problem, the features in F are arranged in a sequence such that
all of the K relevant features that determine πo precede the irrelevant features
in the sequence, with K being unknown. The learning problem is how to ef-
ficiently model πo given this rich feature space representation and achieve a
near optimal return with a high likelihood, in efficient sample complexity.
A careful reader would observe that the problem of achieving targeted
optimality against a memory-bounded agent whose memory size is upper-
bounded by Kmax is an instance of the sequential structure learning problem.
The following explains why. Consider a memory-bounded agent o with memory
size K. Recall from Chapter 2 that a memory-bounded agent is a special case
of a Markovian agent. So the last K joint-actions completely determine πo.
Assume that i is unaware of the exact value of K, but is prepared to model
o with a memory size Kmax ≥ K. Let the features in F be the most recent
Kmax joint-actions. As the first K features (K being unknown to i) from
F completely determine πo and all of the remaining features are irrelevant,
the learning problem is a sequential structure learning problem. Thus our
approach to solving the sequential structure learning problem is very similar
to our approach of achieving targeted optimality against a memory-bounded
agent whose memory size is upper-bounded by Kmax. However for the sake of
completeness, we present it in detail.
Though the sequential structure assumption seems restrictive, we later
show how a solution to this simpler, yet nontrivial, learning problem results in
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an efficient solution to the general learning problem where such an ordering is
unknown. We call our subroutine that solves the sequential structure learning
problem, Model Learning and Exploitation against Markovian agents with the
Sequential structure assumption (MLeM(S)).
We can always model πo by assuming that it is Markovian based on
the entire set of features F. Our new notion of a model π̂ for πo is defined as
follows.
Definition 22. Model: A model π̂ : F ′ 7→ ∆A of πo is defined over a set of
parent features F ′ ⊆F, and specifies a distribution over the action set A (mixed
action) for every feasible instantiation of the parent features.
Modeling πo based on the entire F may involve learning over a much
larger state space than is necessary. Our goal is to model πo with the shortest
most descriptive model and hence achieve the lowest possible sample complex-
ity bound by avoiding unnecessary exploration.
MLeM(S) is introduced in Algorithm 6. Just as in the case of MLeS
(Section 4.1), for the sake of clarity we break our algorithmic analysis of
MLeM(S) into four parts. First in Section 5.2.1, we discuss the choice of the
inputs for MLeM(S). Second in Section 5.2.2, we describe how MLeM(S)
operates from a high-level. Third and fourth in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 re-
spectively, we focus on MLeM(S)’s two main algorithmic components: the
Find-Model(S) algorithm and its action selection mechanism.
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5.2.1 Inputs to Mlem(S)
The inputs to MLeM(S) are ǫ, δ, T and F. Both ǫ and δ are small
probability values. T is the planning horizon explained in the next paragraph.
A reader not interested in a deep theoretical understanding of MLeM(S) may
skip the rest of this subsection and treat these inputs as free parameters. We
devote the rest of this subsection to justifying the choice behind these input
parameters that facilitates our theoretical claims concerning MLeM(S).
Just like MLeS, MLeM(S) operates by planning for T time steps at a
time. In each such planning iteration, it uses the best model of πo at hand and
plans its actions for the next T time steps based on it. Let U∗ be the expected
return from the best response against o, i.e., the optimal return achievable
in the AIM induced by πo. To facilitate the theory behind our claim that
MLeM(S) converges to follow the best response against o, we assume that
the (ǫ, T ) pair taken as input always satisfies Assumption 1 from Section 4.1.1.
We restate it again for the reader’s convenience.
The planning horizon T is sufficiently large and the ǫ sufficiently small
to ensure that
1. T is the ǫ-return mixing time of the optimal policy for the AIM;
2. for any sub-optimal policy π and for any state s of the induced AIM,
UπT (s) < U
∗ − 2ǫ;
We refer the reader to Section 4.1.1 for a detailed discussion on the
existence of such an (ǫ, T ) pair. Our analysis in this chapter assumes that
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MLeM(S) (and also its successive variants introduced later in the chapter) is
aware of such an (ǫ, T ) pair that satisfies Assumption 1. In cases where it is
unaware of such an (ǫ, T ) pair, the approach presented in Section 4.1.5 which
extends MLeS to solve this general case, applies here as well. Note, the above
approach by default ensures safety. Having noted that we skip an analysis for
the case when the (ǫ, T ) pair is unknown (and also how MLeM(S) achieves
safety).
5.2.2 High Level idea of MLeM(S)
Now we move on to the high level idea of MLeM(S) (Algorithm 6)
which is very similar to that of MLeS. Since MLeM(S) is unaware of the
exact K that characterizes πo, it maintains a model of πo for each of the first
k features from F, k ∈ [0 : n]. Thus it maintains n + 1 models in total.
Let the model that is based on the first k features be π̂k. Internally each
π̂k maintains a value Mk(bk) which is the maximum likelihood distribution of
o’s play for every feasible value bk of the first k features from F.
4 Whenever
the first k features assume a value bk in online play, we say a visit to bk has
occurred. π̂k(bk) is then defined as follows:
π̂k(bk) =
{
Mk(bk) once visit(bk) = mk
⊥ when visit(bk) < mk
(5.1)
where visit(bk) is the number of times bk has been visited and mk is a parame-
ter unique to each k. In other words, once a bk is visited mk times, we consider
4Note, in this chapter bk denotes a value of the first k features from F, not a value of
the past k joint-actions as used in Chapter 4.
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Algorithm 6: MLeM(S)
input: ǫ, δ, T, F
repeat1
Determine π̂best;2




τ ← τ + 1;7
until τ > T8
Update all models based on the past T joint-actions;9
until forever10
the estimate Mk(bk) reliable and assign π̂k(bk) to it. Henceforth we make no
updates to π̂k(bk) (for visit(bk) > mk). We discuss later (Equation 5.5) how
mk is chosen for each k. If a reliable estimate of Mk(bk) is unavailable (when
visit(bk) < mk), then π̂k(bk) is set to ⊥ (meaning “I don’t know”).
MLeM(S) operates by planning for T steps at a time. The operations
performed by MLeM(S) are as follows:
M1. Determine π̂best (Line 2). Almost in every planning iteration assign
the predictive model that best describes πo as π̂best by making a call
to Find-Model(S). However once in every ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉ planning iterations,
assign π̂best by selecting randomly amongst the n + 1 models. The need
of this exploratory iteration would become obvious once we specify our
action selection mechanism in Section 5.2.4.
M2. Compute a stationary policy based on the π̂best returned and execute it
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for the next T steps (Lines 3 - 8).
M3. Update all models based on the past T joint-actions (Line 9).
Note the better the model returned in Step M1, the higher is the return
accrued in Step M2. The main objective of Step M1 is then to consistently
return a π̂best which is a close approximation of πo. That brings us to our new
concept of an ǫ-approx model for πo (as opposed to the ǫ-approx concept from
Chapter 4, Definition 19).
Definition 23. ǫ-approx model: We call a model π̂ an ǫ-approx model of πo,
when for each feasible value bK of the relevant feature set {f1, . . . , fK}, the
following condition holds:
π̂(bK) 6=⊥ ∧||π̂(bK) − πo(bK)||∞ ≤ ǫ (5.2)
In order to have a close approximation of πo, Step M1 relies on Find-
Model(S) to return an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo. An
ǫ
T
-approx model of πo is
desired because the T -step expected return from following the optimal policy
pertaining to such a model is always within ǫ of the T -step expected return
from following the optimal policy pertaining to the true model πo [45]. We
next specify the details of Find-Model(S), the main algorithmic component
of MLeM(S).
5.2.3 Find-Model(S) Algorithm
Find-Model(S) is the main algorithm running at the heart of MLeM(S)
and is the key to understanding all of our theoretical claims in this section. Its
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objective is to output the best predictive model for πo from all possible n + 1
models maintained by MLeM(S). Again its functioning is very similar to the
Find-Model algorithm of MLeS from Section 4.1.3.
Intuitively, all models of size ≥ K can learn πo accurately (as they
consist of all of the relevant features) with the bigger models requiring more
samples to do so. On the other hand models of size < K cannot fully represent
πo. From a high-level perspective, Find-Model(S) operates by comparing
models of increasing size incrementally to determine the shortest most de-
scriptive model such that all larger models cease to be more predictive of πo.
The next few paragraphs explain how Find-Model(S) functions. A reader
not interested in deep technical details may directly skip to the paragraph be-
fore Lemma 5.2.1, our main theoretical result concerning Find-Model(S). In
short, Lemma 5.2.1 specifies the sufficient condition on exploration that needs
to be satisfied for Find-Model(S) to return an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo.
Since our approach involves comparing models of different sizes, we
need some way of measuring how much they differ in their predictions. To that
end we use a new ∆k metric (as opposed to the ∆k metric from Chapter 4,
Definition 20).
Definition 24. ∆k: ∆k is the maximum difference in prediction between con-
secutive models of size k and k + 1. Let Aug(bk) be the set of all k + 1 length
vectors which have bk as the value of their first k features, and a feasible value
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of the k + 1’th feature from F as its k + 1’st value. Then,
∆k = max
bk,bk+1∈Aug(bk))
||π̂k(bk) − π̂k+1(bk+1)||∞ s.t. π̂k+1(bk+1) 6=⊥ (5.3)
We will choose mk’s such that π̂k+1(bk+1) 6=⊥ will always imply π̂k(bk) 6=⊥.
If for all bk+1’s, π̂k+1(bk+1) =⊥, then by default ∆k is set to -1.
Find-Model(S) is fully specified in Algorithm 7 and is identical to
Algorithm 4 from Chapter 4, except for the obvious differences in the manner
the ∆k’s and the models are computed. Nonetheless for the sake of complete-
ness, we present it in details in the following paragraphs. Its key steps are as
follows.
S1. On every T step planning iteration, for all 0 ≤ k < n, compute ∆k
(using Equation 5.3) and σk. If ∆k = −1, then we assign σk = 1.
If ∆k 6= −1, then we assign σk as the tightest estimate satisfying the
following condition:
Pr(∆k < σk) > 1 −
δ
n + 1
∀k ≥ K (5.4)
By tightest we mean an estimate as close to ∆k as possible. The details
on how the σk’s are computed are identical to the case of MLeS and are
presented in Appendix A.1. Why we require the error probability from
Equation 5.4 to be δ
n+1
becomes apparent in the following step.
S2. Find-Model(S) then searches for that smallest value of k such that all




for all 0 ≤ k < n, compute ∆k and σk1
for 0 ≤ k < n do2
flag ← true3
for k ≤ k′ < n do4







It then concludes that this smallest k is the true value of K and returns
π̂k as π̂best. Since for each k ≥ K, there is an error probability of at
most δ
n+1
with which the condition from Equation 5.4 may fail, the total
error probability with which Find-Model(S) selects a model of size





= δ. Hence Find-Model(S)
always selects a model of size at most K with a high probability of at
least 1 − δ.
It is important to note that although we compute a σk for every 0 ≤ k < n,
Equation 5.4 is guaranteed to hold only for K ≤ k < n. However as observed
earlier, in the early learning stages Equation 5.4 may also hold for all k ∈
[k′, n}, where k′ < K. This is generally true when we have not explored enough
to deduce the relevance of all K features. So initially Find-Model(S) may
return sub-optimal models. However once sufficient exploration has occurred
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(as quantified in the upcoming Lemma 5.2.1), the model returned by Find-
Model(S) will be an ǫ
T
-approx of πo with high certainty.
We now state our main theoretical result concerning Find-Model(S),
namely Lemma 5.2.1. It states the sufficient condition on the exploration re-




of πo, with a high likelihood. Complete details of the proof behind the Lemma
are identical to Lemma 4.1.1 of MLeS (except how the ∆k’s and the models
are computed) and are presented in Appendix A.2. Henceforth Nk (redefined)
denotes the number of feasible values of the feature set {f1, · · · , fk}. Thus NK
denotes the number of feasible values of the relevant feature set {f1, · · · , fK}
(size of the relevant state space). Also recall that bK denotes a feasible in-
stantiation of the relevant feature set {f1, · · · , fK}.






once all the bK’s have been visited mK times, the π̂best returned by Find-
Model(S) is based on at most the first K features from F and an ǫ
T
-approx
of πo with a high probability of at least 1 − 2δ.
Thus it suffices to set mk which defines when π̂k stops predicting ⊥ for








Lemma 5.2.1 gives us the condition that needs to be satisfied to ensure
that the π̂best returned by Find-Model(S) is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo. However,
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it says nothing about how MLeM(S) should select its actions to ensure that
this condition is satisfied. We conclude our analysis of MLeM(S) with a
discussion of its action selection mechanism (Step M2) which ensures that the
exploration condition from Lemma 5.2.1 holds.
5.2.4 Action Selection
In order to ensure that the condition of visits specified in Lemma 5.2.1
is met as quickly as possible, MLeM(S) uses the model-based RL algorithm
Rmax [15]. We refer the reader to Section 4.1.4 for a brief account on how
Rmax operates and what motivates us to use Rmax as our underlying RL
algorithm.
Akin to MLeS, MLeM(S) maintains a separate instance of Rmax
for each of the possible n + 1 MDPs corresponding to the n + 1 possible
models of πo. At any iteration of MLeM(S), let the π̂best returned by Step
M1 be π̂k and the MDP associated with it be Mk. MLeM(S) then picks the
stationary policy computed from the Rmax instance associated with Mk to
decide on the next T step actions. The policy for the Rmax instance can
be computed using any of the standard techniques, such as Value Iteration
or Policy Iteration. MLeM(S) believes that k is the true value of K and
hence attempts to explore all bk’s mk times to satisfy the condition of visits
from Lemma 5.2.1. The policy computed from the Rmax instance associated
with Mk precisely helps it to achieve that. However, there is a possiblity
that MLeM(S) might get stuck in a part of the state space where only some
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amongst the K relevant features are truly relevant (active). In that case, it
might converge to exploiting based on a suboptimal model π̂k.
In order to avoid that, once in every ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉ T -step iterations, MLeM(S)
computes the policy slightly differently. First, it chooses a k randomly from
0 to n. The goal is to visit a new bk which has not been visited mk times.
If such a visit is not possible, then exploit based on the current π̂best. The
Rmax policy computation is then as follows. Assume that the state space of
the underlying MDP comprise of all n features from F. First, for all states of
the MDP whose first k feature value (first k features from F) have not been
visited mk times, provide them the exploratory bonus. For every other state
use π̂best to perform the Bellman back up. Note π̂best only concerns itself with
the features that it is based upon and not on all of the n features. Just like
MLeS, we call such a T -step planning iteration an exploratory iteration while
the former a greedy iteration.
Now due to these exploratory iterations, π̂K is chosen periodically as
the random model in these exploratory iterations. Eventually by the implicit
explore or exploit property of Rmax, it can be shown that at some exploratory
iteration where MLeM(S) chooses π̂K as the random model, it must achieve
an expected return as high as U∗ − 2ǫ, with a high probability (since there
are only finitely many entries to explore). Then from Assumption 1, we know
that MLeM(S) must be following the optimal policy, otherwise such a high
return would not have been possible. Thus MLeM(S) has learned a decent
enough model of πo that yields the optimal policy. Henceforth in every greedy
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iteration, it keeps exploiting based on this model and follows the optimal policy
which eventually leads to a near optimal return. The details of how the above
happens is exactly similar to the reasoning behind Lemma 4.1.2 of MLeS, and
is presented in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 5.2.2. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, with a high probability of
at least 1 − 4δ, MLeM(S) achieves an actual return ≥ U∗ − 5ǫ against any
Markovian o whose policy is based on the first K features from F, in a number
















, n, NK, |A| and T .
Note our sample complexity argument handles the worst case scenario.
Against most practical opponents, MLeM(S) will likely converge to near op-
timal behavior in far fewer samples.
The computational complexity of MLeM(S) for every planning itera-
tion comprises two parts. The first part arises from Find-Model(S), while
the latter from the action selection step. Find-Model(S) takes an order of
O(n2) computations on each planning iteration. For the action selection step,
we need to solve a MDP. Hence the computational complexity for this step is
equivalent to that of any MDP solver, such as Value Iteration.
This concludes our discussion on MLeM(S). The goal of MLeM(S)
was to solve the sequential structure learning problem, a simplification of the
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general problem. Next, we build on it to propose a more general subroutine
which solves the same problem without the sequential structure assumption.
5.3 Model Learning and Exploitation of Markovian agents
without the Sequential Structure Assumption
In this section we present our subroutine for Step 2 on our road to
specifying Joma. As before we denote the agent under our control as i and
the Markovian agents as a single agent o, with πo being its unknown policy.
Let F be the set of possible features that πo might depend on and n be its
cardinality. The only difference from the sequential structure learning problem
is that now the ordering on the features in F may be arbitrary (based on the
best possible guess) and not by relevance. In other words, there might be
irrelevant features preceding the relevant features in F.
Note, a very straightforward extension of MLeM(S) can solve the
problem: arrange all features in some order and execute MLeM(S). The
downside of this approach is that from Lemma 5.2.1, we now require suffi-
cient visits to all of the K ′ feature values, where K ′ is the smallest value
∈ [0, n] that spans over all relevant features. Observe that some of these K ′
features may be irrelevant. In many domains it is possible to guess a decent
ordering of features and for such cases the above approach provides an efficient
solution. However, in the worst case the last feature in the sequence may be
a relevant feature and in that case MLeM(S) can only solve the problem by
requiring sufficient visits to the entire state space determined from n features:
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the problem we intended to avoid in the very first place. Our goal in this
section is to do better in terms of sample complexity. This goal motivates our
new subroutine: Model Learning and Exploitation against Markovian agents,
or the MLeM algorithm.
MLeM shares the same algorithmic structure as MLeM(S) (Algo-
rithm 6) except for a crucial distinction pertaining to the algorithm used in
Step M1 to compute π̂best.
5.3.1 Find-Model-General algorithm
Step M1 of MLeM is similar to that of MLeM(S) except now it makes
a call to the Find-Model-General algorithm. In a spirit similar to Find-
Model(S), the main objective of Find-Model-General is to eventually
return a π̂best which is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo with a high probability, by observing
as few online samples of data as possible.
We begin with a brief intuitive explanation of how the Find-Model-
General algorithm operates. Unlike MLeM(S), MLeM has to maintain a
model for every possible combination of features. From a high level perspec-
tive, Find-Model-General chooses π̂best by searching incrementally for the
smallest model such that no larger model (ones based on greater number of
features) is more predictive. In order to do so, it iterates over models ranging
from the smallest to the largest. In the process of checking whether a model
π̂ is the best predictive model, Find-Model-General compares it with all
possible models that are based on the features from π̂ and additional ones.
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If all the larger models fail to add to the predictiveness of π, then Find-
Model-General concludes that π̂ is π̂best. If not, it moves on to the next
model.
Algorithm 8 specifies the Find-Model-General algorithm in detail.
A brief summary of its key steps is as follows. Let P be the power set of the
feature set F and Pk ⊆ P be all the subsets of P with cardinality k. In other
words, Pk is the set consisting of all combinations of k features from F. The
steps employed by Find-Model-General are then as follows:
Lines 1-2. Iterate over 0 ≤ k < n and for every k generate Pk.
Line 3. Iterate over every element ℘k from this set, i.e., ℘k is a set of k
features.
Lines 5-9: Let the model comprising the features in ℘k be π̂℘k . Now generate
all possible sequences of size k + 1 to n, where the first k features in the
sequence are the features from ℘k.
Line 10: Execute Find-Model(S) on each of these sequences.
Lines 11-18: If the model returned by Find-Model(S) for all of these
sequences is π̂℘k , then we are sure with a high probability that from the
data samples seen so far, π̂℘k is the best model (Lines 11-17). Return
π̂℘k . If not, keep repeating the process until a particular π̂℘k satisfies the




for 0 ≤ k < n do1
Generate Pk2
for every ℘k ∈ Pk do3
flag ← true4
for 1 ≤ k′ <= n − k do5
Generate Pk′6
for every ℘k′ ∈ Pk′ do7
if ℘k′ ∩ ℘k 6= φ then8
continue
seq ← a sequence starting with ℘k followed by ℘k′9
π̂ ← execute Find-Model(S) on seq10







return model comprised of all features18
Our main theoretical result concerning Find-Model-General, anal-
ogous to the one for Find-Model(S) (Lemma 5.2.1), is as follows. Let N ′2K be
the maximum size of the state space from any 2K-dimensional feature vector
that can be selected from the n features.
Lemma 5.3.1. Once all the feasible values of any 2K-dimensional feature







)) times, then the π̂best returned by Find-Model-
General is an ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high probability of at least 1 − 2δ.
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The proof is presented in Appendix B.1. Lemma 5.3.1 states the suffi-
cient condition that needs to be satisfied to ensure that the π̂best returned by
Find-Model-General suffices to be an ǫ
T
-approx of πo with a high likeli-









To understand the condition specified in Lemma 5.3.1, consider the
following example. Let the feature set be {X1, X2, X3, X4, X5} and let each
feature assume binary values, i.e. Xi ∈ {0, 1}. Assume that the relevant fea-
tures are X1 and X3. So n = 5 and K = 2. Then all 4-dimensional feature
vectors consist of the following vectors: {X1, X2, X3, X4}, {X1, X2, X3, X5},






combinations. N ′4 is the maximum size of the state space from any of these
4-dimensional feature vectors. In this case N ′4 = 2
4 = 16. Then the condition
in Lemma 5.3.1 requires all possible values of these 4-dimensional feature vec-
tors (24×5 = 80 of them) to be visited m′4 times, where m
′
4 is computed using
Equation 5.6.
Note that the condition of visits specified in Lemma 5.3.1 is looser than
that from Lemma 5.2.1 (for MLeM(S)). Lemma 5.2.1 required sufficient visits
to only the relevant state space, whereas Lemma 5.3.1 requires sufficient visits
to certain parts of state space that are irrelevant. Namely it requires visits
to all values of any 2K-dimensional feature vector. This extra exploration
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is necessary to figure out the correct features for πo and can be seen as the
price paid for not having any prior knowledge of πo. Our detailed proof of
Lemma 5.3.1 in Appendix B.1 provides a formal justification of how we arrived
at this condition.
Lemma 5.3.1 gives us the condition that needs to be satisfied to ensure
that the π̂best returned by Find-Model-General is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo. It
says nothing about how the condition is satisfied. This is assured by the action
selection mechanism of MLeM.
5.3.2 Action Selection
The onus lies on the action selection mechanism to ensure that the
condition of visits specified in Lemma 5.3.1 is met as quickly as possible which
will allow Find-Model-General to keep returning a near accurate π̂best
consistently.
In spirit similar to MLeM(S), MLeM now maintains an Rmax in-
stance for each of the 2n possible MDPs, i.e., MDPs originating from all pos-
sible combinations of features as the state space. Also akin to MLeM(S),
MLeM interleaves between greedy and exploratory iterations. At the begin-
ning of each T -step greedy iteration, MLeM picks the Rmax instance asso-
ciated with the MDP comprised of features from π̂best and uses it to compute
the policy to follow for the next T steps.
Whereas at the beginning of each T -step exploratory iteration, MLeM
chooses a k randomly from 0 to n. The policy computation is similar to the
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one for a greedy iteration with a couple of key differences. Assume that the
state space of the underlying MDP comprise all n features from F. First, for
all states of the MDP which have some k feature vector value that has not
been visited m′k times, it provides them the exploratory bonus. For every other
state it uses π̂best to perform the Bellman back up. Once again note that the
π̂best only concerns itself with the features on which it is based and not on all
of the n features. The objective of the exploratory iteration is to facilitate the
exploration needed to satisfy the condition in Lemma 5.3.1.
Then a sample complexity analysis analogous to that of Lemma 5.2.2,
brings us to our main theoretical result concerning MLeM. The term N2K in
the statement of the Lemma is the total number of feasible values of all 2K-
dimensional feature vectors (originating from all combinations of 2K features
from F). All other terms have their usual meaning from Lemma 5.2.2.
Lemma 5.3.2. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, with a high probability
of at least 1 − 4δ, MLeM achieves an actual return ≥ U∗ − 5ǫ against any
















, n, N2K, N
′
2K, |A| and T .
The bound from Lemma 5.3.2 is similar to that of Lemma 5.2.2, except
for the obvious exceptions that the number of entries we need to explore now
is N2K and we need to visit each such entry m
′
2K times (as opposed to NK
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and mK for Lemma 5.2.2). The proof is also similar to that for Lemma 5.2.2
and hence we skip it. We acknowledge that our sample complexity bound in
this case is worse than the sample complexity bound proven for the sequential
structure learning problem (namely Lemma 5.2.2) as it is polynomially depen-
dent on N2K, instead of the size of the relevant state space. As suggested
earlier, the weakening of the bound can be seen as the price we pay for not
having any prior information about πo. However in cases where N2K is signif-
icantly smaller than the state space from the entire F, the savings in terms of
sample complexity is still very significant.
Finally, some comments on the computational complexity of MLeM.
Find-Model-General takes an order of O(n2n) computations on each plan-
ning iteration. However most of these computations can be done in parallel if
the underlying hardware supports parallelism. For the action selection step,
once again the computational complexity is that of any MDP solver.
That completes our analysis of how MLeM solves the general structure
learning problems. In the following section, we present the full blown Joma
algorithm.
5.4 Joint Optimization against Markovian Agents
Until now, we have focused on the scenario in which there is just one
MLeM (or, MLeM(S)) agent in the population. Now, we account for the
case where there is more than one Joma agent in the population in addition





Table 5.1: Payoff matrix for Battle of Sexes (BoS).
are only concerned with modeling the Markovian agents in the population.
Since the Joma agents individually prefer different joint-returns based
on their own utility functions, we require them to agree on one that maxi-
mizes social welfare (SW). It is important that the Joma agents agree on a
common ordering between themselves and their actions. For example consider
the special case of self-play between two Joma agents playing Battle of Sexes
(Table 5.1). This is a very special case pertaining to a situation when the
number of Markovian agents in the population is 0. There are two outcomes
in the game that maximize SW. If the agents are uncoordinated, they may
target different outcomes and end up playing different actions leading to a
SW value of 0. However if they agree on a unique ordering of themselves and
their actions, they can use a deterministic rule to coordinate and attain one of
the SW maximizing outcomes (like iterating over all agents and their actions
in the manner prescribed by their ordering and choosing the first joint-action
that maximizes SW).
We assume that the game is defined in a canonical form so that all
agents see it defined in exactly the same way, in particular including the same
ordering over actions. So an ordering over the actions is implicit. However the
game definition does not include a specification of which agents are to play
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the game, so does not (and can not) specify an ordering over the agents. Such
an ordering must be determined either by convention (e.g. ascending order of
MAC id) or by the agents themselves. If a convention is unavailable, we require
the Joma agents to settle on a common shared ordering between themselves
in a distributed fashion.
Henceforth we denote the number of Joma agents in the population by
J . Also keeping in line with our past analysis we assume that the maximum
SW value is bounded by Rmax = 1. Joma’s functionality can be broken down
into two steps.
Step 1. First Joma strives to settle on a common ordering amongst all the
self agents in a distributed fashion. We call this phase of Joma the
ordering computation phase. Assume there are 5 Joma agents in the
population. Without loss of generality, we refer to them as A,B,C,D
and E from the perspective of the Joma agent whom we are representing
in this computation (that is the naming is arbitrary and may differ for
all the Joma agents). Recall that we have a predefined ordering among
the actions for every agent. Thus for every agent we can label the actions
as action 1, 2, . . ..
As part of the ordering computation phase, each Joma agent plays ran-
domly for T1 = O(Jlog(J
δ
)) time steps. We later specify the rationale
behind the value of T1. Initially Joma groups all the 5 agents in a sin-
gle set (refer to Figure 5.1). Now whenever on a particular time step
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an agent plays a different action from its peers, it splits this set. For
example in Figure 5.1, at some time step agents A and B play action
1, agent C plays action 3, while agents D and E play action 4. Then
Joma splits this set into three sets and defines an ordering among them
pertaining to the different actions played. In our example this leads to
three sets: S1 = {A,B}, S2 = {C} and S3 = {D,E}, with S1 preceding
S2 (denoted by S1 < S2) and S2 preceding S3 (denoted by S2 < S3). S1
precedes S2 because agents from S1 played action 1 while agents from S2
played action 3, and action 1 precedes action 3 in the ordering of actions.
This also means that in the final ordering elements from S1 would always
precede that of S2 and elements from S2 would always precede that of
S3.
Joma continues this process of splitting sets until either of the following
two events happen: (1) it reaches the desired split of J singleton sets with
each set containing an agent; (2) T1 time steps elapse. We later show as
part of proof of Theorem 5.4.1 that through our choice of T1, we ensure
that through T1 steps of random play by the Joma agents, we always
reach the desired split of J singleton sets with an error probability of at
most δ. This in turn means that the Joma agents settle on a common
shared ordering among themselves with an error probability of at most
δ.
Step 2. Once settled on a common ordering, Joma switches to following






      C plays action 3
A, B plays action 1
 D, E plays action 4
A plays action 3
B plays action 2
D plays action 2
E plays action 1
{A, B, C, D, E}
1 3 4
2 3 1 2
Figure 5.1: Example of how the Joma agents agree on an ordering. The final
ordering can be obtained by reading all the sets from the leaf nodes from left
to right, i.e., B < A < C < E < D.
Joma agent runs MLeM independently. Since they are solving the same
problem and have agreed on a common ordering between themselves (the
ordering over actions being implicit), they arrive at the same solution,
i.e., same stationary joint-policy to follow for the ensuing T steps. Then
they follow their share of the joint-policy for the next T steps.
Next, we state and prove the main theoretical property of Joma.
Theorem 5.4.1. Consider a population of Joma and Markovian agents (at
least one) which use features from F. Then for any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1,
with a high probability of at least 1 − 5δ, the Joma agents achieve an actual
joint-return at least within 6ǫ of the SW maximizing expected joint-return, in
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, J , n, N2K, N
′
2K, |A| and T .
Proof. The proof follows in two parts.
First, lets prove that all the Joma agents settle on the same ordering
with a high likelihood. Note that the number of splits in the tree from our
ordering algorithm (Figure 5.1) can be at most J − 1. The probability of any
such split depends on the probability of any pair of Joma agents from that
node of the tree choosing different actions.
For a pair of Joma agents, with at least two actions, the probability
that they would select a different action on a time step by playing randomly
is at least 1
2
. So the expected number of time steps taken by them to choose
a different action is at most 2. Then by Hoeffding bound [40], a node which





steps with error probability at most δ
J
. Since there can be at most J−1 splits
to consider, then in T1 = O(Jlog(J
δ
)) time steps the Joma agents settle on a
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unique ordering among them with an error probability at most δ (from union
bound).
Second, from Lemma 5.3.2 we know that once the Joma agents have
settled on a common shared unique ordering, Joma achieves an actual joint-
return within 5ǫ of the SW maximizing expected joint-return, with a proba-























Also since we have to compensate for the poor return over the initial T1
time steps, we need to run Joma for an additional T1
ǫ
time steps to compensate
and achieve an actual joint-return within 6ǫ of the SW maximizing expected
joint-return. Then combining the claims from all parts of the proof using union
bound and observing that the total sample complexity is T1
ǫ
+T2, gives us the
proof.
This concludes our theoretical analysis of Joma catering to the case
when the Joma agents know each others’ identities to begin with. In the
following section we address the case when the Joma agents are unaware of
each others’ identities and has to detect one another as part of the learning
process.
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5.5 Joma with identities unknown
We retain the same algorithmic outline of Joma. Only our analysis
differs to address this general case.
We first show that at the end of the ordering computation phase, if two
or more agents end up being clubbed in the same node, then the probability
of one of them being a Joma agent is as low as δ. Each Joma agent plays
randomly in the ordering computation phase. Assume at any step of this
phase, a non-Joma agent plays action a. The probability that a Joma agent
plays the same action is at most 1/2 (since the action space includes at least 2
actions for the Joma agents). So the expected number of time steps taken by
a Joma agent to play a different action from a non-Joma agent is at most 2.
Hence through our choice of the length of the ordering computation phase and
by a similar line of reasoning as used in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1, it can be
shown that the probability of a Joma agent sharing a node with another agent
at the end of the ordering computation phase is as low as δ. So if at the end
of the ordering computation phase, two agents share a same node, we can be
sure with a high probability of 1− δ, that these agents are non-Joma agents.
Henceforth, Joma treats these agents as non-Joma agents and switches to
following MLeM (or MLeM(S) depending on the nature of the problem).
However, what if there is a non-Joma agent that does not share a
node with any other agent at the end of the ordering computation phase?
Clearly this agent has evaded detection. In that case the Joma agents continue
treating is as being another Joma agent unless it plays a different action
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other than the one prescribed by MLeM (or MLeM(S)). Joma successfully
identifies it as a non-Joma agent and restarts the MLeM subroutine. However
in the very unlikely scenario if these other agents keep playing the action
prescribed for them by Joma forever, then Joma ends up treating them as a
self agent forever. It then successfully converges to the SW maximizing joint-
return, where the SW value is computed as sum of returns of not only the Joma
agents, but also the ones who pretend to be Joma. If not, then eventually once
all non-Joma agents are detected, then in an additional number of time steps
(from Theorem 5.4.1), Joma converges to achieving its desired SW maximizing
joint-return.
This concludes our complete theoretical analysis of Joma.
5.6 Empirical Validation
Whereas the main contribution of this paper is the introduction of
Joma as a theoretically grounded MAL algorithm, we would also like for it
to be useful in practice. In this section we present some results of relatively
simple experiments testing how Joma performs in the presence of Markovian
and non-Markovian agents. We begin by specifying our implementation of
Joma.
Theoretically, the specification of Joma depends on the following input
parameters: δ, ǫ, T and F. These inputs determine the mk for each model.
Recall that mk is the number of visits we require to each bk to consider the
estimate Mk(bk) (empirical distribution of o’s play for bk) reliable. Further-
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more, we require the (ǫ, T ) pair to satisfy Assumption 1.
An implementation of Joma straight from its theoretical specification
is challenging for the following two reasons.
1. First, there exists no principled way of guessing an (ǫ, T ) pair a priori
that satisfies Assumption 1.
2. Second, even if we know such an (ǫ, T ) pair, the value of each mk com-
puted based on it is prohibitively high for practical purposes. Note, the
definition of mk is a very conservative one and in practice much smaller
values of mk should suffice.
Hence we introduce a few approximations when implementing Joma.
First, instead of seeding Joma with a δ, ǫ, F and T , we seed it with an m, δ and
F. m plays the role of mk and is the same for models of all sizes. δ is required
to compute the value of σk (Equation A.4). All our results are reported for
m = 20 and δ = 0.2. F in our case consists of the past 8 joint-actions. Each
joint-action is treated as a feature. In other words, we let Joma figure out
which amongst these past 8 joint-actions can be best used to model each of
the opponent algorithms. We run Joma using Mlem(S) as the default fall
back algorithm for Step 2.
Also, note that MLeM(S) needs an exploratory iteration once every
⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉ planning iterations. Since we do not specify a value for ǫ, it is not clear
when to opt for an exploratory iteration. Hence we opt against an exploratory
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iteration. In all of our experiments, the explorations that happen in the greedy
iterations are sufficient to generate good results.
Finally, MLeM(S) functions by planning for T time steps at a time.
Such a T -step action selection policy is just the stationary Rmax policy com-
puted by running Value Iteration in the underlying induced MDP and executed
for T steps. In our implementation, we keep executing the computed station-
ary Rmax policy forever, unless a new state of the underlying induced MDP
gets visited for the m’th time. In that case, we recompute it. This approach
is structurally similar to the one described in Algorithm 6, except that it is
more computationally efficient.
Our experiments involve empirical testing in selected multi-player games
from gamut.5 The MAL algorithms chosen as benchmarks for comparison are
Cautious Fictitious Play [17], Awesome [27] and Giga-Wolf [12]. Each of
these algorithms has its own specific objectives and is a popular representa-
tive from its own family of MAL algorithms. Cautious Fictitious Play repre-
sents the class of Fictitious Play algorithms that achieve universal consistency.
Awesome represents the family of MAL algorithms that achieve convergence
and rationality in arbitrary repeated games. Meanwhile, Giga-Wolf repre-
sents the family that achieves convergence and no-regret in repeated games.
Figure 5.6 presents our results. The experiments were conducted over
3 player versions of each game, with two self agents and the third agent drawn
5http://gamut.stanford.edu
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randomly from the set of benchmark agents, along with minimax, self agent
and arbitrary memory-bounded strategies of size 3.6 The X axis of the plot
shows the different games while the Y axis shows the converged SW value for
each algorithm achieved in a game as a fraction of the best converged SW value
achieved by any algorithm for that game. Each point in the plot is an average
over 100 such plays. Joma consistently achieves the highest SW in each of
the games beating the next best algorithm by a significant margin in many
games. The difference with the next best is statistically significant except
in Bertrand Oligopoly, Collaboration Game, Coordination Game, Majority
Voting and Travelers Dilemma (p-values < 0.05 from T-test in all other games).
Note, the only agents from the above set for which Joma provides any
theoretical guarantee are self-play, minimax and the adaptive strategy (based
on features from F). Joma successfully models minimax as a memoryless op-
ponent, while the adaptive strategy as a memory size 3 opponent. Though the
MAL algorithms are non Markovian from Joma’s perspective, it still exploits
them well. In all of our experiments involving the MAL algorithms, Joma
successfully models them based on at most the past 4 joint-actions from his-
tory.
6arbitrary memory bounded agents of memory size 3 generated randomly.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter introduces a novel MAL algorithm, called Joma, that in
an arbitrary repeated matrix game, in the presence of Markovian agents in the
population, is the first to provably achieve a joint-return very close to the SW
maximizing joint-return. Along with a thorough theoretical analysis of Joma’s
sample complexity properties, we also present some initial empirical results
from the gamut testbed demonstrating its relative effectiveness compared to
some of its predecessors. In the next chapter we present more simpler variants
of the MLeM and MLeM(S) subroutines, which are easier to implement.
Though these new algorithms fail to provide similar theoretical guarantees of









































Figure 5.2: Comparative results in different games from gamut. The experi-
ments were conducted over 3 player versions of each game, with two self agents
and the third agent drawn randomly from the set of benchmark agents, along
with minimax, self agent and arbitrary memory-bounded strategies of size 3.
The X axis of the plot shows the different games while the Y axis shows the
converged SW value for each algorithm achieved in a game as a fraction of the
best converged SW value achieved by any algorithm for that game.
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Chapter 6
Targeted Modeling of Markovian agents
In the previous chapter, we introduced an algorithm Joma that in the
presence of Markovian agents in the population, provably achieves a joint re-
turn very close to the SW maximizing joint return by exploiting the Markovian
agents maximally, in efficient sample complexity. We assume that Joma has
some prior knowledge of the possible set of features F upon which the Marko-
vian agents may base their policies, but not the exact set. Being unaware of
the exact feature set that determines the Markovian agents’ policies, Joma
maintains different models of the latter based on different combinations of fea-
tures from F. Then in online repeated play, the main objective of Joma is to
figure out which amongst these models successfully determine the policies of
the Markovian agents and consequently plan its actions based on that. In or-
der to do so, Joma relies on two subroutines, namely MLeM(S) and MLeM,
that implement its two main components, namely the model selection and the
action selection component.
However as observed in Section 5.6, an implementation of these sub-
routines straight from their theoretical specification is challenging. We refer
the reader to Section 5.6 for a complete account of why that is so. Our main
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goal in this chapter is to propose simpler variants of these subroutines that are
easier to implement. In the process we forego the neat theoretical properties
of MLeM(S) and MLeM, however based on our systematic empirical analy-
sis presented in this chapter, the proposed approaches appear to work well in
practice.
Just like MLeM (and hence MLeM(S)), our setting of interest in this
chapter is a repeated game between an agent under our control and other
Markovian agents. Once again observing that we can treat all the Markovian
agents in the population as a single Markovian agent whose policy and action
space is just the joint policy and joint action space of all the Markovian agents
respectively, we treat the problem as a two player repeated game against a
Markovian agent o with an unknown policy πo and action space A. We assume
prior knowledge of a set of features F which is of size n, some of which are
assumed to characterize the unknown πo. The purpose of this chapter is then
to propose a couple of algorithms, called Targeted Opponent M odeler for
M arkovian Agents (or Tomma) and its sequential counterpart Tomma(S),
that suffice as simpler variants of MLeM and MLeM(S) respectively.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 in-
troduces Tomma(S) and Tomma, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 introduce a couple of
surveillance based domains used as test beds for our empirical analysis along
with some empirical results, and Section 6.4 summarizes the chapter.
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6.1 Algorithms and Analysis
Just like we did for MLeM, we begin by proposing a solution to a
simplified version of the modeling problem that relies on the sequential struc-
ture assumption: the sequential structure learning problem (see Definition 21
from Chapter 5). Here the features in F are arranged in a sequence such that
all of the K relevant features that determine πo precede the irrelevant ones
in the sequence, with K being unknown. We call our variation of Tomma
for this problem Tomma(S), with the S standing for the sequential structure
assumption. Later we build on it to solve the general problem where F does
not satisfy the sequential structure assumption, and present Tomma.
6.1.1 Tomma(S)
The concept of a model for πo for Tomma(S) is very similar to that for
MLeM(S) except for one crucial difference. For the sake of completeness, we
reintroduce the concept of a model and in the process explain this difference.
Since Tomma(S) is unaware of the exact K that characterizes πo, it
maintains a model of πo for each set of features that can be incrementally
generated by choosing the first k features from F, k ∈ [0 : n]. Let the model
that is based on the first k features be π̂k. Formally, π̂k : {f1, . . . , fk} 7→ ∆A.
Note π̂0 is a model that is completely stationary, and independent of any
features. Internally each π̂k maintains a value Mk(bk) which is the maximum
likelihood distribution of o’s play, for every possible value bk of the first k
features from F. Whenever the first k features assume a value bk in online
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play, we say a visit to bk has occurred. π̂k(bk) is then defined as,
π̂k(bk) =
{
Mk(bk) once visit(bk) = m,
⊥ when visit(bk) < m;
(6.1)
where visit(bk) is the number of times bk has been visited, and m is a system
level parameter. In other words, once a bk is visited m times, we consider
the estimate Mk(bk) reliable, and assign π̂k(bk) to it. Henceforth we make
no updates to π̂k(bk) (for visit(bk) > m). If a reliable estimate of Mk(bk) is
unavailable (when visit(bk) < m), then π̂k(bk) is set to ⊥ (meaning “I do not
know”).
Note the main difference with the definition of a model pertaining to
MLeM(S) (Equation 5.1) is that now we require the same number of visits
to all bk’s to consider the estimate Mk(bk) reliable, i.e., ∀k,mk = m.
Having introduced the concept of a model, we next present the algo-
rithmic outline for Tomma(S) (Algorithm 9). The inputs to Algorithm 9 are
the feature set F, m, a small probability value δ and the planning horizon T .
Algorithm 9 operates by planning for T time steps at a time. At the begin-
ning of every such planning iteration, it computes a best estimate model for
πo, denoted by π̂best, based on its past interactions with o. It then uses π̂best
to compute a T -step action selection policy which it follows for the next T
steps. Both Tomma(S) and Tomma share the same algorithmic outline of
Algorithm 9. The two places in Algorithm 9 where they differ are (i) how
they compute their respective π̂best, and (ii) how they compute the T -step
action selection policy. We first show how Tomma(S) addresses these two
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Algorithm 9: Tomma(S) and Tomma
input: F, m, δ, T
repeat
Determine π̂best (best predictive model of πo);
Compute T -step action selection policy using π̂best;
τ ← 1;
repeat
Execute the action selection policy;
τ ← τ + 1;
until τ > T
Update all models based on past T joint actions;
until forever
sub-problems.
Model selection: The objective of the model selection component of
Tomma(S) is to output the best predictive model for πo from all of the n + 1
models maintained. We call a model to be of size k if it uses the first k features
from F. Initially π̂0 is assigned to π̂best. Recall that the first K features from F
completely determine πo, K being unknown. Then, all models of size ≥ K can
learn πo accurately (as they include all of the relevant features), with the bigger
models requiring more samples to do so. On the other hand, models of size
< K cannot fully represent πo. Then Tomma(S) chooses π̂best by comparing
models of increasing size, to determine the shortest most descriptive model
such that the next larger model ceases to be more predictive of πo.
A careful reader will notice that there is a significant difference between
the model selection mechanism of Tomma(S) and MLeM(S), though they
both appear to be very similar. In case of MLeM(S), we search for the
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shortest model such that all larger models cease to be more predictive, not
just the next larger one.
Assume at some planning iteration, π̂best = π̂k. In the next planning
iteration, Tomma(S) compares π̂k with π̂k+1. In order to do so, it first com-
putes a ∆k that is the difference in prediction of π̂k and π̂k+1 (computed using
Equation 5.3). Then it computes a σk. If ∆k = −1, then we assign σk = 1. If
∆k 6= −1, then the computed σk is the tightest estimate satisfying the following
condition (akin to the computation of σk for MLeM(S), see Equation 5.4):
Pr(∆k < σk) > 1 − δ if E(∆k) = 0 (6.2)
where δ is the small probability value taken as input. By tightest we mean
an estimate as close to ∆k as possible. What Equation 6.2 suggests is that
given the data seen so far, if there is no statistical evidence to the claim that
a model spanning over the first k + 1 features from F is more predictive than
one spanning over the first k features from F (i.e. E(∆k) = 0), then ∆k should
always be less than the computed σk with a high probability of at least 1−δ. A
careful reader would observe that for K ≤ k < n, E(∆k) is always 0. However
in the initial stages of learning, E(∆k) = 0 may also hold for some k < K. This
is generally true when we have not explored enough to deduce the relevance
of all K features.










Recall from Chapter 5 that Nk+1 is the size of the feature space {f1, . . . , fk+1}.
It can be shown through a couple of applications of Hoeffding bound and
union bound, that if we assign σk using Equation 6.3, then the condition from
Equation 6.2 remains satisfied. Complete details of how we arrived at this are
presented in Appendix C.1.
Now if ∆k exceeds σk, Tomma(S) has reason to believe that π̂k is not
the correct model for πo and it updates π̂best to π̂k+1; otherwise it retains π̂k
as π̂best. Later at the end of this Section, we explain that once converged to
the correct model π̂K , the error probability with which Tomma(S) switches
mistakenly to a bigger model is upper-bounded by δ.
Note that our model selection in this case is much greedier than that
of MLeM(S). We could have used the same model selection component of
MLeM(S) (i.e., Find-Model(S)) over here as well. However, we want to
deliberately use a greedier model selection to pave way for the model selec-
tion of Tomma, which is greedy in similar fashion and computationally more
efficient than that of MLeM.
Action selection: Akin to MLeM(S), the T -step action selection
policy for Tomma(S) is based on Rmax [15]. Now, assume at some planning
iteration, π̂best = π̂k, which means that data from past plays suggest that π̂k
is as predictive as π̂k+1, with a high likelihood. To be more certain about this
hypothesis, Tomma(S) strives to explore the entire feature space pertaining
to the feature set {f1, . . . , fk+1}, m times. In order to do so, it follows Rmax
assuming the state space is determined by the feature space {f1, . . . , fk+1},
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while the transition and the reward functions are determined by π̂k+1. Two
things can happen from there onwards. Either, (1) because of this exhaustive
exploration of the feature space {f1, . . . , fk+1}, it infers that π̂k+1 is indeed
more predictive than π̂k, and switches to π̂k+1 as π̂best. Or, (2) the above does
not happen, and Rmax converges to exploiting based on π̂k+1. The hope is
that by following this incremental style of exploration, it will incrementally
switch through different models, until it converges to π̂K . From that point
onwards it never switches to a bigger model, with a high likelihood of 1 − δ.
However unlike MLeM(S), there remains a chance that Tomma(S)
may get stuck at a local optimum by converging to a smaller sized model be-
cause of insufficient exploration. This generally happens when the exploration
is restricted to only a part of the state space, where only some amongst the
relevant features are truly active. We consider this to be an acceptable trade-
off, especially in time critical missions, where the goal is to quickly compute a
reasonable model of the other agent, and act based on it.
This concludes our presentation of Tomma(S). We next build on it to
propose the full blown Tomma algorithm that does not make the sequential
structure assumption for F.
6.1.2 Tomma
The most important difference between the general modeling problem,
and its sequential counterpart is that the former does not have access to a
feature set F with the relevant features preceding the irrelevant ones. So
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unlike Tomma(S), Tomma does not have access to an ordered model space
which it can incrementally search for the correct model.
Tomma maintains a model for every combination of features from F,
and it sorts them in a sequence such that the ones which are quicker to learn
precede the others. For example if the features are based on different mem-
ory sizes (as in our empirical analyses in Sections 6.2 and 6.3), models which
are based on features computed from smaller memory sizes precede the ones
based on features computed from bigger memory sizes since they are quicker
to learn. If such a predefined ordering is not feasible, then we proceed with an
arbitrary ordering of models sorted based on their sizes. Tomma then incre-
mentally searches this model space to find the first model from this sequence
that determines πo.
Algorithm 10 gives an example of a comparator function that can be
used to compare two models π̂ and π̄ which are based on features computed
from different memory sizes. The function MemSize(π̂, x) first arranges the
features that comprise π̂ in increasing order of memory sizes, and then returns
the memory size of the x’th feature from this ordering.
Model selection: The model selection for Tomma happens in a sim-
ilar fashion to that of Tomma(S) except for a few subtle differences. Initially
π̂best is assigned to the model appearing first in the sorted sequence, i.e., the
completely stationary model. Assume at some planning phase, π̂best = π̂. Then
in the next planning phase,Tomma compares π̂ with all possible models that
include all features from π̂ plus one additional feature, to check whether there
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Algorithm 10: A sample Model Comparator for Tomma
input: π̂, π̄
s1 ← size of π̂; s2 ← size of π̄;
while s1 > 0 and s2 > 0 do
if MemSize(π̂, s1) < MemSize(π̄, s2) then
return π̂ < π̄;
if MemSize(π̂, s1) > MemSize(π̄, s2) then
return π̄ < π̂;
s1 ← s1 − 1;s2 ← s2 − 1;
if s1 == 0 then
return π̂ < π̄;
else
return π̂ > π̄;
is any incremental model that is more predictive than π̂. If it finds one, say π̄,
it rejects π̂ and switches to the next model in its model sequence. The com-
parison between every pair of such models is performed in the same manner
as presented in Equation 6.2.
It is important to note that it does not directly switch to π̄ as the next
model to check because all we can infer is that π̄ is more predictive than π̂.
But π̄ can still be sub-optimal, and there may be other models following π̂
and preceding π̄ in the sorted model sequence, which are better candidates for
πo and are easier to learn. We can only find them by incrementally searching
through the model sequence.
Action selection: The T -step action selection policy for Tomma is
also very similar to that of Tomma(S) except for one significant difference.
Assume F= {f1, f2, f3, f4}. Assume at some planning phase, π̂best = π̂ where π̂
130
is based on features f1 and f3. For that phase, Tomma follows Rmax assuming
the state space is a combination of all individual feature spaces comprised of
all features from π̂ plus an additional feature. In the above example, this boils
down to the state space being a combination of feature spaces {f1, f2, f3} and
{f1, f3, f4}. Thus, for all states which have an unvisited entry (an instantiation
of the feature set {f1, f2, f3} or {f1, f3, f4}, which have not been visited m
times), it provides the exploration bonus. For all other states, it assumes that
the transition and reward functions are determined by π̂. In spirit similar to
Tomma(S), it then strives to explore all states pertaining to this augmented
state space, m times, for evidence suggesting that π̂ is insufficient for modeling
πo. If it cannot find one, Rmax converges to exploiting based on π̂.
Like Tomma(S) and unlike MLeM, Tomma too may get stuck at a
local optimum by converging to a sub-optimal model because of insufficient
exploration. As suggested earlier, we consider this to be an acceptable tradeoff.
However, once converged to the correct model π̂K , both Tomma(S)
and Tomma stick to it with a very high probability from then onwards. In
fact it is not hard to show that the false negative rate of the model selec-
tion component for Tomma(S) and Tomma are δ and nδ respectively. The
following paragraph explains why.
Consider first the case of Tomma(S). All we need to compute is the
probability with which Tomma(S) rejects π̂K , once it has rejected all smaller
sized models. Assume the worst case that this occurs only after all of the
possible bK’s, and bK+1’s get visited m times. From Equation 6.2, Tomma(S)
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can only reject π̂K with error probability at most δ. Suppose it does not reject
π̂K . Then it should not reject π̂K in the future either, since the estimates of
∆K and σK never change from then onwards (since all of the possible bK’s,
and bK+1’s have already been visited m times, and there can be no future
updates to models π̂K and π̂K+1). Thus the error probability of rejecting π̂K
is strictly upper-bounded by δ. The proof for Tomma follows in a similar
fashion. The error probability in this case is nδ, because we have to sum up
the error from all model comparisons performed on the correct model, which
is upper-bounded by n (size of F).
This concludes our description of the algorithms, and their properties.
We now present our first domain for empirical analysis.
6.2 The Surveillance Game
To empirically validate our algorithms, we introduce a challenging new
domain — The Surveillance Game. The game is motivated by the multi-robot
patrol problem, a well studied problem in the robotics community, e.g. [1, 53].
In the general version of the problem, a team of robots is required to re-
peatedly visit some target area (e.g., perimeter, 2-D environment) in order to
maximize its chance of detecting certain adversaries which are trying to pene-
trate through the patrol path. Although the problem has received considerable
attention in recent years, past research tends to seek fixed patrol paths that
do not adapt to adversary behavior. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
prior work on deploying learning agents for surveillance.
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6.2.1 Game specifics
In the Surveillance Game (see Figure 6.1), the perimeter is divided into
P discrete segments. There are k robots monitoring the perimeter, denoted
by Ri, 0 ≤ i < k. Each robot is in charge of a fraction of the perimeter of
size P
k
, with one-segment overlaps at the boundaries. Thus R0 is in charge
of perimeter segments 0 to ⌈P
k






⌉, and so forth. There are k intruders denoted by Ii, 0 ≤ i < k, each
attempting to penetrate through one of the boundary segments (henceforth
known as the penetration segments). Specifically, I0 tries to penetrate through
segment 0, I1 through segment ⌈
P
k
⌉, and so on. So ∀0 ≤ i < k−1, Ri and Ri+1
share the job of preventing Ii+1 from penetrating through penetration segment
⌈(i+1)P
k
⌉, while Rk−1 and R0 jointly try to prevent I0 from penetrating through
penetration segment 0. Apart from preventing the intruders from penetrating,
the robots also have an additional task of periodically patrolling their part of
the perimeter, with the idea that they have some other duty to perform along
the way, which is not mission critical, but that is best done frequently (such
as cleaning).
We assume the presence of a centralized controller that has full visi-
bility, and controls the robots. We decide the action selection on every time
step for the controller, not the intruders. The robots can move to an adjacent
segment in 1 time step. Each penetration takes τ > 0 time steps to complete.
To keep the problem tractable, we assume that there are just two actions avail-
able to each robot: whenever a robot reaches a penetration segment, it can
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either take a short lap, or a long lap. A short lap is when the robot leaves the
penetration segment, and comes back just in time to catch a penetration (if
one happened), i.e., it moves τ/2 segments away and then returns so that it’s
guaranteed to catch any intruder that started to penetrate while it was gone.
A long lap is when the robot traverses its complete range of segments, e.g.,




versa. If a robot reaches a penetration segment while a penetration is taking
place, we say that the intruder has been caught, with no penalty incurred. On
the other hand each successful penetration leads to a penalty of RPen (or a
reward of −RPen). The robots get a positive reward of RLO, and ξ
ZRHI for
every short and long lap respectively, with RLO < RHI < RPen. 0 ≤ ξ < 1 is
a system level decay constant, and Z is the number of actions elapsed since
that robot last took a long lap. This reward structure incentivizes the robots
to take long laps periodically.
All of our empirical results focus on the following instance of this
domain: P = 36, k = 3, τ = 8, RLO = 5, RHI = 100, RPen = 500, and
ξ = 0.9 (Figure 6.1). Henceforth, we always allude to this domain instance.
6.2.2 Intruder behavior
Clearly, the intruders’ behavior is germane to the problem as based on
it the robots respond. We assume that the intruders know everything about
the domain except the reward structure and the policy of the robots which are











short lap short lap
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penetration segment for I0
R2 R0
Figure 6.1: The Surveillance Game.
long laps. Whether an intruder penetrates on a particular time step depends
on its own estimate of the probability with which it might get caught, a.k.a.
probability of penetration detection (ppd). We next explain the crucial concept
of ppd with an example.
An intruder’s estimate of ppd is based on its own estimate of the robots’
policy, i.e., how do the two robots guarding the penetration segment balance
between taking short and long laps. In order to do that it maintains different
estimates of the robots policy based on different memory sizes. Assume I0
is computing the ppd for a memory size L. This means I0 keeps track of
the ratio of the number of times R0 and R2 took short laps in their past L
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actions. Denote these values as xR0 , and xR2 respectively. To I0, xR0 is thus an
estimate of R0’s policy. Assume a scenario where R0 and R2 are at segments
3 and 33 respectively, and are moving away from segment 0 (Figure 6.1). If I0
decides to penetrate at that time step, the probability with which it believes
it is going to get caught by either R0 or R2 is xR0 + (1 − xR0)xR2 . Thus the
corresponding ppd value for I0 at that time step based on memory size L is
xR0 + (1 − xR0)xR2 .
We consider two types of intruders - one deterministic, the other stochas-
tic. Both maintain a set of ppd values based on different memory sizes. These
multiple models reflect the intruder’s uncertainty in choosing a memory size
that best characterizes the ppd value. They also maintain a threshold value
denoted by 0 < η < 1.
The deterministic type decides to intrude if all its maintained ppd values are
< η, otherwise not.
The stochastic type decides to intrude with probability 1−η, if the minimum
ppd value amongst all its maintained ppd values is < η, otherwise not.
The different scenarios of intrusion consider in our experiments (by
varying each of the relevant parameters) is summarized in Table 6.1. For
example in Case 1, all the intruders are of stochastic type using ppd values
from memory sizes {10, 20, 30}, and having η = 0.4.
Note, all the intruders considered are memory-bounded and hence Marko-
vian by definition. However, their memory size can be as big as 30 (Cases 1-6
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Case Population ppd from Memory sizes η
1 All S All {10, 20, 30} All .4
2 All S All {10, 20, 30} I0, I1 = .2, I2 = .4
3 All D All {10, 20, 30} All .4
4 All D All {10, 20, 30} I0, I1 = .2, I2 = .4
5 I0, I1= D, I2= S All {10, 20, 30} All .4
6 I0, I1= D, I2= S All {10, 20, 30} I0, I1 = .2, I2 = .4
7∗ All S All {5, 15, 25} All .4
Table 6.1: Different cases of intrusion considered.
(D stands for a deterministic intruder, and S stands for a stochastic intruder.)
from Table 6.1). Treating the past 30 joint-actions as features renders the prob-
lem intractable. To tackle that, we model the intruders using ppd estimates as
features. This gives us a compact way of representing their policy and renders
the learning problem tractable. As long we have the correct ppd estimates,
ones which are computed from memory sizes 10, 20 and 30 for Cases 1-6, we
have the adequate representative capacity to model these intruders. However,
maintaining such concise statistics as features makes the underlying setting
non-Markovian. This is because the values of these features at time step t + 1
is not determined by their collective values and the joint action taken, from
time t. In a way we have applied a function approximator [70] over the real
Markovian feature space and rendered the problem non-Markovian. Thus our
goal is not to converge to an optimal policy since in many scenarios it may not
be possible to compute one, but to show that both Tomma(S) and Tomma
compute decent policies which lead to a high return. In Section 6.2.3, we
discuss how we deal with the non-Markovian nature of the underlying setting
137
while computing an action selection policy for our algorithms.
Having introduced the game specifics and the different scenarios of
intruder behavior, we next move on to our empirical results.
6.2.3 Results for the Surveillance Game
The most natural comparison point for Tomma is against current ap-
proaches from the literature that tackle memory-bounded agents, such as
PCM(A) [58] and CMLeS (introduced in Chapter 4). However none of them
scale to large memory sizes: in Cases 1-6 from Table 6.1, these approaches
would need to explore all joint histories of size 30 to compute the optimal pol-
icy, and thus would be prohibitively sample inefficient. Instead, we perform
the following comparisons. In the first set of experiments, we compare different
variations of Tomma and Tomma(S) (with different feature sets as input) to
see how they fair under different input settings. While in the second set of
experiments, we compare how MLeM(S) and MLeM fair when implemented
with the same set of adjustments as suggested in Section 5.6.
6.2.3.1 Experiments involving Tomma(S) and Tomma
Our first set of results focuses on Cases 1-6 from Table 6.1. The different
algorithms considered for the controller for these cases are:
1. Tomma(S) with feature set F1 (denoted by Tomma(S)-1) comprised of
ppds derived from memory sizes {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. Note, F1 satisfies the
sequential structure assumption for all Cases 1-6. In each of these cases the
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ppds for the intruders are derived from memory sizes 10, 20 and 30: the first
three features of F1;
2. Tomma(S) with feature set F2 (denoted by Tomma(S)-2) comprised of
ppds derived from memory sizes {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40}. Note, F2 does not
satisfy the sequential structure assumption, but includes all of the relevant
features;
3. Tomma with feature set F2;
4. Known-Model (denoted by K-M) that assumes full prior knowledge of
the relevant features;
Since the ppd values are continuous values ∈ [0, 1], we discretize the
feature space for them into 5 intervals of length 0.2. K-M runs Rmax with
m = 35. In all our experiments, we seed all variations of Tomma with values:
δ = 0.2, m = 35 and ξ = 0.9. Our results for cases which involve stochasticity
have been averaged over 40 runs (all cases except 3 and 4 from Table 6.1).
Under normal circumstances while dealing with a Markovian agent, the
T -step action selection policy on any planning iteration is just the stationary
Rmax policy for the underlying MDP executed for T steps (computed using
Value Iteration). However, since we are in a non-Markovian setting, we cannot
solve for a stationary Rmax policy. We counteract this by making a necessary
adjustment to our action selection component. Our planning iteration lasts for
just one time step. However on each time step, we compute a 10-step episodic
Rmax policy and execute the action prescribed by it for the current time step.


























Figure 6.2: Cumulative reward plot for Case 1.
for the current time step based on it.
Our objective is to check how well the different variations of Tomma
and Tomma(S) compete with K-M. Note that the final policy computed by
K-M is the best policy that we can expect to compute given the different
parameter values we use for our algorithms. Hence with a slight abuse of
terminology, we refer to the final policy computed by K-M as the optimal
policy - the one we strive to achieve.
Figures 6.2 to 6.7 show the cumulative reward plots of all of our algo-
rithms for Cases 1- 6. Each of these plots show the convergence to the optimal
policy for the different algorithms (convergence is indicated when the upward





























Figure 6.3: Cumulative reward plot for Case 2.
Also as expected Tomma(S)-1 dominates Tomma, while Tomma dom-
inates Tomma(S)-2, with respect to the convergence to the optimal policy.
Tomma(S)-1 benefits from having prior knowledge of a feature set (F1) where
the features satisfy the sequential structure assumption. This explains why it
performs the best. Tomma(S)-2 also assumes that it has a sequential feature
set, however is provided with an incorrect one (F2). Hence it has to learn a
much bigger model than Tomma(S)-1, and does the worst. Tomma is bet-
ter suited for arbitrary feature sets and hence does better than Tomma(S)-2.
Note in all of these cases, both Tomma(S)-1 and Tomma consistently con-
verge to the optimal policy (indicated by almost similar slopes to that of K-M
in all of the Figures 6.2 to 6.7).
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show all the different models that Tomma(S) and























































Figure 6.5: Cumulative reward plot for Case 4.
model comprised of ppd values from memory sizes {10, 20, 30}. The Y-axis of
the two plots shows the different models that Tomma(S) and Tomma skip






















































Figure 6.7: Cumulative reward plot for Case 6.
to a model that is based on ppds derived from memory sizes 10 and 20. Note
in the case of Tomma(S)-1 (Figure 6.8), the sequence of different models are
computed by incrementally selecting features from F1, whereas in the case of
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Tomma (Figure 6.9) the sequence of different models are computed by sorting
all possible models based on the sort comparator introduced in Algorithm 10.
In the latter case, models which are easier to learn (i.e., ones which are based
on smaller memory sizes) take precedence. Since the model selection for all
the other cases (Cases 2 - 6 from Table 6.1) are qualitatively the same, we
omit their plots.
In all of these experiments, the difference between the converged values
(both number of time steps taken to converge to the correct model and the
optimal policy) between every pair of algorithms, for all the cases, is statis-
tically significant (by T-test, p-value < 0.05). Also very importantly, both
Tomma and the two versions of Tomma(S), once converged to the correct
model, never switch to a bigger model. This stability provides empirical evi-
dence in support of our claim that the false negative rate of the model selection
component of both Tomma(S) and Tomma is low.
Our next results concern Case 7 from Table 6.1. In this case, we em-
ploy Tomma, and Tomma(S) with a feature set F= {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. Note,
the feature set does not have the relevant features for the intruders strategies’
since the latter is determined by ppds derived from memory sizes 5, 15 and 25.
Again, K-M assumes full prior knowledge of the relevant features. Figure 6.10
shows the convergence to the final policy for the different algorithms. Note,
neither of our algorithms converges to the optimal policy, the one K-M con-
verges to (different slopes). However, each learns a decent sub-optimal model


























Figure 6.8: Model selection for Tomma(S)-1 for Case 1. The I0 plot shows











































Figure 6.9: Model selection for Tomma for Case 1. The I0 plot shows the
model selection for intruder I0, and so forth.
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if F does not contain the relevant features, but has reasonably good ones, our


























Figure 6.10: Cumulative reward plot for Case 7.
6.2.3.2 Experiments involving MLeM(S) and MLeM
In our second set of experiments, we tested with MLeM(S) and MLeM
as the algorithm used by the centralized controller. We make the same set of
empirical adjustments for these algorithms as we did in Chapter 5. We seed
these algorithms with an m, δ and F. m plays the role of mk and is the same
for models of all sizes. δ is required to compute the value of σk (Equation 6.3).
All our results are reported for m = 35 and δ = 0.2. For MLeM(S), F is
comprised of ppds derived from memory sizes {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} (the set F1
from our previous set of experiments), whereas for MLeM, F comprised of
ppds derived from memory sizes {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40} (the set F2 from our
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previous set of experiments). Clearly in case of MLeM(S), F satisfies the
sequential structure assumption. Also alike Chapter 5, we ran MLeM(S) and
MLeM without any exploratory iterations, relying solely on the exploration
from the greedy iterations.
Like our implementation of MLeM, the planning iteration in this case
also lasts for just one time step. On each time step, we compute a 10-step
episodic Rmax policy and execute the action prescribed by it for the current
time step. This involves creating a lookahead tree of size 10 and choosing the
best action for the current time step based on it. As suggested earlier, this can
be seen as a counter measure to dealing with the underlying non-Markovian
setting.
Unfortunately in all cases from Table 6.1, both MLeM(S) and MLeM
never converge to the correct model. In all of these cases, they converge to
exploiting based on a shorter incorrect model and achieve a sub-optimal return.
The only exceptions are Cases 3 and 4, where despite exploiting based on a
shorted model, they learn to follow the optimal policy. Figure 6.11 shows
that for Case 1, MLeM(S) converges to exploiting based on a model based
on ppd derived from memory size 10. Whereas Figure 6.12 shows that for
Case 1, MLeM though learns a decent model based on ppds derived from
bigger memory sizes, yet in the end fails to learn the correct model. Since the
other model selection plots for Cases 2 - 6 are qualitatively similar to that of
Figures 6.11 and 6.12, we omit them.


























Figure 6.11: Model selection for MLeM(S) for Case 1. The I0 plot shows the











































Figure 6.12: Model selection for MLeM for Case 1. The I0 plot shows the
model selection for intruder I0, and so forth.
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to learn the correct model, whereas Tomma(S) and Tomma succeeded. We
believe the reason is that in case of the latter, the algorithms are deliberately
designed to explore the next bigger model(s) in the model sequence and only
converge to exploiting when the next bigger model(s) do not contribute to
the predictiveness. In that fashion the exploration bias helps it to hop over
sub-optimal models and try bigger models which appear to be more predictive.
On the contrary our approximate empirical implementation of MLeM(S) and
MLeM, relies solely on exploring based on the current model. Though this
still might lead to decent exploration and convergence to locally good models,
its exploratory bias is not as sophisticated as that of Tomma(S) and Tomma.
We now move on to present results from our second domain of interest.
6.3 The Ticket Checking domain
The Ticket Checking domain is inspired by a real life problem of catch-
ing passengers who do not buy a ticket (or evaders) while traveling on trains.
For example in urban transit systems such as the Los Angeles Metro Rail sys-
tem, passengers are legally required to buy a ticket before boarding a train, but
there are no checkpoints prior to boarding which physically deny evaders from
boarding a train. Instead patrol officers are deployed in the transit system
to check for evaders. A key research question is how to intelligently sched-
ule these patrol officers so that the chances of catching evaders is maximized.
Currently the state-of-the-art approach to solving the problem is a stationary
Stackelberg policy which assumes that the evaders a-priori know the strategy
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of the patrol officers and best respond to it [42]. In this section we deal with
possibly more realistic evaders who decide their current step action (whether
to buy a ticket or not) based on their observations from the past few days.
Our results show that Tomma(S) and Tomma significantly outperform the
Stackelberg policy in such scenarios. We begin by introducing the domain,
and then move on to present our results.
6.3.1 Domain specifics
Our implementation of the domain is similar to the one specified in [42].
The transit system is characterized by the number of stations, denoted by
Stations, and the number of time units denoted by Time. The train system
consists of a single line, that is all the trains travel in the same direction visiting
the same set of stations at specific time points. For simplicity, we assume that
the time taken by a train to travel between any two stations is always the
same. So we can model time as slotted, focussing only on time points at which
some train arrives at a particular station.
For example consider the transit system from Figure 6.13. There are
three 3 stations in the system, denoted by A, B and C. Each train starts at
station A, visits station B at 1 time point and finally terminates at station C
at another time point. Let the time point when a train leaves station A be t.
Then the path of that train can be defined as At − B(t + 1) − C(t + 2). We
identify each train by its unique train path. So the 6 possible trains in this
transit system are A1−B2−C3, A2−B3−C4, A3−B4−C5, A4−B5−C6,
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A5 − B6 − C7 and A6 − B7 − C8.
We assume that the total number of passengers P using the system and
their distribution across the different routes remain the same every day. Each
passenger takes his preferred route regardless of the patrol strategy. Also each
passenger boards a train from a specific station and leaves at a specific station
in a train path. We further assume that each passenger takes at least one time
unit to exit the station once he leaves the train. This is to allow some time
for a patrol officer to check for his ticket given there exists one to perform
that check. So the 3 possible passenger routes for the train A1−B2−C3 are
A1 − B2 − C2, A1 − B2 − C3 − C4 and B2 − C3 − C4. Note that in each
of these routes, each passenger stays at the exiting station for at least 1 time
unit. In our example from Figure 6.13, there are 3 × 6 = 18 such passenger
routes.
There are a fixed number γ of deployable patrol officers, each of whom
can be scheduled for at most ξ time units. There are two types of atomic
patrol actions: on-train inspection where an officer checks for tickets while
traveling on a train from one station to the other, or in-station inspection
where an officer checks for tickets of off-boarding passengers at a particular
station, each lasting for 1 time unit. Thus a feasible strategy for any patrol
officer can be any sequence of such atomic actions of size ξ. For example
if ξ = 3, a possible strategy for a patrol officer for the transit system from
Figure 6.13 can be A1−B2−C3−C4, which comprises 2 on-train inspections,





1 32 4 5 6 7 8







Figure 6.13: The transit system with 3 stations and 8 time units.
C3 − C4 − C5 − C6 is another such possible patrol strategy which comprises
3 in-station inspections, namely C3 − C4, C4 − C5 and C5 − C6.
However, just because an evader travels in a train with a patrol officer
does not mean that he is going to get caught. It might be that the evader is
standing at the very end of the train and there may be not be enough time
for the patrol officer to reach all the way to the end of the train to catch him.
So given a patrol strategy P and a rider route Z, the inspection probability of




f ∈ [0, 1] is a system defined fixed probability with which an evader gets
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caught for an atomic patrol action on his route. We justify the inspection
probability as follows. We assume that for on-train inspections, the riders are
inspected one at a time starting from the start of the train. The fraction of
the train that is inspected depends on the duration of the on-train inspections.
Given sufficient number of such on-train inspections, the patrol works his way
through the entire train and eventually catches an evader at the end of the
train. Similarly for in-station inspections, a patrol officer can be assigned to
any random compartment of the train and can only inspect a fraction f of the
total volume of passengers. That explains why the inspection probability adds
up. The total inspection probability is the sum of the inspection probabilities
from all patrol strategies, each pertaining to a patrol officer.
We assume that each passenger is risk neutral. That is each passenger
makes a binary decision of buying a ticket, or not, based on his expected
cost from performing the two actions on that particular day. For example,
let the price of a ticket be Fare and the fine for fare evasion when caught be
Fine. Also assume that the passenger’s internal estimate of the probability of
getting detected on that particular day (explained in the next paragraph) for
not buying a ticket be p. Then a risk neutral passenger prefers not to buy a
ticket as long as the following inequality holds, p×Fine < Fare, or, p < Fare
F ine
.
Now all that remains to be explained is how each passenger estimates
his probability of getting detected on a particular day for not buying a ticket,
or pod. We assume that the passengers get to see the patrol officers’ strategies
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on each day 1. Each passenger looks back at a fixed number L of past samples
of patrol officers’ strategies (from last L days) to compute an estimate of the
latter. For example let the passenger route be A1 − B2 − B3 and L = 3.
Assume that in the past 3 days, there has been only one A1 − B2 on-train
inspection and no B2 − B3 in-station inspections. So his estimate is that the
A1 − B2 on-train inspection and the B2 − B3 in-station inspection happens
each day with a probability of 1
3
and 0 respectively. Hence the corresponding
pod estimate is, p = 1
3
× f + 0 × f = 1
3
f .
This concludes our specification of the domain. We next move on to
present our results for this domain.
6.3.2 Results for the Ticket Checking domain
Our results are for a specific instance of the domain with Stations = 3,
Time = 8, P= 1000, Fine = 25, Fare = 10, f = 0.3, γ = 1 (meaning one
patrol officer) and ξ = 5. Figure 6.13 shows the transit system. The population
of 1000 passengers is distributed randomly to each of the 18 possible routes on
each run of our simulation. For each route, we have a mix of passengers who
compute their pod estimates by using L ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Thus for each passenger
route the fraction of the population that evades is determined by the values
of 3 unknown features, namely the pod estimates of that route from memory
sizes 2, 3 and 4.
1Assuming that the word goes around each day on how the patrolling was performed on
that particular day.
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Our results focus on using Tomma(S) and Tomma for determining
the patrol strategy on each day. Akin to the setting in [42], we assume prior
knowledge of the total number of passengers in each route for each simulation
run. Tomma (and also Tomma(S)) maintains different models for each dif-
ferent passenger route. Neither of these algorithms have any prior knowledge
of the exact features. However they assume that the features are drawn from
a set F which comprises pod estimates from values of L ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. A
model for a route is a mapping from a set of pod estimates computed from
different values of L to the fraction of evaders in the population of that route.
Since the pod values are continuous values ∈ [0, 1], we discretize the feature
space for them into 5 intervals of length 0.2. In all of our experiments, we seed
all variations of Tomma with values: δ = 0.2 and m = 1000.
Note that the pod estimates are non-Markovian features as well (just
like ppds). Thus we make a necessary adjustment to our action selection com-
ponent. Our planning iteration lasts for just 1 time step. On each time step,
we compute a 2-step episodic Rmax policy and execute the action prescribed
by it for the current time step. This involves creating a lookahead tree of size
2 and choosing the best action on the current time step based on it.
Our first benchmark for comparison is the Known-Model (or K-M)
version which assumes prior knowledge of all of the relevant features for each
passenger route and runs Rmax with m = 1000. Note that the final policy
computed by K-M is the best policy that we can expect to compute given
the different parameter values we use for our algorithms. Hence with a slight
155
abuse of terminology, we refer to the final policy computed by K-M as the
optimal policy - the one we strive to achieve.
Our second benchmark for comparison is a random strategy, called
Random, that randomly allocates a patrol strategy for our patrol officer from
amongst the possible patrol strategies.
Finally, our third benchmark for comparison is the Stackelberg solution
from [42], called Stackelberg. Note, the total expected payoff (money collected
on each day from both fines and fares) can be decomposed into individual ex-
pected payoffs from bilateral interactions between each individual passenger
and the patrol officer. This implies that the game is payoff equivalent to a
Bayesian Stackelberg game between one patrol officer (leader) and one pas-
senger (follower) whose type is determined by a prior probability distribution
on the different passenger routes. The probability that the passenger is from
passenger route r is proportional to the ratio of the passenger volume on that
route to P. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the Stackelberg solution is the
max-min solution of this Bayesian Stackelberg game. For our domain, we can
easily compute it using a Linear Program.
All of our results have been averaged over 40 runs. As mentioned earlier,
in each such run we randomly assign the route for each passenger to one of
the possible 18 routes. Also for each passenger, the distribution from which
they are assigned one of the values from L ∈ {2, 3, 4} (needed to compute the
pod) is chosen randomly on each such run.
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Figure 6.14 shows the cumulative reward plots of all of our algorithms.
As expected, both the Tomma variants do much worse than K-M. Also as
expected the two variants of Tomma dominate Stackelberg and Random. It
is interesting to see that both the Tomma variants do equally well. The dif-
ference in the cumulative reward obtained after 5000 simulated days between
the two variants of Tomma is statistically insignificant by a T-test. However
the difference in the cumulative reward obtained after 5000 simulated days be-
tween Tomma and Stackelberg is statistically significant by a T-test (p-value
< 0.05). Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the average of the different models that
Tomma(S) and Tomma converged to respectively, for the different passenger
routes. Note in both of these cases, the algorithms converged to exploiting
based on smaller sub-optimal models for each route. However, the models
were decent enough to generate the optimal policy. On average both Tomma
and Tomma(S) converged to following the optimal policy consistently from
day 3500. This is indicated by similar upward slopes of these algorithms in
comparison to that of K-M from day 3500 and onwards.
Stackelberg is a stationary policy that does not adapt to the behavior
of the evaders. Instead it assumes that the passengers always best respond
to it. On the other hand, both of our variations of Tomma leverage from
learning and exploiting the behavior of the evaders to good effect. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to model the behavior of evaders
































Figure 6.14: The cumulative reward plot.
6.4 Summary
Our goal in this chapter was to propose simpler variants of the MLeM(S)
and MLeM algorithms introduced in Chapter 5. The specification of both of
these algorithms were motivated from a theoretical standpoint and empirical
implementation required certain adjustments. The algorithms introduced in
this chapter, namely Tomma(S) and Tomma, are easier to implement than
MLeM(S) and MLeM respectively, and can be implemented straight from
their specification without any empirical adjustments.

























Figure 6.15: Model selection for Tomma(S).
chapter is a repeated game between an agent under our control and another
Markovian agent. We assume prior knowledge of a set of features F some of
which are assumed to characterize the unknown policy of the Markovian agent.
Being unaware of the exact feature set that determines the Markovian agent’s
policy, both Tomma(S) and Tomma maintain different models of the latter
based on different combinations of features from F. Then in online repeated
play, the main objective of these algorithms is to figure out which amongst
these models successfully determines the policy of the Markovian agent and




































Figure 6.16: Model selection for Tomma.
successfully addresses both of the above problems by leveraging insights from
the Rmax algorithm. They are fully implemented with results from two chal-
lenging surveillance based domains demonstrating their effectiveness.
This concludes our discussion on modeling other agents in a repeated
game setting. In Chapters 3 to 6, we presented different algorithms that
provide different sets of guarantees depending on the different assumptions
they make of the agents they are interacting with. In the next chapter we
take a departure from the repeated game setting, the recurrent theme in the
thesis so far, and focus on a specific instance of a single agent RL problem,
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called structure learning for factored MDPs. Here we show how our solution to
modeling a Markovian agent as addressed in Chapter 5, extends to solving this
RL problem with new sample complexity bounds which are competitive and
compares well with the state-of-the-art approach in representative domains.
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Chapter 7
Structure Learning in Factored MDPs
In Chapter 5 we proposed a couple of subroutines, namely MLeM(S)
and MLeM, that are tailored to model and exploit the unknown policy of a
Markovian agent. Both of these subroutines assume prior knowledge of the
possible set of features upon which a Markovian agent may base its policy,
but not the exact set. For both of these subroutine, we pose the problem of
modeling the unknown policy of a Markovian agent as learning the unknown
feature space and transition function of an induced MDP (induced by the
Markovian agent’s policy). Now it so happens that both of these subroutines
can be easily extended to solve a related challenging problem in Reinforcement
Learning (RL), namely structure learning in factored MDPs. The purpose of
this chapter is to lay down the direct correlations between the two aforemen-
tioned problems and show how the MLeM(S) and MLeM subroutines extend
to solve the structure learning problem for factored MDPs.
Representing a MDP [70] with a large state space is challenging due to
the curse of dimensionality. One popular way of doing so is factoring the state
space into discrete factors (a.k.a features), and using formalisms such as the
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) [36] to succinctly represent the state tran-
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sition dynamics. A DBN representation for the factored transition function
can capture the fact that the transition dynamics of a factor is often depen-
dent on only a subset of other factors, called parent factors of that factor (see
Figure 7.1). The size of the biggest set of parent factors is the in-degree of the
DBN. Such an MDP is called a factored state MDP, or simply factored MDP
(FMDP). We refer the reader to Definition 5 from Chapter 2 to re-familiarize
oneself with the formal concept of FMDPs. From a high level, this chapter
addresses the problem of learning the unknown factored transition function
of each individual factor and planning based on it, by efficient exploration
and exploitation. In the RL parlance, the complete problem is often called
structure learning in FMDPs [4, 30].
There are three important parallels between the problem of modeling
a Markovian agent and structure learning in a FMDP. First, in both cases the
underlying framework is a MDP (an AIM in case of the former, see Defini-
tion 17 from Chapter 2). Second, in both cases the structure of the transition
function of the MDP is unknown. In case of a Markovian agent, we are un-
sure which features determine the former’s policy. In case of a FMDP, we
are unsure which parent factors determine the transition of a factor. Third,
in both cases we strive to achieve an actual return close to U∗ in provably
efficient sample complexity. In case of modeling a Markovian agent, U∗ is the
expected return from following the optimal policy in the induced AIM. In case
of structure learning in a FMDP, U∗ is the expected return from following the
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Figure 7.1: A DBN representation with in-degree K = 3. The next step values
for factors X1 and X2 for a particular action depend only on the current step
values of factor sets {X1, X2, X3} and {X1, Xn−1, Xn−3} respectively.
this chapter we focus solely on the problem of structure learning in FMDPs.
Just like we did in all previous chapters, we assume that the FMDP
is a unichain one. As illustrated in Chapter 2, there are a number of key
theoretical properties of unichain FMDPs (or more generally unichain MDPs)
which simplify our analysis. Foremost amongst them is that while trying to
compute an optimal policy for the FMDP, we do not need to worry about
different returns originating from different states. The optimal return is a
unique value denoted by U∗ and can be achieved from any start state by
following the optimal policy. For the rest of the chapter whenever we allude
to a FMDP, we mean a unichain FMDP.
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Some of the earlier work in RL for FMDPs, are extensions of prov-
ably sample efficient RL algorithms for general MDPs. Algorithms such as
Factored-E3 [46] and Factored-Rmax [36] achieve near optimal behavior in a
polynomial number of samples, but require prior knowledge about the struc-
ture of the transition function, in the form of complete DBN structures with
unknown conditional probability tables. More recently, there have been ap-
proaches proposed that do not assume prior knowledge about the structure
of the transition function, and constructs it from experience in the environ-
ment [29, 39]. However, these results are mostly empirical successes in partic-
ular domains, with no formal analysis of sample complexity.
To the best of our knowledge, Slf-Rmax [4] is the first algorithm
to solve the structure learning problem with a formal guarantee on sample
complexity. More recently, [30] proposed Met-Rmax, which improves upon
Slf-Rmax with a better sample complexity guarantee. However, akin to
Slf-Rmax, Met-Rmax requires as input the in-degree (K) of the transition
function’s DBN structure. In this chapter, we are interested in scenarios where
prior knowledge of K is unavailable and K is hard to guess.
Our objective is to propose the first structure learning algorithm for er-
godic FMDPs, called Learn Structure and Exploit with Rmax (Lse-Rmax),
that leverages from our findings in implementing MLeM, to efficiently solve
the problem without requiring a prior knowledge of the in-degree K. Instead
we make a different assumption that is analogous to Assumption 1 from Chap-
ters 4 and 5, stated next.
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Like MLeM, Lse-Rmax operates by planning for T time steps at a
time. In each such planning iteration, it uses the best model of each factored
component of the transition function, namely each Pi,a, at hand and plans
its actions for the next T time steps based on it. To facilitate the theory
behind our claim that Lse-Rmax eventually achieves a return very close to
U∗, we assume that the (ǫ, T ) pair taken as input always satisfies the following
condition:
Assumption 2. The planning horizon T is sufficiently large and the ǫ suffi-
ciently small to ensure that
1. T is the ǫ-return mixing time of the optimal policy for the AIM;
2. for any sub-optimal policy π and for any state s of the induced AIM,
UπT (s) < U
∗ − 2ǫ;
A pertinent question is whether for any FMDP such an (ǫ, T ) pair exists
or not. Let Û be the expected return in the FMDP from the best sub-optimal
policy. Lets choose an ǫ smaller than U
∗−Û
3
. Let T be the maximum of all
ǫ-return mixing times from all policies. Clearly this choice of an (ǫ, T ) pair
satisfies Assumption 2. Hence for any FMDP, there exists an (ǫ, T ) pair that
satisfies Assumption 2.
Our analysis in this entire chapter assumes that Lse-Rmax is aware of
such an (ǫ, T ) pair that satisfies Assumption 2. In cases where it is unaware
of such an (ǫ, T ) pair, the approach presented in Section 4.1.5 which extends
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MLeS to solve this general case, applies here as well. Having noted that we
ignore this case in our analysis.
We propose two variants of Lse-Rmax, for two versions of the problem.
1. The first deals with a specific case where factors for each individual Pi,a
can be arranged in a sequence with the relevant factors (which determine
the transition function) preceding the irrelevant ones in the sequence
(analogous to the sequential structure learning problem from Section 5.2,
see Definition 21).
For example, the probability of a machine running on a particular time
step in a network may depend on the states of its K closest neighbors
from the past step. Though this fact is common knowledge, K may
be unknown. The sequence of factors is then an incremental ordering
of the states of all neighbors based on adjacency, with the immediate
neighbors heading the sequence. We call problems of such a nature
sequential structure learning problems for FMDPs. We believe many
real world problems can be mapped to problems of such nature, and
hence can leverage from our solution.
2. The second deals with the general case where such an ordering is un-
known. Problems of such nature constitute the more general structure
learning problem for FMDPs (analogous to the general structure learning
problem from Section 5.3).
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Since the sample complexity analysis for Lse-Rmax is similar to that
of MLeM, our main goal in this chapter is to tie the knot between the sample
complexity analysis of the two approaches and derive similar style bounds as
derived in Chapter 5. Our bounds are competitive and compare well with that
of Met-Rmax. We also present empirical results from two popular benchmark
domains demonstrating Lse-Rmax’s competitiveness.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 7.1
and 7.2 present Lse-Rmax in detail, Section 7.3 presents our empirical anal-
ysis and Section 7.4 summarizes the chapter.
7.1 Sequential Structure Learning in FMDPs
As suggested earlier, we use the same technique as used in solving
the sequential structure learning problem for modeling a Markovian agent in
solving its counterpart for FMDPs. We refer the reader to Section 5.2 (the
discussion on MLeM(S)) for a complete account of how to solve the sequential
structure learning problem. Our goal in this section is to tie the knot between
our current approach and the one presented in Section 5.2 to derive similar
style sample complexity bounds. Analogous to MLeM(S), we call our variant
of Lse-Rmax tailored to solve this specific problem as Lse-Rmax(S).
Recall from Definition 5 that in a FMDP, each state consists of n dis-
crete factors. Furthermore the transition function of the FMDP is also factored
into n×|A| components, denoted by Pi,a’s, i ≤ n, a ∈ A, and each Pi,a satisfies
the conditional independence assumption. Each Pi,a has its own structure. We
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assume that the in-degree of the DBN structure is K: all factors have at most
K parent factors.
Trivially, the problem can be solved by assuming that every Pi,a is
dependent on all n factors, and running Rmax. The downside of this approach
is that it requires an order of ≈ Õ(dn) data samples, where d is the maximum
of the number of values each Pi,a can assume. Needless to say, the above
approach does not scale for large values of n. Our objective is to solve the
problem in a sample complexity which is polynomial in dK . We begin by
formally defining the sequential structure learning problem for FMDPs.
Definition 25. Sequential Structure Learning problem for FMDPs: We as-
sume that for each Pi,a, we have an ordering of the parent factors and the
first K factors in the ordering determine Pi,a, K being unknown. The learn-
ing problem is how to efficiently model each Pi,a given this rich factor space
representation and achieve a return close to U∗ with a high likelihood, in the
best possible sample complexity.
The main objective of Lse-Rmax(S) is to learn a decent approximation
of each Pi,a, such that the policy computed from such a joint model yields a
return close to U∗. Lse-Rmax(S) then treats each Pi,a in the same fashion
as MLeM(S) treats a Markovian agent whose feature space comprises the
first K features from a set F. So it maintains n × |A| number of MLeM(S)
instances, one pertaining to each Pi,a. On any T -step planning iteration, the
Find-Model(S) component of each MLeM(S) instance returns a specific
169
model for its corresponding Pi,a based on which the action selection module
must operate. The only exception is during the exploratory planning iteration,
where Lse-Rmax(S) in a principled manner chooses a random model for each
Pi,a to explore.
For the action selection part, just like MLeM(S), Lse-Rmax(S) inter-
leaves between executing greedy planning iterations and exploratory planning
iterations. The Rmax policy computation for every greedy planning iteration
happens as follows. Let P̂i,a denote the model chosen by the Find-Model(S)
component of the MLeM(S) instance associated with Pi,a. Then for any state
action pair (s, a), if there exists an (i, a) pair such that P̂i,a(s) =⊥, it means
that Lse-Rmax(S) has no way of estimating Pi,a(s) based on P̂i,a. To fa-
cilitate exploration to such state action pairs, Lse-Rmax(S) gives them the
imaginary exploratory bonus. For all other state action pairs, Lse-Rmax(S)
performs the conventional Bellman backup.
On a similar note, the Rmax policy computation for every exploratory
planning iteration happens as follows. Let the random model chosen for Pi,a
be P̂i,a. Then for any state action pair (s, a), there exists an (i, a) pair such
that P̂i,a(s) =⊥, Lse-Rmax(S) gives that state action pair the imaginary ex-
ploratory bonus. For every other (s, a) pair, it uses the model for Pi,a predicted
by its corresponding Find-Model(S) which is the best predictive model for
the corresponding Pi,a based on the data samples seen so far, to perform the
Bellman back up.
Then through a sample complexity analysis very similar to that of
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Lemma 5.2.2, we appear at the sample complexity bound for Lse-Rmax(S).
But there are a few differences. First, compared to a state space size of NK
in Lemma 5.2.2, the current state space is of size n|A|dK . This is because
we have n × |A| number of Pi,a’s, and each span over d
K values. Second, we
have a new value of mk (as opposed to Equation 5.5). The new value of mk is
computed accounting for the following differences:
• compared to a requirement of an ǫ
T
-approx model for πo in Lemma 5.2.2,
here we need to learn an ǫ
nT
-approx model for each Pi,a. The reason is
that since the state space is composed of n independent factors, an error
of ǫ
nT
in the estimation of transition for each factor, leads to a total error
of ǫ
T
in the estimation of transition for the entire state;
• more so we need to learn an ǫ
nT
-approx model of each Pi,a with an error
probability of at most δ
n|A| . This means we have learnt the entire factored
transition function with an error probability of at most δ;
• finally, in case of MLeM(S) each model specifies a distribution over |A|
actions. Thats why the term |A| in the numerator of the log term in
Equation 5.5. Here, each model P̂i,a specifies a distribution over d items;










This brings us to our main theoretical result concerning Lse-Rmax(S),
stated next.
Lemma 7.1.1. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, with a high probability of
at least 1 − 4δ, Lse-Rmax(S) achieves an actual return ≥ U∗ − 5ǫ for the
















, n, dK, |A| and T .
That concludes our discussion of Lse-Rmax(S), our algorithm for solv-
ing the sequential structure learning problem for FMDPs. Next we present the
full blown Lse-Rmax algorithm that uses the MLeM algorithm from Chap-
ter 5 to solve the general structure learning problem.
7.2 General Structure Learning in FMDPs
In the general version of the problem, the ordering of the factors for
each Pi,a is arbitrary (based on the best possible guess) and not by relevance.
In other words, there might be irrelevant factors preceding the relevant factors
in each ordering. Since the technical specification of Lse-Rmax is very similar
to that of MLeM, we do not present the former in detail. We refer the reader
to Section 5.3 (the discussion on MLeM) for a complete account of how to
solve the general structure learning problem. Our goal in this section is to tie
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the knot between our current approach and the one presented in Section 5.3
to derive similar style sample complexity bounds.
Lse-Rmax treats each Pi,a in the same fashion as MLeM treats a
Markovian agent whose feature space comprises any K features from a set F.
So it maintains n × |A| number of MLeM instances, one pertaining to each
Pi,a. On any planning iteration, the Find-Model component of each MLeM
instance returns a specific model for its corresponding Pi,a based on which
the action selection module must operate. The only exception is during the
exploratory planning iteration.
For the action selection part, just like MLeM, Lse-Rmax interleaves
between executing greedy planning iterations and exploratory planning iter-
ations. The Rmax policy computation for every greedy planning iteration
happens as follows. Let P̂i,a be the model chosen by the Find-Model com-
ponent of the MLeM instance associated with Pi,a. Then for any state action
pair (s, a), if there exists an (i, a) pair such that P̂i,a(s) =⊥, it means that Lse-
Rmax has no way of estimating Pi,a(s) based on P̂i,a. To facilitate exploration
to such state action pairs, Lse-Rmax gives them the imaginary exploratory
bonus. For all other state action pairs, Lse-Rmax performs the conventional
Bellman backup.
On a similar note, the Rmax policy computation for every exploratory
planning iteration happens as follows. Lse-Rmax chooses a k randomly from 0
to n. For all (s, a) pairs that contain a k factor value bk in s for which action a
has not been taken m′k times, give them the imaginary exploratory bonus. For
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every other (s, a) pair, use the model for Pi,a predicted by its corresponding
Find-Model which is the best predictive model for the corresponding Pi,a
based on the data samples seen so far, to perform the Bellman back up.
Then through a sample complexity analysis very similar to that of
Lemma 5.3.2, we appear at the sample complexity bound for Lse-Rmax.
The key differences are as follows.
First, compared to a state space size of N2K in Lemma 5.3.2, the current





|A|d2K . This is because our exploration condition
from Lemma 5.3.1 requires that for each individual Pi,a, every 2K-dimensional






number of 2K-dimensional factor values.
Second, we have a new value for m′k (as opposed to Equation 5.6). The
new value of m′k is computed accounting for the following differences:
• compared to a value N ′k for the maximum size of the feature space from
any k-dimensional feature vector in Lemma 5.3.2, the current value of
the same is dk;
• as observed earlier, compared to a requirement of an ǫ
T
-approx model for
πo in Lemma 5.2.2, here we need to learn an
ǫ
nT
-approx model for each
Pi,a. More so we need to learn an
ǫ
nT
-approx model of each Pi,a with an
error probability of at most δ
n|A| . Also in case of MLeM, each model
specifies a distribution over |A| actions. Here, each model P̂i,a specifies
a distribution over d items;
174









This brings us to our main theoretical result concerning Lse-Rmax,
stated next.
Lemma 7.2.1. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, with a high probability of at
least 1 − 4δ, Lse-Rmax achieves an actual return ≥ U∗ − 5ǫ for the general



















, nK, dK, |A| and T .
In comparison the closest competitor of Lse-Rmax from the literature,
Met-Rmax requires as input the in-degree K of the transition function’s DBN





combinations of DBN rep-
resentations originating from the possible K choices of parent factors for each
factor and tries to learn each of them to a reasonable approximation. After
learning them, it uses an elimination mechanism to find the best amongst all
of these possible DBN representations for each factor. The sample complexity















Note the sample complexity bound of Met-Rmax is better than that
of Lse-Rmax primarily because it can leverage from prior knowledge of the
175
in-degree K. We conjecture that the sample complexity bound proven for Lse-
Rmax is very competitive, if not the best for cases where prior knowledge of
K is unavailable. We leave it as an open problem for the readers to improve
the bound. However even though Lse-Rmax has a weaker sample complexity
bound than Met-Rmax, it seems to work nearly as well as the latter in
practice. In the following section, we present empirical results from a couple
of benchmark domains demonstrating Lse-Rmax’s competitiveness.
7.3 Results
In this section we test Lse-Rmax ’s empirical performance in two pop-
ular domains compared to its closest competitor Met-Rmax. Theoretically in
the context of Lse-Rmax , we need to set the value of m′k using Equation 7.2.
Note that these estimates for m′k proven theoretically are extremely conserva-
tive, and for most practical scenarios, much lower values should suffice. In our
experiments we set a fixed m for each k by doing a parameter search over a
coarse grid, and choosing the best value. Also we run Lse-Rmax without any
exploratory planning iteration. The explorations from the greedy planning
iterations were enough to determine the structure of the transition function.
For, Met-Rmax we set K to the in-degree. The m values chosen for
the benchmarks are from the results reported in [30]. Additionally for Lse-
Rmax we use δ = 0.2, needed for the computation of the σk’s. All of our
results have been averaged over 50 runs.
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7.3.1 Stock Trading domain
Our first domain of interest is the Stock Trading domain introduced
in [4]. The domain simulates a stock market composed of a set of economy
sectors, each associated with a set of stocks. The size of the domain is defined
by the number of sectors (e) and the number of stocks per sector (o). The
domain consists of two types of binary variables: e sector ownership variables
representing whether or not the agent owns a sector, and e×o stock variables,
representing whether each of the individual stocks is rising or falling. The
probability that any given stock will be rising at time t+1 is determined by a
combination of the values of all stocks in its sector at time t, according to the
formula
Pr(stock rising) = 0.1 + 0.8 ×
number of stocks in sector rising at time t
number of stocks in sector
(7.3)
The agent gets a reward of +1 for each stock that is rising in a sector
that it owns, and −1 for each stock that is not rising. For stocks in sectors
that the agent does not own, the reward is 0 regardless of whether they are
rising or dropping. The maximum possible reward in a time step is thus e× o,
which occurs when the agent owns all sectors and all stocks are rising. The
agent’s actions are to buy/sell sectors or simply do nothing. Our results are
for a domain where e = 3 and o = 2. For such a setting there are A = 4
actions and 36 factors in the factored transition function.
Our results are for Lse-Rmax using m = 20. Figure 7.2 shows the
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cumulative reward plot of both Lse-Rmax and Met-Rmax. Clearly the
cumulative reward obtained by both the algorithms are fairly close. In fact
the difference is statistically insignificant by a T-test. Figure 7.3 shows the
accuracy with which Lse-Rmax performs model selection. The Y-axis gives
the fraction of factors for which Lse-Rmax has identified the correct parent
factors (correct model) until that time step. Note, that even at time step
1, Lse-Rmax has correctly figured out almost 1/3 of the structure of the
transition function. This is because the 3 e sector ownership factors have no
parent factors and by default Lse-Rmax starts by assuming that each factor is
independent of any parent factors. Lse-Rmax figures out the correct structure
for almost 60 % of the factors within 2300 time steps, and consistently follows
the optimal policy from there onwards. Prior to that Lse-Rmax still accrues a
high cumulative reward because it plans based on decent sub-optimal models.
7.3.2 System Administrator domain
Our second domain of interest is the System Administrator domain
introduced in [36]. We use the bidirectional ring topology instance of the
problem with 8 machines. The state is represented by 8 binary factors, rep-
resenting whether or not each of the machines is running. The probability
that a machine is running at time t + 1 depends on whether itself and its two
neighbors are running at time t, so the in-degree of the DBN representation


























Figure 7.2: Cumulative reward plot in Stock Trading.
or do nothing. If machine i is down at time t and reboot(i) is executed, it
will be running at time t + 1 with probability 1. If the machine and both its
neighbors are running, there is a 0.05 probability that it will fail at the next
time step. Each neighbor that is failing at time t increases the probability of
failure at time t + 1 by 0.3. For example, if machine i is running but both
neighbors are down, there is a 0.65 chance that machine i will be down at the
next time step. Each machine that is running at time t accrues a reward of
+1, and if the action taken is reboot there is a penalty of -1.
Here we assume that it is known beforehand that the state of a machine
depends on its own state, the action taken, and the states of its K closest


































Figure 7.3: Model selection of Lse-Rmax in Stock Trading.
of the sequential structure learning problem for FMDPs and hence we choose to
use Lse-Rmax(S) instead of Lse-Rmax. We also assume that every machine
has the same transition structure. Our results are for Lse-Rmax(S) with
m = 30. Not surprisingly the cumulative reward accrued by Lse-Rmax(S) is
significantly better than that of Met-Rmax (see Figure 7.4). The difference is
statistically insignificant by a T-test (p-value < 0.05). Lse-Rmax(S) betters
Met-Rmax because it makes a more informed structural assumption of the
factored transition function than the latter. In this case LSE-Rmax(S) figures






















Figure 7.4: Cumulative reward plot in System Administrator.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we showed how our approach to modeling Markovian
agents (MLeM, Chapter 5) can be used to solve a challenging problem in
RL, namely structure learning in factored MDPs. The current state-of-the-art
approaches to the problem require as input the in-degree (K) of the transition
function’s DBN structure. In this chapter, we were interested in scenarios
where prior knowledge of K is unavailable, and K is hard to guess. In this
regard we proposed the first structure learning algorithm for ergodic FMDPs,
called Learn Structure and Exploit with Rmax (Lse-Rmax), that leverages
from our findings in implementing MLeM, to efficiently solve the structure



























Figure 7.5: Model selection of Lse-Rmax(S) in System Administrator.
stead we make a different assumption that is analogous to Assumption 1 from
Chapters 4 and 5. Since the sample complexity analysis for Lse-Rmax is
fairly similar to that of MLeM, our main goal in this chapter was to tie the
knot between the sample complexity analysis of the two approaches and de-
rive similar style bounds as in Chapter 5. We argued that our bounds are
competitive and compare well with that of Met-Rmax. We also presented
empirical results from two popular benchmark domains demonstrating Lse-
Rmax’s competitiveness.
That concludes all the technical contributions of this thesis. We now





The purpose of this chapter is to situate our research in the literature
of Multiagent Learning (MAL). We believe that the algorithms proposed in
this thesis, namely CMLeS and Joma, extend the frontier of MAL research
by a significant margin by achieving a new set of objectives that have not
been achieved by any other MAL algorithm to date. Though in this chapter
we cite many representative MAL algorithms that are similar in nature to
CMLeS and Joma, we go in depth for only those which are characteristically
the closest. In each of these cases wherever applicable, we point out in what
ways CMLeS and/or Joma is different than these algorithms, in the process
further underlining the importance of CMLeS and Joma in the context of
MAL research.
While learning in repeated games has been addressed in the field of
Game Theory [56, 33] for over a few decades now, the problem received its
attention in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community fairly recently, spanning
mostly over the past two decades. The field has since then been called the
Multiagent Learning field because of its obvious parallels with the single agent
learning field, primarily known as Reinforcement Learning (RL) research [70].
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However there is a significant difference between the two problem settings
that renders a straightforward extension of RL techniques to solve the MAL
problem non-trivial.
Foremost amongst them is understanding what constitutes a good learn-
ing goal for the different learning agents in a MAL setting. Unlike the single
agent setting, where in most scenarios the underlying setting is a MDP and
the objective of the learner is to converge to the optimal policy of the MDP, in
a MAL setting the underlying setting is a non-stationary one for which there
exists no clear cut optimal policy which the learners can strive to achieve. In
such cases, it is very important to define a learning goal for each independent
learner which they must strive to achieve as an objective.
Incidentally, it is on this issue that various MAL researchers have dis-
agreed over the years with each having their own preferred criteria that they
expect a MAL learner to satisfy. Table 8.1 gives a brief overview of the differ-
ent scenarios that have been considered in the literature of learning in matrix
games. The row and the column indices represent the different agent pop-
ulations modeled, and some of the different learning criteria that have been
proposed in MAL to date, respectively. The entries are representative MAL
algorithms that satisfy a particular criterion while interacting with a particu-
lar agent population. To the best of our knowledge, the agent populations we
have as the row indices are the only ones for which there exist formal learning
guarantees. On a similar note, the column indices represent the most popular
set of learning criteria proposed.
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Table 8.1 situates CMLeS and Joma in the context of MAL research.
As is obvious from the table, both CMLeS and Joma satisfy a wide set of
learning criteria while interacting with different agent populations. CMLeS is
the first to achieve convergence, targeted optimality against memory-bounded
agents and safety against any other set of agents. CMLeS’s guarantee of
achieving targeted optimality when every other agent in the population is
memory-bounded is also matched by Pcm(A) (denoted as Pcm in Table 8.1),
however CMLeS achieves so in a much more sample efficient manner than the
latter. On the other hand, Joma is the only MAL algorithm that maximizes
SW while interacting with a population comprising Markovian agents. Note,
Joma also maximizes SW while dealing with a population comprising memory-
bounded agents, and again does so in a much more sample efficient manner
than Pcm(A).
We dedicate the rest of this chapter to laying down the different criteria
that have been proposed for the MAL learners to satisfy, in the process sum-
marizing key representative algorithms that adhere to each of these criteria.
While there is a huge body of literature on MAL where the underlying setting
is more complex than a matrix game (such as stochastic games and sequential
games [56]), we mostly focus on the literature on learning in matrix games
(Sections 8.1 to 8.5): the chosen setting for this thesis. However in the process
we often cite related research pertaining to learning in other complex settings
wherever applicable.
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8.1 Safety, Consistency and Universal Consistency
Before the MAL problem got attention within the AI community, some
of its key challenges were addressed numerous times in Game Theory under
the name of Bayes Envelope, dating back to the work of Hannan [37]. In the
field of Game Theory, to the best of our knowledge, Fudenberg and Levine [32]
were the first to put forth a set of criteria for learning in repeated games. For
two player repeated games, their work required the learner to satisfy the fol-
lowing two requirements:- (1) safety: the learning algorithm must guarantee
at least the security value of the game; (2) consistency : the learning algo-
rithm must guarantee that it does as well as the best response to the empirical
distribution of play when interacting against an agent whose policy is station-
ary. As a follow up they introduced the requirement of universal consistency
which requires a learning algorithm to perform at least as well as the best
response to the historical frequency of play, regardless of the type of policy of
the other agent. Note universal consistency means satisfying both safety and
consistency, but not vice versa.
They showed that a simple modification of the Fictitious Play algo-
rithm [17] called Cautious Fictitious Play [32], can actually satisfy the crite-
rion of universal consistency. Fictitious Play is a learning algorithm that plays
best response based on the historical frequency of actions played by the other
agent. Fictitious Play by itself is consistent but not safe. Cautious Fictitious
Play builds upon Fictitious Play by choosing each action on a time step with
a probability that is an exponential function of that action’s expected payoff
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measured against the historical frequency of the other agent’s play. What Fu-
denberg and Levine show in [32] is that for any policy of the other agent there
always exists a value T > 0 such that when executed for a period of time > T
time steps, Cautious Fictitious Play provably achieves universal consistency.
8.2 Rationality and Convergence
To the best of our knowledge in the AI community, Bowling and Veloso [14]
were the first to put forth a set of criteria for evaluating MAL algorithms for
repeated matrix games, which was stricter that the ones proposed until then
in Game Theory (such as safety, consistency and universal consistency). In
matrix games with two players and two actions per player, their proposed
algorithm Wolf-Iga [13] satisfies the following criteria:
• Rationality: converges to playing best response against stationary, or
memoryless, agents. Note rationality is equivalent to the criterion of
consistency introduced by Fudenberg and Levine;
• Convergence: converges to playing a Nash equilibrium (NE) joint-policy
in self-play;
Wolf-Iga is an improvement over the more general Iga algorithm previously
proposed by Singh and Kearns [63], which has very similar guarantees, only
failing to converge to NE in one specific scenario of self-play [13].
Wolf-Iga is based on a very simple principle, called the Win or Learn
Fast principle (or the Wolf principle): “learn quickly while losing, slowly
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while winning”. Each independent Wolf-Iga learner maintains two learning
rates, δi and δj with δi > δj. On each time step Wolf-Iga performs gradient
ascent on the current policy where the learning rate for performing the gradient
ascent depends on the notion of whether the learner is “losing” or “winning”.
Wolf-Iga considers itself losing when the expected payoff from following the
current policy is less than that from following its own share of a pre-chosen NE
joint-policy. On the other hand it considers itself winning when the reverse
is true. In situations where it is losing, it uses the bigger learning rate δi to
perform the gradient ascent update. In situations it is winning, it uses the
smaller learning rate δj. What Bowling and Veloso show in [13] is that if
gradient ascent on the current policy is performed in the manner as described
above, then Wolf-Iga indeed achieves convergence and rationality.
Subsequent approaches extended the rationality and convergence crite-
ria to arbitrary (multi-player, multi-action) repeated games [7, 27]. Amongst
them, Awesome [27] achieves convergence and rationality in arbitrary re-
peated games without requiring the agents to observe each others’ mixed pol-
icy on every time step, while the algorithm by Bannerjee and Peng [7] requires
the agents to do so.
Awesome is very similar in nature to CMLeS. In fact the module of
CMLeS that achieves convergence is inspired from that of Awesome. Akin to
CMLeS, Awesome assumes access to a NE solver which computes a NE joint-
policy for all the agents. The Awesome learners then attempt to converge
to this NE joint-policy by following its own share of the NE joint-policy in
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repeated phases. Each phase lasts for a duration that monotonically increases
with the number of that phase. At the end of each such NE coordination phase,
Awesome checks whether any agent has deviated from following its share of
the NE joint-policy by a significant margin. If not, then it starts the next NE
coordination phase, otherwise it follows a predefined policy that ensures that
if the other agents are indeed stationary, then Awesome converges to playing
best response against them. However again in the process if there is evidence
that the other agents are non-stationary, then Awesome switches back to
following the NE coordination phase. Due to this repeated switching between
the NE coordination phase and the aforementioned fixed policy, Awesome
provably converges to a NE joint-policy in self-play, or converges to following
the best response when the other agents in the population are stationary.
We consider CMLeS to be a significant improvement over both Wolf-
Iga and Awesome as it provides a wider set of guarantees than both. Unlike
Wolf-Iga but like Awesome, CMLeS is designed for arbitrary games. Un-
like both Wolf-Iga and Awesome, CMLeS models a significantly more
complex class of agent policies, namely memory-bounded policies, rather than
complete stationary polices. Finally CMLeS also ensures that against a set of
agents which are neither self nor the target set of memory-bounded agents, it
still ensures a return that is close to the security value, i.e., achieves safety. Nei-
ther Wolf-Iga nor Awesome provide any guarantee when the other agent(s)
are neither self nor stationary.
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8.3 Rationality and No Regret
There has also been significant research on developing MAL algorithms
that converge to a NE joint-policy in self-play (achieves convergence) and
achieve bounded or no regret against other agents [12, 7, 9] while learning in
repeated matrix games. The regret reg(aj, si) of a learning agent i for playing
a sequence of actions si instead of a playing a fixed action aj always given

















−i are the actions played by i and the other agents at time t respec-
tively. Then the regret of a learning algorithm over a time period T is defined
as max
aj∈A
reg(aj, si). We say a learning algorithm achieves no regret when its
regret approaches zero as time approaches infinity, when pitted against any
agent(s). Note the criterion of achieving no regret is equivalent to the criterion
of universal consistency introduced by Fudenberg and Levine.
The most popular amongst algorithms that achieve convergence and no
regret is Giga-Wolf [12] that achieves at most no regret against all other
agents and converges to a NE joint-policy in two player two action games.
Just like Wolf-Iga builds upon the gradient ascent algorithm Iga, Giga-
Wolf bases itself upon the gradient ascent algorithm Giga proposed by Mar-
tin Zinkevich [77]. Giga too is inspired from Iga and achieves zero-regret.
Giga-Wolf improves upon Giga to additionally satisfy the property of con-
vergence.
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Giga-Wolf is a gradient based learning algorithm that internally
keeps track of two different gradient updated policies, xt and zt . The al-
gorithm chooses actions according to the policy xt , but updates both xt and
zt on each time step. The update rules consist of three steps. Step 1 updates
xt according to Giga’s standard gradient update rule and stores the result as
xt+1. Step 2 updates zt in the same manner, but with a smaller step size. Step
3 makes a final adjustment on xt+1 by moving it towards zt+1. The magni-
tude of this adjustment is limited by the change in zt that occurred in Step
2. We refer the reader to [12] for a detailed account on how these updates are
made. What Bowling show in [12] is that if gradient ascent on the current pol-
icy is performed in the manner as described above, then Giga-Wolf indeed
achieves convergence and no-regret in two player, two action repeated games.
There is a no clear cut way of comparing Giga-Wolf with CMLeS (or
Joma). Both have their individual theoretical properties which are appealing
in their own right . As part of our ongoing research we are trying to incorporate
no-reget as a replacement of the safety property for CMLeS and Joma.
8.4 Guarded Optimality with focus on Targeted Opti-
mality
Most of the algorithms cited in this chapter until now do not generalize
well to bigger games and/or more sophisticated agents. For example all of the
algorithms from the gradient ascent family (such as Wolf-Iga, Iga, Giga-
Wolf, etc) are mostly tailored for two agent repeated matrix games with two
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actions per player. Awesome though generalizes to arbitrary games, but akin
to Wolf-Iga and Iga can only deal with stationary agents. Noticing this
limitation in the current MAL algorithms for repeated matrix games, more
recently Powers and Shoham [59] proposed a new set of evaluation criteria
with the hope that algorithms adhering to these new criteria would generalize
well to bigger games and against more sophisticated agents. Their criterion
called guarded optimality requires the learning algorithm to choose a target set
of agent behaviors a priori and while interacting in a population comprised of
self, agents from this predefined target set, and other arbitrary agents (agents
outside the target set) satisfy the following two objectives:
1. achieve close to the SW maximizing joint-return by exploiting the agents
from the target set maximally;
2. individually never achieve a return below the security value;
In the special case of two player repeated games, achieving guarded
optimality means satisfying the following three objectives:
1. achieve close to SW maximizing joint-return in self-play;
2. when the other agent is drawn from the target set, the learning algorithm
should achieve close to the optimal return by exploiting the other agent
maximally. This property is popularly known as targeted optimality ;
3. individually never achieve a return below the security value;
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To that end Powers and Shoham propose two algorithms, namely Pcm(S)
and Pcm(A), that achieves guarded optimality against stationary agents (mem-
oryless agents) and the broader class of memory-bounded agents respectively.
Pcm(A) is an extension of Manipulator [58], a more specific algorithm tailored
for 2 player games. Our focus on SW maximization as the target solution con-
cept for the Joma agents is motivated from the concept of guarded optimality.
Both Pcm(S) and Pcm(A) are fairly similar in design. We briefly
present the algorithmic structure of Pcm(S). Pcm(A) is similar to Pcm(S)
except it applies the same learning methodology to learning in the presence
of memory-bounded agents. Pcm(S) strategizes as follows. To begin with,
it follows a “Signal” subroutine for a designated number of time steps. After
that it can provably classify all stationary agents into one group and all the
Pcm(S) agents into another group. The remaining agents are therefore arbi-
trary agents which are neither Pcm(S) nor stationary. If the set of arbitrary
agents is empty and there is only one Pcm(S) agent in the population, then
the corresponding Pcm(S) agent switches to playing best response against
the identified stationary agents (whose policies have already been learnt from
observations in the “Signal” phase). If not, then the Pcm(S) agents switch
to following a “Coordinate” subroutine that solves a complex optimization
problem which ensures that all the Pcm(S) agents achieve the SW maximiz-
ing joint-return by exploiting the detected stationary agents maximally, while
ensuring that they never achieve a return below their security value. Each
Pcm(S) agent then keeps playing its own share of this joint-policy forever.
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Of all the algorithms presented in this thesis, Joma is the closest in
nature to Pcm(S) and Pcm(A). Joma can be seen as an improvement over
either of these MAL algorithms in the following ways. First, Joma deals with
a far more complex class of agent behavior (Markovian agents) in compari-
son to Pcm(S) and Pcm(A). Second, even while modeling memory-bounded
agents, Joma successfully models memory-bounded agents with a big memory
size as long as their policies are based on informative features that transition
in a Markovian fashion on every time step, and Joma’s feature set includes
those features. In contrast, Pcm(A) only models memory-bounded agents of
memory size K based on the most recent K joint-actions from history. Since
the space of K joint-actions grows exponentially in K, Pcm(A) is restricted
to modeling memory-bounded agents having a small K. Third, Joma’s sam-
ple complexity properties are much more well defined than that of Pcm(A)
and Pcm(S). In case of Pcm(A) and Pcm(S), the sample complexity bounds
are very much dependent on how the internal subroutines (such as “Signal”
and ‘Coordinate”) are implemented. In fact the sample complexity analyses
provided for Pcm(S) and Pcm(A) in [59] are mostly existential in nature.
In contrast the sample complexity bounds proven for Joma are concrete and
thorough.
8.5 Focusing solely on guarantees in self-play
Most of the initial research in MAL focuses solely on guarantees in
self-play. The assumption is that all agents would follow the proposed MAL
194
algorithm and converge to an initially agreed upon solution concept, such
as convergence to a NE joint-policy or maximization of SW. We devote this
section to citing some of them.
One of the very popular MAL algorithms in this area is Nash-Q pro-
posed by Hu and Wellman [41]. Nash-Q extends the popular single agent RL
algorithm Q-learning [74] to a non-cooperative multiagent context, using the
framework of general-sum stochastic games. A general-sum stochastic game
is a more complex setting than a repeated game. In a general-sum stochastic
game, each agent’s reward depends on the joint-action of all the agents and
the current state, and state transitions obey the Markov property. In other
words, each state is a matrix game played by the agents in the system, and
transitions between different states following a joint-action is analogous to the
transitions in a MDP. A general-sum stochastic game with just one state where
all transitions lead back to the same state is a repeated game. Nash-Q main-
tains Q-functions over joint-actions, and performs updates on them assuming
that every agent would exhibit a NE behavior. In order to do so it also main-
tains Q-functions for other agents (models). The learning protocol provably
converges to a NE joint-policy given certain restrictions on the stage games
(defined by Q-values) hold. Since a repeated game is a special instance of a
general-sum stochastic game, Nash-Q can also be seen as a MAL algorithm
for a repeated game.
On a similar line of research focusing on extending Q-learning to a
non-cooperative multiagent context, Littman proposed an algorithm Friend-
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or-Foe Q learning (FFQ) [50] that always converges to a NE joint-policy in self-
play. The differences from Nash-Q is that FFQ does not need to maintain Q
estimates for the other agents and guarantees convergence to a NE joint-policy
in self-play. FFQ can be seen as an extension of the Minimax-Q algorithm [49]
also proposed by Littman which focuses solely on two player zero sum games.
Most of the algorithms cited until now in this section use Q-learning
as the underlying learning algorithm and use the traditional Value Function
based updates on the Q estimates for each agent. On a related note, there
is a significant volume of research in MAL that uses Q-learning as the base
learning algorithm and does updates based on evolutionary methods, such as
the model based on replicator dynamics [44, 72, 7]. A popular representative
of such algorithms is the Frequency Adjusted Q-learning algorithm, or FAQ-
learning [44], which uses a variation of Q-learning that complies with the
prediction of an evolutionary model based on replicator dynamics. Though
there is no theoretical guarantee of convergence for FAQ-learning, it has been
empirically shown to converge to a NE in certain two player two action general
sum games.
There has also been some research where the focus has been on con-
vergence to a correlated equilibrium (CE) in self-play rather than a Nash
equilibrium [31, 38]. The concept of CE introduced by Aumann [6] can be
described as follows: assume on each time step each agent receives a private
signal which does not affect the payoffs. The agent then chooses its current
step action in the game depending on this signal. A CE of the original game
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is just a Nash equilibrium of the game with the signals. If the signals are
independent across the agents, CE is then just a Nash equilibrium in mixed or
pure strategies of the original game. But if the signals are correlated, then it
is significantly different than a NE. A good representative of such algorithms
is the adaptive procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell [38]. The adap-
tive procedure is based on the following simple principle. On each time step,
continue playing the same action as in the previous time step, or switch to
another action with a probability that is proportional to how much higher the
cumulative payoff would have been had the agent always made that change in
the past. What Hart and Mas-Colell show in [38] is that this simple adaptive
procedure generates trajectories of play that almost surely converge to the set
of CE (it may not always converge to a unique CE and may oscillate between
multiple CE’s).
There has also been a significant volume of MAL research that focuses
on SW maximization as the target solution concept, rather than convergence to
a NE joint-policy. This solution concept though seems more natural for team
games or fully cooperative games [56], appears fairly reasonable for general sum
games. For example Arieli and Babichenko proposed a learning algorithm for
two player games called “Average Testing” [5] that provably achieves close to
the social welfare maximizing joint-return by only observing its own payoffs
from each step of play. Note, the assumption in this case is much weaker than
what we have made in this thesis. In this thesis we assume that the matrix
game is completely known to all the agents and each agent observes the entire
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joint-action on each time step. “Average Testing” uses a simple adaptive
procedure where each agent sticks to its current step policy if it yields a payoff
that exceeds its average payoff by at least some fixed ǫ > 0; otherwise chooses
a policy at random. The trick is when to decide to stick and when to choose
randomly.
Works that strive for both SW maximization and convergence to a
NE joint-policy are rare. Primarily because it is hard to achieve both in
arbitrary games. The most popular amongst them is the algorithm proposed
by Littman and Stone that achieves a SW maximizing joint-return in two
player repeated games while following a NE action selection strategy [51].
The algorithm is inspired from the ELE algorithm proposed by Brafman and
Tennenholtz [16]. The algorithm itself constitutes a policy, and the joint-
policy comprising both the agents following the algorithm is a NE joint-policy.
The algorithm employs a punishment procedure where any defecting agent
(that switches from following the algorithm) is adequately punished (reduced
to achieving a payoff at most its security value) so that it becomes irrational
for any agent to ever defect. Munoz and Littman later extended the approach
to achieve the same in repeated stochastic games [54].
However as suggested earlier, maximizing SW primarily makes sense
when the setting is that of a cooperative matrix game, i,e., all agents get the
same payoff for each joint-action. Hence most research on cooperative MAL
primarily focuses on achieving this solution concept. Some of the early work
on cooperative MAL focuses on joint-action learners, or JALs [26, 22], which
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are an extension of Q-learning to cooperative MAL settings. Q-learning in
the traditional sense ignores the existence of other agents. Although there
has been some research that shows Q-learning can perform well in certain
cooperative multiagent settings [62], such results are few and mostly rely on
the domain at hand. JALs in contrast, learn the value of each joint-action via
integration of RL with equilibrium (or coordination) learning methods. Each
Q update for a particular joint-action is similar to that of Q-learning treating
a joint-action as a simple action. However for action selection, a JAL learner
needs to know what actions the other agents are going to select so that it can
coordinate its own action with theirs. For that it maintains beliefs about the
models of the other agents, and uses it to coordinate. Subsequent research
has extended JAL to arbitrary two player general sum games (such as the
work by Bannerjee and Sen [10]) and to more complex team games which are
represented in the form of graphical games (such as the works by Guestrin
et.al. [35] and Kok and Vlassis [48]).
A problem related to cooperative MAL, is the “Ad-hoc teamwork prob-
lem” introduced by Stone et. al. [66]. In this field of research, the goal is to
create successful team members, as opposed to successful full teams (because
we may not have control over creating the full team). A strong team member
must be able to coordinate with its cohorts irrespective of whether the com-
monality of their algorithms, or behaviors, is substantial or limited. Though
the main objective of the ‘Ad-hoc teamwork problem” is to look beyond the
canonical settings provided by game theory and focus on real world problems,
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there has been some interesting research that looks at it from the standpoint of
learning in a repeated matrix game [67, 2]. In both of these cases, the research
has solely focused on how to lead a memory-bounded best response teammate
while interacting in a repeated game.
Most of the algorithms cited in this section have their neat theoretical
properties catering to their own individual agenda. It is unfair to compare
their merits and demerits with the MAL algorithms proposed in this thesis.
Though in this thesis we decided to look beyond self-play and focus on mod-
eling other adaptive agents, we still relied on certain restrictive assumptions
like the underlying framework is that of a matrix game which is completely
known beforehand and the actions of all agents on every time step is observ-
able. In this regard, it is important to note that much of the research cited in
this section make far weaker assumptions. For example the algorithm by Hart
and Mas-Colell that converges to a CE in self-play only relies on observing
its own payoff on each time step. Similarly Nash-Q, FFQ and Minimax-Q are
tailored for general sum stochastic games, a setting more complex than that
of a matrix game.
Finally, though our research mostly studies the MAL problem from a
theoretical perspective, there has been some research that studies the MAL
problem from an empirical standpoint [3, 11]. The main objective of these
works is to empirically study the performance of the different MAL algorithms
when pitted against each other and to test their relative strengths and weak-
nesses in different matrix games. In this regard, this thesis introduce CMLeS
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and Joma as new candidates for study in this way and also provides some
initial results to this effect.
There has also been research on opponent modeling where the goal is
to propose learning algorithms tailored to exploit specific MAL algorithms.
For example Chang and Kaelbling proposed an algorithm [23] that can “fool”
Wolf-Phc [14], a variant of Wolf-Iga. Similar observations were noted
in [18]. More recently Munoz and Jennings proposed an approach [28] that can
exploit Fictitious Play in two player matrix games. Also it is worth noting that
there has also been a significant volume of recent work on opponent modeling
in different game theoretic settings, apart from repeated matrix games and
stochastic games. Most notable amongst them are the works on opponent
modeling in Poker, an extensive form game [64, 34]. There has also been some
research addressing opponent modeling in games which have emerged from
popular competitions, such as the Lemonade Stand game [71] and the games
from the Trading Agent competitions [57]. However most of these works are
empirical and tailored to the specific domain of interest. As part of our ongoing
research, we are seeking avenues for making both CMLeS and Joma more
practically applicable so that they can be applied to solving some of these real
world problems.
Having situated CMLeS and Joma in the literature of MAL algo-
rithms, in the next chapter we present some concluding remarks about our
research goals and what we tried to accomplish in this thesis. In the process,
we once again summarize all the contributions of this thesis and wrap up by
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citing some short and long term possibilities of future research.
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Safety Rationality Convergence Maximize SW/ Guarded Universal
Targeted optimality optimality consistency
self-play Wolf-Iga, × Wolf-Iga, Pcm, Pcm, Giga-Wolf





stationary Wolf-Iga, Wolf-Iga, × Wolf-Iga, Wolf-Iga, Giga-Wolf
Giga-Wolf, Giga-Wolf, Giga-Wolf, Giga-Wolf,
Awesome, Awesome, Awesome, Awesome,
Pcm, Pcm, Pcm, Pcm,
CMLeS, CMLeS, CMLeS, CMLeS,
JOMA JOMA JOMA JOMA
memory-bounded Pcm, × × Pcm, Pcm, Giga-Wolf
CMLeS, CMLeS, CMLeS,
JOMA JOMA JOMA
self, Pcm, × × × Pcm Giga-Wolf
stationary CMLeS,
and arbitrary JOMA,
self and Pcm, × × Pcm, Pcm, Giga-Wolf
mem-bounded CMLeS, JOMA JOMA
JOMA
self, Pcm, × × × Pcm Giga-Wolf
mem-bounded, CMLeS,
and arbitrary JOMA
self and Pcm, × × JOMA JOMA Giga-Wolf
Markovian CMLeS,
JOMA
self, Pcm, × × × Giga-Wolf
Markovian, CMLeS,
and arbitrary JOMA
arbitrary Pcm, × × × Pcm Giga-Wolf
CMLeS,
JOMA
Table 8.1: Multiagent Learning scenarios. The row and the column indices
represent the different agent populations modeled, and some of the different
learning criteria that have been proposed in MAL to date, respectively. The
entries are representative MAL algorithms that satisfy a particular criterion
while interacting with a particular agent population. A × entry means that the
particular criterion does not apply to the corresponding agent population. A
blank entry means there exists no algorithm satisfying that particular criterion
for the corresponding agent population.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
One longstanding goal of AI is the creation of robust autonomous agents
that can be deployed in the real world for extended periods of time, without
human supervision. Two important capabilities in service of this goal are
learning and interaction. Learning is necessary because agent developers can-
not be expected to predict the characteristics of all possible environments that
the agent might come across in the future. Rather, when situated in a new
environment, an autonomous agent must be able to explore the effects of its
actions in order to figure out the best possible behavior for its current environ-
ment. This challenging problem is well-studied in the area of Reinforcement
Learning (RL).
Learning is hard enough when there is only one agent affecting the
environment. However, in a world with long-lived fully autonomous agents,
these agents may act in the same environment, in which case they will often
interact. The area of multiagent systems studies such groups of autonomous
interacting entities sharing a common environment. When some or all of these
entities are learning, especially about each other, we arrive at the area of
Multiagent Learning (or MAL for short).
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MAL is often studied in the stylized settings provided by repeated ma-
trix games (normal form games) such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and
Rock-Paper-Scissors. Repeated games of this type provide the simplest setting
that encapsulates many of the key challenges posed by MAL. Specifically, they
abstract away the conventional notion of state (situatedness) and allow one to
focus purely on the impact of the agents’ actions on each other’s outcomes, or
utilities.
The goal of this thesis was to develop MAL algorithms that learn to
perform better with time against agents which are adaptive. To that end we
particularly extend focus to a class of agent behavior that can be modeled
as being Markovian. We define a Markovian agent to be one that chooses
its actions as a (fixed) function of a set of discrete feature variables computed
from the joint history of play, which transition in a Markovian fashion on every
time step. As illustrated later in Chapter 2, memory-bounded agents (agents
whose strategy is a function of some historical window of past actions by all
the agents [58, 59]) are a special class of Markovian agents whose feature space
is the set of joint actions from a bounded history of play.
This thesis takes a significant step forward in the theory of MAL as
it introduces novel algorithms for modeling a comparatively more complex
class of agent behavior than has been modeled to date. Furthermore for all of
our main algorithms, we provide sample complexity bounds (total number of
actions taken to converge to the final desired behavior).
We begin by summarizing the key contributions of this thesis.
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9.1 Summary of the contributions
In brief the key contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. The first contribution concerns modeling memory-bounded agents. In
this regard we formally frame the problem as learning in an Adversary
Induced Markov Decision Processes (or AIM for short, see Definition 17
from Chapter 2): a general framework for modeling Markovian agents.
As part of this contribution, we propose a couple of algorithms that
utilize the AIM framework to model memory-bounded agents, assuming
their memory size is known. We also present empirical evidence of the
effectiveness of these algorithms by pitting them against certain repre-
sentative algorithms from the MAL and game theory literature.
2. Our second contribution builds on our first contribution, and proposes
a novel MAL algorithm called Convergence with Model Learning and
Safety (or CMLeS [20] for short) that in a multi-player multi-action
(arbitrary) repeated matrix game, is the first to achieve the following
three goals:
• Convergence: converges to following a Nash Equilibrium joint pol-
icy profile in self-play (when all other agents are also CMLeS
agents);
• Targeted Optimality against memory-bounded agents: converges to
achieving close to the best response with a high certainty, against a
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set of memory-bounded agents whose memory size is upper bounded
by a known value Kmax;
• Safety: achieves at least the security value against every other set
of agents;
CMLeS is the first of the two major MAL algorithms proposed in this
thesis, the second one is stated as our next contribution.
3. Our third contribution, introduces another novel MAL algorithm called
Joint Optimization against Markovian Agents (or Joma for short), that
achieves the following two goals:
• Maximizes social welfare in the presence of Markovian agents: in
the presence of Markovian agents in the population, Joma provably
achieve a joint return very close to the social welfare maximizing
joint return (for the Joma agents), with a high certainty. Joma
assumes prior knowledge of a set of possible features, called the
target set of features, some of which are assumed to characterize
the unknown policy of the Markovian agent. Joma achieves its
objective of modeling the Markovian agents with the most concise
model (based on only the relevant features from the target set) via
efficient exploration and in the process remains sample efficient.
• Safety: achieves at least the security value against every other set
of agents;
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Along with a thorough theoretical analysis of Joma’s properties, we also
present some empirical results from the gamut test-bed demonstrating
its relative effectiveness compared to some of its peers from the MAL
literature.
4. Our fourth contribution focuses on a special case scenario of a two player
repeated game against a Markovian agent. Here we propose a simpli-
fied algorithm, motivated from our findings while implementing Joma,
that efficiently models and exploits a Markovian agent in a two player
repeated game. Again we assume prior knowledge of a set of possible fea-
tures (target set of features) some of which are assumed to characterize
the unknown policy of the Markovian agent.
As part of our empirical analysis for this contribution, we focus on two
domains. The first is a challenging new domain called “The Surveillance
Game”. The game is derived from the multi-robot patrol problem, a
well-studied problem in the robotics community, e.g. [1, 53]. The sec-
ond focuses on “The Ticket Checking problem” introduced in [42]. The
problem is inspired by a real life problem of catching passengers who do
not buy a ticket while traveling on trains. In both of these domains,
to the best of our knowledge, our research takes the first step towards
deploying learning agents to solve the problem.
5. The fifth and final contribution of this thesis shows how our approach
of modeling Markovian agents generalizes to solving a broader class of
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problems pertaining to the single agent RL setting, called structure learn-
ing in factored state MDPs (FMDP) [4, 30]. Structure learning is the
problem of learning the unknown structures in the underlying transition
function of the FMDP from as few samples of online data as possible.
Leveraging from our approach of modeling Markovian agents, we pro-
pose an alternative mechanism of solving the structure learning problem
that results in sample complexity bounds which compare well with those
provided by existing approaches. We also show empirically that our ap-
proach competes well with the current state-of-the-art structure learning
algorithm in certain representative benchmark domains.
That concludes our discussion on all the contributions of this thesis.
Next we highlight some avenues for future research.
9.2 Future Work
We break the segment on future work into two parts. The first part
focuses on some near term research possibilities, while the latter on some long
term research possibilities.
9.2.1 Near term research possibilities
We present three near term possibilities of future research.
1. The first near term research possibility focuses on looking at avenues that
may further tighten our sample complexity bounds. Though we believe
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that our sample complexity analyses is thorough and the bounds appear
to be reasonably tight, it would still be interesting to see whether they
can be further tightened. Especially, it would be interesting to check
whether a bandit style model selection technique improves our sample
complexity bound.
2. An important assumption in this work is that the Joma agents will al-
ways jointly explore to discover the unknown policy of the Markovian
agents. Since the current algorithmic framework for Joma does not pun-
ish any agent for not following its prescribed strategy, a self interested
agent may be motivated to unilaterally deviate from playing Joma in
search of a higher return for itself. The second near term research possi-
bility focuses on improving Joma to have a Nash equilibrium exploration
policy where no agent has a unilateral incentive to deviate.
3. The third and final near term research possibility involves further empir-
ical testing of our proposed algorithms in suitable domains that are of
practical relevance. For example, it might be worthwhile to check how
our results on “The Ticket Checking problem” extend to solve the real
world problem of catching “evaders”. In other words, how Tomma and
Tomma(S) perform in a real world scenario of catching evaders. In this
case, we rely on training and testing Tomma (and/or Tomma(S)) on
real life data that might be available on request from the Los Angles
Metro Rail system authorities.
210
Next we elaborate on some of the long term research possibilities.
9.2.2 Long term research possibilities
Here we present three long term possibilities of future research.
1. For both CMLeS and Joma, our default fall back guarantee is safety.
That is if there are arbitrary agents (agents which are not memory-
bounded in case of CMLeS, or Markovian in case of Joma) in the
population, then each of these algorithms ensure an actual return very
close to the security value, with a high certainty. The first long term
research possibility focuses on replacing the safety property with the no-
regret property (achieve universal consistency). That is in the presence of
arbitrary agents in the population, we require our learning algorithm to
achieve no-regret. If such is not achievable, then it would be worthwhile
to prove this negative result as an impossibility result.
2. The second long term research possibility focuses on pushing the frontier
of agents which can be modeled beyond the Markovian class. It would
be particularly worthwhile to discover new classes of agent policies that
change over time (non-stationary) and can be modeled. Once we have
identified such agent policies, it would interesting to see how Joma can
be extended/modified to include these policies under its umbrella (the
umbrella of agent policies that Joma can successfully model).
3. The final long term research possibility focuses on proposing a practical
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variant of Joma that can be applied to solve a real life complex problem.
For example creating a Trading Agent Ad Auction (TAC-AA) [43] agent
which follows the algorithmic outline of Joma. We believe this is the
most ambitious of all of the research possibilities that we have stated
so far. Nonetheless, it is a very interesting and worthwhile direction of
future research.
With that we conclude this thesis. The main goal of this thesis was
to develop MAL algorithms that learn to perform better with time against
agents which are adaptive. To that end we particularly extend focus to a
class of agent behavior that can be modeled as being Markovian. We believe
that the algorithms proposed in this thesis, namely CMLeS and Joma (and
their key components such as MLeM and others), extend the frontier of MAL
research by a significant margin by achieving a new set of goals that have not
been achieved by any other MAL algorithm to date. Furthermore for all of our
main algorithms, we provide sample complexity bounds wherever applicable.
We believe this thesis takes a significant step forward in the theory of MAL
as it introduces novel algorithms for modeling a comparatively more complex





A.1 Computation of σk
For each k, the goal is to select a value for σk s.t. Equation. 4.3 in
Chapter 4 is satisfied. To repeat, σk’s are computed such that the following
condition is satisfied:




where δ is a very small constant probability and ∆k 6= −1.
In the computation of ∆k, Find-Model chooses a specific bk, a bk+1 ∈
Aug(bk) and an action j for which the models Mk and Mk+1 differ maxi-
mally on that particular time step. Let Mk(bk, j) be the probability value as-
signed to action j by Mk(bk). Without loss of generality, assume Mk(bk, j) ≥
Mk+1(bk+1, j). Then ∆k < σk implies satisfying Mk(bk, j)−Mk+1(bk+1, j) <
σk. For k ≥ K, we can then rewrite the above inequality as,
Mk(bk, j) − E(Mk(bk, j)) + (E(Mk+1(bk+1, j)) − Mk+1(bk+1, j)) < σk (A.1)
Equation A.1 follows from the reasoning that ∀k ≥ K, E(Mk(bk, j)) = E(Mk+1(bk+1, j)).
One way to satisfy Inequality A.1 is by ensuring that,
Mk(bk, j) − E(Mk(bk, j)) < σ1
E(Mk+1(bk+1, j)) − Mk+1(bk+1, j) < σ2 (A.2)
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and subsequently setting σk = σ1 + σ2.
Now, since we are unsure which pair of bk and bk+1, or action may get
selected, we need to ensure that the inequalities presented in A.2 are satisfied
for all possible choices of bk, bk+1’s and actions. Thus we need to ensure that
the following inequalities are satisfied:








If the above inequalities are satisfied, then by union bound, we know
that that for any pair of bk and bk+1, and an action j, both the inequalities
presented in A.2 are satisfied with an error probability of at most δ
n+1
. By
















Then by subsequently assigning σk = σ1 + σ2, we have our desired




A slightly tighter bound for σk can be achieved if we assume that all
mk’s are fixed and equal to m (as in our empirical evaluation). If all mk’s are
equal to m, then both the estimates Mk(bk, j) and Mk+1(bk+1, j) are based
on m samples. Then from Hoeffding bound, it follows that:




By bounding 2exp(−mσ2k) by
δ









There are Nk+1|A| possible ways ∆k can be computed. Bounding the
total error from all such computations using union bound, we get Pr(∆k <




A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1.1
In this section we present the proof for Lemma 4.1.1 from Chapter 4.
Observation 1: Let at any planning iteration, the probability with
which Find-Model selects a model of size < K be p. If all sub-optimal
models of size < K are rejected, then it selects π̂K with probability at least 1−
(n−K) δ
n+1
(from Equation 4.3 main draft and using union bound). Therefore,
the probability with which it selects a model ≤ K is at least p + (1 − p)(1 −
(n − K) δ
n+1
) ≥ 1 − δ. So models with size > K are only selected with a low
probability of at most δ. This is exactly in line with our first goal: we want a
model that is at most of size K with a high probability of 1 − δ.
Observation 2: If Find-Model selects π̂K as π̂best, then we have the
best model. If it selects a model of size k < K, then we have a model which






σk′ , over all bK’s
that have been visited mK times. This follows directly from the definition of
∆k (Equation 4.2 main draft), and Line 5 of the Find-Model algorithm. The
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latter ensures that the following is true: ∆k < σk, ∆k+1 < σk+1, . . . , ∆K−1 <
σK−1.
Observation 3: Furthermore, from Hoeffding bound, it follows that





)) times, then MK(bK) is a ψ-approx of
πo(bK) with a probability of failure at most
δ
NK
. Revisit Equation 4.1 (main
draft) for a re-cap on how π̂K is related to MK .
Observation 4: Combining the above three observations and applying






with probability at least 1 − (1 + 1
NK
)δ, π̂best is of size at most k ≤ K and
π̂best(bK) is an (
∑
k≤k′<K
σk′ + ψ)-approx of πo(bK).
Thus all we need to do is choose mK such that
∑
k≤k′<K
σk′ +ψ is bounded
by ǫ
T
and ensure that every bK gets visited mK times. It can be shown that






explains why that is true.
Suppose we choose mk for any k as follows:
mk =












times, then π̂K(bK) is an
ǫ
(2n+1)T












Assume the worst case that Find-Model returns a model of size 0










































So we have shown that once a bK is visited mK times, then π̂best(bK)
is an ǫ
T




The rest of the proof follows from summing up the error from all feasible bK’s
using union bound. Then if follows that once all bK’s are visited mK times,




πo with an error probability of at most 2δ.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1.2
In this section we present the proof for Lemma 4.1.2 from Chapter 4.
The analysis is an extension of that of Rmax with some differences to account
for the learning of an opponent model. We present the proof in steps.
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1. The inputs to MLeS are Kmax, δ, ǫ and T . Recall that the (ǫ, T ) pair
taken as input satisfies Assumption 1. Given an (ǫ, T ) pair as input, we
need to learn an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo.
The number of entries denoted as L1 that needs to be explored is as
follows:
L1 = NKmK (A.7)
This follows from observing that the size of the relevant state space is





















2. The Implicit Explore and Exploit Lemma of Rmax states that the policy
followed by Rmax will either exploit and attain an expected return that
is within ǫ of the optimal return for the learned approximate MDP,
or will explore with probability at least ǫ in the true MDP (Lemma 6
of [4]). Now we are going to assume the worst case scenario that the
explorations to different entries (from Lemma 4.1.1) only happen in the
exploratory iterations and when MLeS chooses K as the random value
from [0, n]. For the case of MLeS this implies that eventually at
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some exploratory iteration, MLeS must choose K as the random
value from [0, Kmax] and also achieve a T -step expected return that is
within ǫ of the optimal return for the approximate MDP. This is because
there are finite number of entries to explore (L1 in this case) and hence
by the Implicit Explore and Exploit Lemma, Rmax must exploit at some
point.
However what we are really concerned about is the return in the true
MDP, not in the approximate MDP induced by the learned model. Note,
every probability value estimated by our model is ǫ
T
close to the correct
value, with a probability of failure at most 2δ (from Lemma 4.1.1). In
other words our model is an ǫ
T
-approx model of πo with a failure prob-
ability of at most 2δ. Then it follows that the return achieved in the
true MDP can never be below 2ǫ of the optimal return U∗ over those T
steps, with a probability of failure at most 2δ (from the Approximation
Lemma of RMax). This follows from the reasoning that if Rmax is ex-
ploiting then it must be confining itself to “known” state action pairs
(state action pairs for which it believes it has a near accurate model).
From Lemma 4.1.1 it is true that the predictions made by π̂best for these
“known” state action pairs are near accurate with an error of at most ǫ
T
.
Now this is where Assumption 1 comes handy. Since, the expected return
in the true MDP is at least U∗− 2ǫ, then from Assumption 1, the model
π̂best based on which we are planning must be sufficient enough to yield
the optimal policy. Otherwise such a high expected return would not
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have been possible. Note no sub-optimal policy could have achieved
that high an expected return over T steps. Hence from then onwards in
every greedy iteration MLeS always follows the optimal policy.
3. For simplification of analysis, assume that the above mentioned ex-
ploratory iteration occurs only after all the entries are visited the suf-
ficient number of times and each such entry is only explored in an ex-
ploratory iteration where MLeS chooses K as the random value from
[0, Kmax]. Then the expected number of time steps elapsed before this
iteration occurs is,
L2 = L1 × (Kmax + 1)(φ + 1) ×
1
ǫ
× T , where φ = ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉
The reasoning behind is as follows:
i. each such iteration in expectation occurs once in every (Kmax +1)(φ+
1) iterations (since the exploratory iteration happens once every φ + 1
iterations and on each such exploratory iteration a value from [0, Kmax]
is only picked with probability 1
Kmax+1
;
ii. the exploration probability of visiting a new slot in each such itera-
tion is at least ǫ; and
iii. each iteration lasts for at most T time steps.

















Then from Hoeffding bound, it can be shown that the actual number of
time steps taken for all the above explorations to succeed is,
L3 = O(L2 × log(
1
δ




with a probability of failure at most δ.
4. Once the above has been achieved, from then onwards in every greedy
iteration the return is at least U∗ − 2ǫ, with a probability of failure





) iterations, the expected return over every φ + 1
iterations is at least:
φ
φ + 1




≥ U∗ − 3ǫ, substituting φ = ⌈1−3ǫ
ǫ
⌉
5. Now, in the worst case the expected return over all of the first L3 time
steps may be 0. This is because the objective of MLeS in these time
steps is to learn the opponent model to a decent approximation and that
often leads to a poor expected return. Thus, the number of time steps
needed in total to compensate for the above loss and ensure an expected
return of at least U∗ − 4ǫ is at most,




























6. Finally, what we have shown is that MLeS achieves an expected return
≥ U∗ − 4ǫ, with a high probability of at least 1 − 3δ, in L4 time steps.
However our aim is to derive a learning time bound for the actual return.
Then, by Hoeffding bound, the actual return of MLeS is ≥ U∗−5ǫ, with








number of time steps.














This concludes the derivation.
A.4 Achieving safety when Assumption 1 does not hold
The notion of safety from Fudenberg and Levine [32] requires the learner
i to ensure that there always exists a T > 0 such that the expected return
accrued by i remains ≥ SVi − ǫ provably for any T
′ ≥ T . However for our
extended version of MLeS that runs in restarts, we show that only at the
beginning of any restart, MLeS achieves an actual return ≥ SVi − ǫ with a
high certainty. What if the actual return falls below SVi − ǫ in every run
following a restart? Then we have not achieved safety. In this section we show
that provably after a certain number of restarts this never happens.
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)) time steps. (A.11)
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In the presence of arbitrary agents in the population (agents who are
not Kmax memory-bounded), MLeS converges to modeling them based on
some K ≤ Kmax. Note, once it switches to a bigger value of K, it cannot go
back to a smaller value. Hence in the worst case, MLeS converges to modeling
them based on a memory size Kmax. Thus from then onwards each run i lasts








) substituting K = Kmax in Eqn. A.12.
= Õ(213i) by getting rid of all the constant terms. (A.13)









213j − 213(x+1) = 2
13x(x+1)
2 − 213(x+1) (A.14)
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Our goal is to show that there exists a value of x such that g(x) is
monotonically increasing from that value onwards. Note if that is true, then
we know that there exists a value of i, say i′, such that from i′ and onwards,
the difference in the number of time steps elapsed until restart i′ + 1 and the
length of run i′ + 1 is an increasing function. If that holds, then we must
eventually reach a point when we have compensated enough in the preceding
runs to ensure that the return never falls below SVi − ǫ after the current run,
even if the current run yields no return. Hence the rest of the proof focuses










which is clearly positive for x > 2. Hence by the rule of increasing




B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3.1
In this section we present the proof for Lemma 5.3.1 from chapter 5.
Trivially, if 2K ≥ n, then all n-dimensional feature vector values need
to be visited m′n times. Henceforth, we focus on the more interesting case of
2K < n.
Since Find-Model-General incrementally checks for all feature com-
binations that best describe πo, at some point it must check whether the correct
feature set (F ) is the best one. This is when all the sequences checked before it
have failed to return a model. It then generates all feature sequences that start








= 2n−K−1 ≤ 2n of them. Observe
that if each of the feasible values of the feature set F is visited mK times, then
for every such sequence, the π̂ returned in Line 10 of Find-Model-General
is the same and an ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high probability of at least 1− 2
nδ
(from Lemma 5.2.1 and taking union bound over all such sequences). Thus the
π̂best returned by Find-Model-General is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo with a high
probability of at least 1 − 2nδ.
However, what if Find-Model-General returns another model, say
π̂F ′ , based on feature set F
′ before it has a chance to test F? Then at some
226
point it must have executed Line 10 on the sequence that starts with the
features from F ′ followed by the ones from F . Observe that the size of this
sequence is at most 2K (recall |F | = K). Assume the worst case that the
size is 2K. Then through a similar reasoning as presented in the previous
paragraph, if all the values of the 2K-dimensional feature vector comprised of
features from F ∪F ′ are visited the number of times specified by Lemma 5.2.1,
then π̂F ′ has to be an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high probability of at least 1−2
nδ.
Since we are unsure which F ′ Find-Model-General may return, as a safe
bet we need to ensure that all the feasible values of any 2K-dimensional feature
vector (originating from combinations of 2K features from F) are visited the
number of times specified by Lemma 5.2.1, s.t. π̂best is an
ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with
a high probability of at least 1 − 2nδ.
However our goal is to get an ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high probability
of at least 1 − δ. This is achieved by ensuring that all the values of any 2K-
dimensional feature vector is visited m′2K times, where m
′
2K is much bigger than
mK . We arrive at the value for m
′
2K by reassigning δ ← δ/2
n in Equation 5.5
and observing that the size of the state space is now the maximum size of
the state space from any 2K-dimensional feature vector (N ′2K , not NK). The















Then what follows is once all the feasible values of any 2K-dimensional
feature vector are visited m′2K times, the π̂best returned by Find-Model-
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General is an ǫ
T
-approx of πo, with a high probability of at least 1 − δ.
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Appendix C
C.1 Computation of σk for Equation 6.2
For each k, the goal is to select a value for σk s.t. Equation. 6.2 in
Chapter 6 is satisfied. To repeat, σk’s are computed such that the following
condition is satisfied:
Pr(∆k ≥ σk) ≤ δ if E(∆k) = 0
where δ is a very small constant probability. Our derivation of σk in Equa-
tion A.4 is very similar to the one presented here with just one difference:
there we needed an error probability bound of δ
n+1
instead of δ. Hence the
derivation follows in the same line of reasoning as that of the derivation of σk
in Equation A.4, with the only obvious difference of replacing δ
n+1
by δ. Hence
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